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The evolution of the EU’s Eastern Partnership initiative and especially the adoption of the 
Association Agreements by Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia have evoked Russia’s increasing 
concern regarding the incremental “EU-ization” of the post-Soviet regional order. Moscow has 
adjusted its own policy toward the respective states accordingly. In the context of the 2014 Crimean 
issue, a number of empirically-oriented research which explore Russian foreign policy instruments 
towards its Near Abroad countries has grown. Even the concepts of ‘soft power’ and ‘smart power’ 
are often used by experts to portray the recent transformations in Russia’s foreign policy. However, 
the employment of such concepts risks neglecting the fundamental and complex asymmetric 
interdependence between Russia and the post-Soviet republics.  
This study puts forward an alternative theoretical framework underpinned by the concepts of 
‘leverage’ and ‘linkage’, as developed by Levitsky & Way, that allows the accounting for this 
interdependence in a systematic manner. The thesis develops the linkage-leverage nexus approach, 
which enables a comprehensive analysis of Russian foreign policy instruments toward post-Soviet 
states in a regional environment determined by security threats, stateness issues, turbulence in 
domestic politics, energy, and trade-related problems. The respective analytical approach is 
subsequently applied to the case study of Russian-Moldovan relations. In order to demonstrate the 
validity of this approach the author employs a method of process-tracing that examines vast 
empirical data, including various documents, numerous official statements, expert opinions and 
media accounts, and eventually unfolds the causal mechanism of linkage-leverage nexus. 
The result of analysis supports the main argument of the thesis asserting that the increasing 
instrumentalization of the existing linkage between Russia and the countries in its Near Abroad may 
lead to undermining sovereignty and territorial integrity of individual states, such as Moldova. The 
presented conceptualization of external influence on domestic decision-making process with regard 
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Russia has always defined its Near Abroad as a zone of special interest, designing the 
regional institutions correspondingly. Since 2009, these efforts have been challenged in a particular 
context of what has been perceived in Moscow as a rival initiative, namely the European Union’s 
(EU) Eastern Partnership initiative (EaP). The Russian leadership has been concerned about the 
political changes stemming from approximation of a number of these countries, including Moldova, 
to the EU. The Association Agreement (AA) with the EU (and the Deep and Comprehensive Free 
Trade Area (DCFTA) as its main component) has become a normative mechanism of such an 
approximation. Chisinau signed the document on 27 June 2014 and ratified on 2 July 2014.
1 
The 
preliminary application of the agreement is planned to begin in October 2014.
2
 In addition, 
Moldovan citizens have benefited from the visa-free regime with the EU as of April 2014. 
In Moscow, the approximation of the EaP states to the EU was interpreted as a process of 
EU-ization of the post-Soviet regional order, which needs to be countered with Russia’s more active 
policy. The country’s government has therefore decided to intensify its influence on the states in its 
Near Abroad, by adopting both additional ‘sticks’ (including political and economic pressure) and 
‘carrots’ (new incentives to cooperate with Moscow), in order to target both the elites and the 
population in these states.
3
 Since 2010, Russia’s leadership has actively developed a project 
specifically aimed to compete with EU’s power of attraction – the Eurasian Economic Union. 
Belarus’ ‘integration discount’ as a part of the accession to the Eurasian Custom Union in 2010, as 
well as Armenia’s withdrawal from its course towards the EU to the benefit of participation in the 
Eurasian project in 2013, are illustrative examples of tangible achievements of Russia’s foreign 
policy actions aimed at counterbalancing EU’s growing influence at Russia’s doorstep. 
In this connection, it has become a commonplace to argue that the aforementioned changes 
in Russian foreign policy are a reflection of the growing Russia’s ‘smart power’ policy.4 Whilst 
such an approach accounts for the changing nature of Russian foreign policy, the growing 
application of this analytical concept has neglected longstanding complex asymmetrical 
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interdependence (to use the original term of Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye)
5
 between Russia and 
the post-Soviet republics. Due to this peculiarity of relations in the post-Soviet space, a significant 
number of instruments are available for Russia, ranging from a common set of values, cultural and 
language ties, to the existence of military power instruments. Moreover, the interdependence 
between Moscow and its neighbor states, stemming from a long and common history of coexistence 
as one single political entity, makes it possible for Moscow to employ these instruments in a 
particular and efficient manner.  
To account for the dynamic changes in Russian transforming policy towards its Near Abroad 
and the application of a wide range of foreign policy instruments, the present approach builds upon 
a conceptualization of Russia’s foreign policy in a framework underpinned by the concepts of 
leverage and linkage, proposed by Levitsky and Way,
6
 which has been rarely applied to Russian 
foreign policy.
7
 This approach aims at a comprehensive analysis of Russian foreign policy 
instruments toward participants of the EaP initiative in a complex regional environment determined 
by security threats, stateness issues, turbulence in domestic politics, and energy and trade-related 
problems. Focusing on the external influence on domestic decision-making process, with regard to 
the foreign policy agenda, the thesis brings structuralist and agent-centred approaches of 
International Relations closer together. The linkage-leverage nexus analytical concept presented 
below offers a perspective, which connects the two theoretical concepts of Democratization theory, 
linkage and leverage, with empirically-oriented researches on the Russian foreign policy towards its 
Near Abroad. 
Empirical area studies of International Relations in the field of Foreign Policy Analysis 
often lack focus on specific internal and external factors that shape foreign policy. Even though this 
research does not present a detailed study of the factors that come specifically from Russian 
domestic politics, it examines structural elements and agents that construct Russian foreign policy 
towards the respective countries in a particular political context. The study seeks to find a better 
explanation of contemporary Russia’s foreign policy. 
Relevance of the term “Near Abroad” 
Indeed, “the Near Abroad” is very contested term and used in a specific manner in the 
Russian context. The objectivity of its application and pointing in this study is explained by the 
characteristics of the term itself that makes it suitable for the conceptulization of Russian 
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multipatterned influence on the policies of the post-Soviet states. First of all, it is important to 
understand that “Near Abroad” is substanitally more than just a reference to geographic area 
covering all countries that previously comprised the Soviet Union. It is not simply a static statement 
of past or historical fact of the dissolution of the USSR and the emergence of new independent 
states, as it is in the case of widely used “post-Soviet space” and rarely referred “new abroad” 
terms. The “Near Abroad” is rather a politically, socially and culturally constructed linguistic 
reflection of a new dynamic reality formed in aftermath of radical historical transformations of the 
single community of political entities and peoples. The notion encompasses intertwinement of 
political, social and cultural dimensions of the complex relationships amongst the former Soviet 
Union states that forms basis for the asymmetric interdependence between Russia and other post-
Soviet countries. I prefer writing the word combination “Near Abroad” with uppercase letters in 
order to highlight it as a ‘name’ for such interdependence used in discursive context of the post-
Soviet space, as well as to underline my own critical engagement with the concept. 
The name is often seen as having only political connotation, namely being the linguistic 
embodiment of Russian ‘neo-imperialistic’ ambitions; aspirations to restore the Soviet Union or at 
least preserve its influence in the post-Soviet states.
8
 Certainly, the term is politicized both by 
adherents and opponents to Russian policy. In this study, the term is considered as one of the 
manifestations of the Russian Federation linkage to the post-Soviet countries. As it is argued in 
more details below, linkage can be instrumentalized to serve foreign policy goals, and so, the term 
“Near Abroad” can also be instrumentalized. Furthermore, it can represent even a threat to one’s 
sovereignty; for example, if the Near Abroad is treated as a post-Soviet space with unsettled borders 
of not fully and not really independent states.
9
 
The politicization of the term “Near Abroad” is also result of geopolitical projection onto 
language. The Near Abroad is often referred as Russian sphere of influence, and such references are 
supported by relative statements of high-level Russian officials (for example, the Russian ex-
President Dmitry Medvedev’s widely quoted descriptive phrase “zone of privileged interests” of 
Russia definitively contributes to consolidation of interpretation of the Near Abroad in geopolitical 
sense). At the same time, the Russian sphere of influence today, unlike at the time of the Russian 
                                                 
8
 See, for examples, Safire, William: “On Language; The Near Abroad”, NYT, 22.05.1994, 
http://www.nytimes.com/1994/05/22/magazine/on-language-the-near-abroad.html; Erlanger, Steven: “The World; 
Learning to Fear Putin’s Gaze”, NYT, 25.02.2001, http://www.nytimes.com/2001/02/25/weekinreview/the-world-
learning-to-fear-putin-s-gaze.html; Landsbergis, Vytautas: “Concepts of ‘abroad’: near and remote neighborhood of 
Lithuania”, Geopolitika, 29.06.2007, http://www.geopolitika.lt/?artc=915; Макарычев Андрей: «Метафоры 
регионализма в международно-политическом дискурсе» [Makarychev, Andrey: “Metaphors of regionalism in 
international political discourse”], IPF, http://www.policy.hu/makarychev/rus17.htm (last access 02.09.2014). 
9
 Гусейнов Гасан: Карта нашей Родины: идеологема между словом и телом [Gusejnov, Gasan: Map of our 
motherland: Ideologema between word and body], Moscow: OGI, 2005, pp. 15-16. 
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Empire or the Soviet Union, is circumscribed only by historical past, socio-cultural proximities, and 
geographic vicinity between former ‘metropolis’ and ‘colonies’ without claims on global 
domination. This contemporary Russian regional sphere of influence is challenged by global 
expansionism of the US and pan-regional expansionism of the EU, both aimed to penetrate into 
‘traditional’ zone of Russian immediate interests. Given such geopolitical environment, the Near 
Abroad is seen by Russian politicians as a buffer zone to this Western expansion which is perceived 
as a threat to state sovereignty. 
At the conceptual and discursive level, the Western challenge to Russia’s Near Abroad has 
also acquired a specific name “Eastern Partnership”, that actually aims at undermining the notion of 
the “Near Abroad”. If we take a more neutral term “new abroad” to substitute a subjective one 
“Near Abroad”, then an analogous term for the same geographic area in Eastern Europe for the EU 
is “new neighborhood”.10 Thus, it comes as no surprise that under the European Neighborhood 
Policy, a new initiative for the Eastern European post-Soviet countries (except the Baltic States, 
which are EU members) appeared. The two notions “Near Abroad” and “Eastern Partnership”, of 
course, cannot be compared, simply because “Eastern Partnership” is a normative and institutional 
term that in its discursive context refers mostly to economic cooperation, while “Near Abroad” 
stems primarily from historical past, social interaction, and culture (economics is rather secondary 
to them). 
The last but not least point, in regard to the relevancy of the term in question, the use of “the 
Near Abroad” in academic literature on Russian foreign policy should go beyond the political 
aspects of the notion and not neglect its social and cultural dimensions. “The Near Abroad” is not so 
much an ideological term used in pro-Russian propaganda as a linguistic reflection of people’s lives 
and destinies in the post-Soviet space, which, in spite of emergence of state borders separating 
people, are still closely intertwined. Precisely, this interdependence is what is important when we 
study the intsrumentalisation of Russian linkage to create leverage on foreign policy decision-
making in the post-Soviet states. The term “Near Abroad” is an illustrative linguistic representation 
of the post-Soviet space as a geographic and socio-cultural space with a highly dense 
multidimensional linkage of Russia to the countries, with which it used to form a single political 
and economic structure. Therefore, it fits well into the analytical framework of the study presented 
below. Nevertheless, in more general terms the notion “post-Soviet space” is also used in the thesis. 
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 For an example of usage of the term “New Neighbourhood”, see Kagan, Robert: “New Europe, Old Russia”, The 
Washington Post, 06.02.2008, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2008/02/05/AR2008020502879.html; Pop, Adrian, Pascariu, Gabriela, Anglitoiu, George, Purcarus, 
Alexadru: “Romania and the Republic of Moldova – Between the European Neighbourhood Policy and the Porspect of 
EU Enlargement”, in: Pre-accession impact studies III, Study No.5, EIR, 




As already indicated above, the point of departure of this thesis is Moscow’s special role in 
the politics of the post-Soviet states, which has been formed due to an asymmetric interdependent 
relationship between Russia and countries of its Near Abroad; Russia as less dependent actor uses 
its position to influence others. The idea draws on neoliberal concept of complex interdependence 
developed by Nye and Keohane. In their conceptualization the scholars have noticed that 
asymmetry in interdependent relations provides the dominant party with power over its dependent 
counterpart.
11
 This is evident especially at the regional level of international relations, where the ties 
between states are very dense, multidimensional and leaders are clearly marked. 
This type of relationship corresponds to a significant degree of linkage that Russia possesses 
over all post-Soviet countries. The term ‘linkage’ was conceptualized by representatives of the 
Democratization theory, Steven Levitsky and Lukan Way, who defined it as “the density of a 
country’s ties to the United States, the European Union countries and Western-led multilateral 
institutions”.12 However, the concept of linkage can be applied also to powerful non-Western 
international actors: this form of interaction between states cannot be considered as a prerogative of 
the West alone.
13
 Either way, given its attention to various dimensions of interdependence, the 
concept of linkage offers a promising perspective on the study of Russian foreign policy. 
Linkage is a complex dimension of foreign policy that manifests itself in different spheres of 
inter-state relations. Levitsky and Way differentiate between six main types of linkage: economic, 
intergovernmental, social, communication, civil society and technocratic.
14
 The list presented by the 
scholars nevertheless is not exhaustive and may include other categories of linkage. For example, 
Gwendolyn Sasse adds here “aid linkage”.15 The present analysis indicates the following types of 
linkage: military (security), economic, political, social, information, and cultural. Importantly, the 
latter involves ethnical, cultural and psychological aspects of inter-national relations, such as 
collective memory, proximity of cultural values, ethnic origins, and languages. 
I argue that the dense set of links creates the basis for projection of leverage: the dependence 
(caused by linkage) can be used as a tool of influence on one’s foreign policy decision-making (that 
is leverage). Linkage is indispensable for the effective application of leverage: the denser the 
linkage in an asymmetrical models of cooperation, the stronger the leverage. To describe this 
phenomenon I use the notion of the linkage-leverage nexus, meaning that there is an important 
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reinforcing dynamic between the two; eventually, one can think of a spiral of ‘linkage’ and 
‘leverage’ impulses mutually intensifying each other. Since leverage in this case appears to be a 
derivative of linkage, it should have the same dimensions of linkage, corresponding to whether it 
makes use of security, political, economic, social, information, and cultural ties. 
This study distinguishes between the ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ types of the leverage. Yet in contrast 
to Nye’s conceptualization of ‘softness’ and ‘hardness’ of power, centred on “currencies” of power 
that intrinsically mean tools of a particular foreign policy, the thesis defines ‘softness’ and 
‘hardness’ of leverage according to effect it produces in regard to sovereignty exercised by the 
authority of the target state. I acknowledge that the question of how to measure effect of power is 
widely disputed in the field of IR studies and I do not seek to find an answer to it. Nevertheless, the 
present dualistic classification of leverage is important for understanding how the mechanism of 
linkage-leverage nexus is functioning and what objectives it pursues. Such a classification is 
necessary for Foreign Policy Analysis in order to get an idea what consequences the application of 
leverage generated from linkage is capable to cause. Thus, in the present study the classification of  
hard and soft leverage is rather a methodological tool employed for better distinction of impact the 
instrumentalisation of linkage can bring to sovereignty of individual states. 
In doing so, the thesis assumes that the state sovereignty may be directly questioned and/or 
threatened by hard leverage, even though no military means have been employed. Hard leverage 
takes place when the power position of the authorities in the respective countries is destabilized and 
their existential capacity to maintain ‘stateness’ is in question. This is a result of activation of 
linkage, which would create a favorable environment for people to support particular incentives. 
Eventually, the sovereignty of the respective states would be undermined, and centrifugal 
tendencies and separatist aspirations would be triggered, leading to a potential redefinition of the 
state organization. On the contrary, soft leverage is weak to generate an effect on state sovereignty. 
I assert that it is the balance between linkage and leverage, its ‘powerful derivative’, as well as the 
purposeful choices in application of either ‘soft’ or ‘hard’ leverage that underpin Russia’s foreign 
policy towards the Near Abroad states. 
In addition, the thesis distinguishes among potential and actual types of activity of linkage-
leverage nexus based respectively on threat and action. When threats become realised, leverage 
enters into the actual stage, and it is most effective if it is underpinned by legitimacy from the local 
populace and refers to their active support. In this case, linkage is called for creating favourable 
environment that induces local people to support incentives. Eventually, this can lead to hard 
leverage when triggers separatist aspirations within the nation. Multidimensional linkage between 
Russia and the near abroad states means that the hard leverage can undermine national sovereignty 
at vulnerable points. 
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The case and methodological orientation 
The situation in some of the post-Soviet states is exacerbated by the existence of specific 
characteristics of both Russian linkage and internal political and socio-economic situation within 
the target state. Therefore, a study of the linkage-leverage nexus requires a careful selection of 
individual cases. In this study, the linkage-leverage nexus approach is applied to the case of 
Moldova. Although all post-Soviet states (Central Asian and East European post-Soviet countries as 
well as countries of South Caucasus) share similarities determined primarily by the common Soviet 
past and the asymmetric independence to Russia, a number of circumstances contribute to the multi-
dimensional nature of the asymmetrical interdependence between Russia and Moldova. 
While following a pro-European foreign policy course, Moldova simultaneously has a 
particularly close religious and cultural proximity with Russia, and large population of ethnic 
Russians and Russian-speakers live on its territory. In addition, Moldova is economically dependent 
on Russia, including the imports of goods and energy, humanitarian aid, and labour emigration to 
large Russian cities. Moldova’s population is ethnically divided, which is represented in its political 
organization. At the same time, Russia has maintained close relations to Transdniestria, a Moldovan 
breakaway region, and Gagauzia, an autonomous region of Moldova, where the Russian language is 
dominant in all spheres of everyday life. 
In the case of Moldova, all patterns of the critical phenomenon, that is, dimensions of 
linkage are well present. Chisinau is therefore especially susceptible to Moscow’s influence within 
the state. In the recent years, Moldova has experienced a dramatic clash of external factors affecting 
its internal situation and political orientation, which has urged scholars to pay attention to this 
country. Today, Chisinau is a subject to the Russian intensive leverage generated practically from 
all dimensions of Russia’s linkage. Moreover, it is under pressure from Moscow’s hard leverage, 
i.e. its sovereignty as well as authority of the actual leadership is contested. 
The linkage-leverage nexus is viewed in the present study as a causal mechanism, the 
function of which results in ‘power-shaped’ outcome, i.e. leverage, derived from an independent 
variable presented by linkage. To identify, validate and test causal process the study employs a 
method of process tracing. In 2013, it was developed by Derek Beach and Rasmus Pedersen into a 
full-fledged and comprehensive methodology, which became the main guiding lights for the 
thesis.
16 
The method contributes to the epistemological purpose of the present research endeavour, 
namely bringing closer agent-centred and structuralist approaches to study power in asymmetrical 
relations between dominant and dependent actors of international relations. The thesis presents the 
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 Beach, Dereck & Pedersen, Rasmus Brun: Process-Tracing Methods: Foundations and Guidelines, Ann Arbor: The 
University of Michigan Press, 2013. 
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closed circuit process of sequent transformations of linkage to leverage in the form of analytical 
narratives, i.e. storytelling explaining a causal mechanism of linkage-leverage nexus. It attempts to 
observe all relevant events that create the causal chain of the linkage-leverage nexus, and primarily 
policy actions and speech acts aimed at the instrumentalization of Russian economic, security, 
political, social, information, and cultural links to Moldova into the same dimensions of leverage. In 
order to create an accessible picture of the causalities I narrate the analytical stories apart, 
describing dimensions divided into three major blocks: politico-military, economic and socio-
cultural. 
I believe that the Russian intensified ‘linkage-leverage’ policy is a response to the radical 
changes occurring in the relations with the countries of its Near Abroad. Therefore, when applying 
the process tracing method I focus on the period starting from 2009, when the EaP, perceived in 
Moscow as a rival integration project, pushed the Russian policy to active actions. However, the 
starting time-point for the study of Russian policy toward Moldova differs according to the 
analytical narratives, i.e. dimensions of linkage. It is important to consider that linkages are not 
created overnight; some ties among post-Soviet states are centuries-old. Nevertheless, I confine 
myself to trace the process starting from the period of Moldovan independence. But not every 
linkage needs to be studied since the beginning of 1990s: I will go back to this early period only if 
linkage has been accumulated for subsequent (after 2009) production of leverage (particularly, 
related to the Transdniestrian settlement). As for the end point of Russia’s actions, this paper 
considers individual manifestations of Russian leverage generated through linkage to Moldova as 
actual outcomes of the linkage-leverage nexus. 
All in all, the main research purpose of the analysis of the Russian linkage-leverage nexus 
approached with process tracing method, is to test the conceptualized causal mechanism of linkage 
and leverage nexus using the case of Russia’s foreign policy towards Moldova. The main research 
task stemmed from this purpose is to identify the actual causal process whereby the initial point X 
(linkage) is transmitted through a causal mechanism (nexus) to produce an outcome Y (leverage). In 
the course of the research the following important aspect of argumentation presented above must be 
validated: the instrumentalisation of linkage has two types of functional activity – potential and 
actual – and both of them may result in exerting direct or indirect impact on the sovereignty of the 
target state that eventually creates two forms of leverage, respectively, hard and soft. 
The structure of the work 
The first chapter presents the analytical framework, which is developed on the basis of 
concepts of ‘linkage’ and ‘leverage’, while introducing a distinction between the ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ 
leverage as well as ‘potential’ and ‘actual’activity of linkage-leverage nexus. The discussions in this 
chapter are guided by a general task to adjust the Western concepts to the ‘realities’ of Russian 
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policy in the post-Soviet space. Namely, it is aimed at constructing an analytical framework for the 
analysis of Russian foreign policy practices in the post-Soviet space that takes into consideration the 
complexity of asymmetrical interdependent relations between Russia and countries of its Near 
Abroad. The chapter involves critical discussions both on theory and analytical approaches in 
foreign policy analysis provided by traditions of Democratization theory. Eventually, the study 
presents a different understanding of the concepts that is embodied in an analytical approach, which 
can be applied in addition to Western states, and to policies of other regional powers. 
I analyze academic literature of various authors who both criticise and improve these 
concepts. While discussing the drawbacks and advantages of linkage and leverage concepts, the 
thesis finds that Democratization theory does not connect linkage and leverage with each other and, 
in fact, the two factors of the external influence are functioning separately one from another. This is 
the crucial constraint of the theory that does not allow analysing the complexity of interdependent 
relations between powerful regional actor and weak partners. The present conceptualization of 
linkage and leverage overcomes this limitation, and connects the factors within the structural 
mechanism of linkage and leverage nexus. It reveals the process of transformation of linkage into 
leverage which aims at the preservation of the existent linkage between the actors or the creation of 
a stronger one. Further conceptualization of the two factors of external influence carries on within 
the discussions regarding the prospects of the application of the linkage-leverage nexus concept to 
the analysis of Russian policy in the post-Soviet space, given the features of this policy, which 
distinguish it from the policies of the Western countries in this region. 
The second chapter provides a methodological approach for the analytical framework. To 
test the suggested conceptualization of linkage and leverage I employ process tracing as my main 
method. The research material includes various and numerous documents, official statements, 
minutes, expert reports, media accounts, and so forth. For the analysis of economic linkage and 
leverage I refer to official and expert statistics, and based on this data, I make additional 
calculations that enable to capture the patterns of economic relations between Moldova and Russia 
with better accuracy. As a supporting material and in addition to interviews from media, I 
conducted two semi-structured interviews with Moldovan experts, who presented their views on the 
developments of the relations between the states. This helps to construct the overall picture from the 
eyes of the direct observers of the process. 
The second chapter is followed by applying the analytical and methodological approaches to 
the case study of Moldova. In the analytical part of the work, I narrate ‘stories’ about Russian 
policy in Moldova, which refer to dimensions of Russia’s linkage-leverage nexus that can be 
observed through the comprehensive research on Russia-Moldova relations. Practically, the analysis 
demonstrates how an approach based on the concept of linkage-leverage nexus can capture the 
10 
 
patterns and mechanisms of the Russian-Moldovan relationship. Each analytical narrative has two 
parts that pertain to ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ effects of Russian linkage-leverage interaction. 
In the concluding chapter, I discuss the possible consequences of the contemporary Russian 
policy toward Moldova and present main developments of the conceptualization of linkage-leverage 
nexus as well as my view on importance of the concept for comparative studies in International 
Relations. Additionally, I outline a guideline for researchers who decide to apply this analytical 
framework in their academic inquiries. The conclusion brings up some problems of the developed 
concept, difficulties in applying the analytical approach, and the aspects that require further 
consideration and improvement.  
The study does not claim the presented conceptualization of linkage and leverage within the 
unified single mechanism called “nexus” to be an all-encompassing approach, neither does it argues 
that the concept of linkage-leverage nexus is the only proper one to study Russian policy in the 
post-Soviet space. This thesis, rather presents a different conceptual interpretation of linkage and 
leverage and opens up new prospects for discussions in this regard. I believe that the approach will 
find its audience among the analysts of foreign policies and can be applied to foreign policy 
analyses of other influential international relations actors, including the US and the EU. 
Nevertheless, the geographic interest of this study is Russia’s Near Abroad, which is 
currently under the process of EU-inization, which challenges Russian influence in the region and 
causes a new ‘explosion’ in the organizational structure of Moscow’s foreign policy. This study 
demonstrates how the balance between linkage and leverage, as well as the choices in application of 
either ‘soft’ or ‘hard’ leverage underpin this policy. Considering the fact that the balance within the 
linkage-leverage nexus is varying all the time and the policy has many different characteristics in 
regard to different post-Soviet republics, it is necessary to analyse the Russian policy toward the 







2. Theoretical and analytical framework 
2.1. Conceptualization of linkage-leverage nexus 
2.1.1. Linkage and leverage and their dimensions 
The expression “You will always find something you need in the last place you look” is 
used a lot by people with a lot of life experience, but in my case it was interpreted as a call to action 
“if you want to find an explanation look through theories you never thought to check”. I took this 
approach when I decided to look through ‘Westernized’ Democratization theory to understand 
Russia’s foreign policy. The decision was driven by a personal conviction in this regard – foreign 
policy cannot be discriminated by democratic and non-democratic policies. If one wishes to 
understand the sources of Western ‘democratic’ power targeted at ‘non-democratic’ states, s/he 
should look for it, first of all, in Democratization theory that is specially created to explain the 
turbulent interrelations between the ‘democratic’ West and the ‘barbarous’ Others. This theory has 
two essential categories, traditionally considered in the Western theory as two key dimensions of 
the post-cold war international environment – linkage and leverage. The categories are nothing 
more than the main international factors affecting domestic policy, and, in essence, the theory 
assumes that these factors are two features of the Western policy, which play a crucial role in 
democratizing authoritarian states. 
Linkage and leverage – the two main concepts for this study – are strongly associated with 
the prominent representatives of Democratization theory, Steven Levitsky and Lukan Way, who 
started developing the concepts in 2005 within their grand concept of competitive authoritarianism. 
They were those scholars who have conceptualized linkage and leverage as two basic factors of 
Western influence on the post-Communist ‘regimes’.17 Recently, some other representatives of 
Democratization theory took up the two concepts, both to improve their conceptualization
18
 and to 
widen their application, including to non-Western countries
19
. 
Indeed, Levitsky and Way are not pioneers in developing the concepts of leverage and 
linkage: they are just among the foremost ‘conceptualizers’ of the two factors of external influence. 
For instance, Milada Vachudova is the one who works with the concept of leverage in the context of 
the EU’s enlargement policy towards the Eastern European Countries. She distinguishes ‘passive’ 
leverage, which relies merely on virtue of existence and usual conduct of the EU and ‘active’ 
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leverage, which is based on deliberate policies of the EU toward candidate states.
20
 Intrinsically, 
these two types of leverage are similar to such widely referred in the Integration theory types of 
power, frequently attributed to the EU, as ‘power of attraction’ and ‘normative power’. 
Vachudova’s strong emphasis on the EU’s effective leverage only as conditionality power, 
neglects the important early theoretical developments on the EU influence by Geoffrey Pridham and 
Laurence Whitehead who stressed the importance of political, social and economic linkage.
21
 The 
distinction of the works of Levitsky and Way is that they are the first scholars who described the 
close interaction between linkage and leverage. However, they did not dwell on this interaction. 
Thus, the process in which leverage is actually produced from the aggregate of links between 
dominant and dependent actors of international cooperation remains unnoticed. In contrast to them, 
this study does not consider linkage only as an unintentional dimension of external influence but 
argues that it can be also purposive, i.e. links can be created and instrumentalized with certain 
intention to exert influence of directional effect in order to produce leverage and support its 
application by creating favourable environment within a target country. 
Levitsky and Way define leverage as governments’ vulnerability to external (Western) 
democratizing pressure. According to the scholars, mechanisms of leverage comprise diplomatic 
pressure, political conditionality, sanctions and military intervention, and of course, the threat of 
them. Initially the researchers argued that Western leverage is affected by both bargaining power of 
targeted authoritarian states, which is the latter’s ability to avoid punishing actions of the Western 
community, and potential economic, security, and the other impact the Western countries have on 
them.
22
 Later they reconsidered the causes that contribute to effectiveness of Western leverage and 
removed the possibility of the targeted state to “bargain” with the West, by replacing the bargaining 
with the tendency of Western powers to use their pressure. All in all, they concluded that the 
highest leverage is achieved when Western pressure is “both likely and consequential”.23 
Levitsky and Way identified also three factors that determine leverage. The first is the 
states’ size and military and economic strength – obviously, small and weak states are more 
vulnerable to external pressure than those in larger countries with substantial military and economic 
strength (such as China or Russia). The second factor is “the existence of competing issues on 
Western foreign policy agenda”. Way and Levitsky argue: “leverage may be limited… in countries 
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 Levitsky, Steven & Way, Lukan A.: “Linkage, Leverage, and the Post-Communist Divide” (2007). 
23
 Levitsky, Steven & Way, Lukan A.: Competitive authoritarianism (2010) – p. 43. 
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where Western governments have important economic or security interests at stake”,24 such as in 
Egypt, Saudi Arabia, UAE and Turkey. Thirdly, the degree of Western leverage can be affected by 
the existence of military, economic and political support that alternative (usually regional) power 
provides to incumbent governments facing Western pressure. The scholars call them “black 
knights”, and Russia which supports the loyal political regimes in the post-Soviet space thereby 
undermines the Western ‘democratizing’ impulse, is identified as one of these “black knights”.25 In 
short, leverage is quite a non-democratic tool that democratic Western countries do not disdain to 
use toward ‘unfriendly’ non-democratic states when they do not comply with Western democratic 
norms. 
Levitsky and Way define the second dimension of the post-Cold war environment, Western 
linkage, as “the density of ties (economic, political, diplomatic, social and organizational) and 
cross-border flows (of capital, goods and services, people, and information) between particular 
countries and the US, the EU, and Western-dominated multilateral institutions”.26 Linkage is a 
complex dimension of foreign policy that manifests itself in different spheres of inter-state relations. 
Levitsky and Way differentiate between six main types of linkage: economic (trade, investment, 
credit and assistance), intergovernmental (diplomatic and military ties, participation in alliances, 
treaties and international organizations), social (flows of people), communication (flows of 
information), civil society (ties to NGOs, religious and party organizations, etc.), and geographic 
proximity.
27
 In the course of their conceptualization, they acknowledged that geographic proximity 
cannot be considered as a dimension of linkage but a source of it or rather a facilitator and an 
intensifier of the linkage network. Therefore, the scholars substituted it with “technocratic linkage” 
associated with the presence of the elite educated in the West and/or having close ties with Western 
universities, NGOs and institutes.
28
 
The list presented by Levitsky and Way has been extended to include other categories of 
linkage, or provide a different classification of the existing items. For example, Gwendolyn Sasse 
distinguishes the “aid linkage” as a separate dimension of linkage that comprises economic, military 
and democracy assistance provided by Western countries.
29
 However, from my point of view, there 
is not a compelling reason for this, as assistance is a type of economic, political, military, social, 
and other dimensions of linkage, rather than an individual dimension. Nevertheless, a researcher is 
free to categorize according to the substantiated purposes of his/her study. 
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This study permits itself to use this right and considers the following types of linkage, 
comprising types of linkage identified by Levitsky and Way, Sasse and with some additional 
adjustments: 
 economic (trade, investments, membership in trade organizations, energy relations, 
credit and other forms of economic aid, ties to business elite); 
 security (military cooperation, membership in military alliances and treaties, 
presence of foreign troops, support for fighting against external and internal security 
threats); 
 political (intergovernmental and diplomatic ties, membership in political alliances 
and institutions, external governance, ties to political elites, parties, opposition); 
 social (migration, people-to-people communication, ties to NGOs and religious 
organizations, foreign education, assistance in implementing social projects, 
humanitarian aid); 
 information (flow of information, including media, academic and expert 
associations, internet-based information sources and social networks); 
 cultural (proximity of ethnicity, language, religion, common historical memory and 
similar patterns of behavior). 
According to Levitsky and Way, “linkage serves as a transmitter of international influence” 
and contributes to ‘democratization’ through: heightening the international salience of everything 
that goes ‘wrong’ in the states under “the democratizing pressure”; shaping preferences and so 
creating domestic constituencies with a stake adhering to ‘Western norms’; and reshaping the 
domestic distribution of power resources by strengthening opposition forces, which are in favour to 
the West, and weakening and isolating ‘anti-Western’ incumbents.30 However, initially it was also 
stressed that linkage increases the probability of an international response, which, as was described 
above, is an important cause for enhancing effectiveness of leverage.
31
 All this eventually raises the 
cost of ‘authoritarian regime’. 
A comparison between linkage and soft power inevitably comes to mind. The effects of 
linkage described by Levitsky and Way are very similar to what soft power does, according to 
Nye.
32
 Both linkage and soft power shape incentives and preferences inside of states. This is not 
surprising; after all, Levitsky and Way admit that their concept of linkage draws on Keohane and 
Nye’s work on “complex interdependence”, understood as “multiple channels of contacts among 
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societies”.33 Apparently, the joint work of academicians had produced a subsequent impact also on 
conceptualization of soft power advanced by Nye. 
In their first article on linkage and leverage Levitsky and Way stated: 
Unlike leverage, linkage is primarily a source of soft power. Its effects are 
diffuse, indirect, and often difficult to detect. Yet where linkage is extensive, it 
creates multiple pressure points… As a result, the democratizing pressure 
generated by linkage is often more pervasive, and more persistent, than that 




It influences a range of non-state actors, generating decentralizing forms of 
pressure that frequently operate below the radar screens of international 
observers. To significant extent, then, linkage blurs international and domestic 
politics, transforming international expectations into domestic demands.
35
 
Thus, it is safe to argue that linkage is not simply a density of ties of one state to another 
state or group of states, but a source of power itself. Unfortunately, Levitsky and Way do not dwell 
on relations between ‘soft’ power and linkage, though it would disclose the nature of the 
phenomenon. I believe that the real sources of soft power are based on linkage and not merely on 
culture, values and policies, as Nye argued.
36
 Culture, political values and policies are rather 
dimensions of linkage that eventually generates ‘soft power’. If it is assume that linkage is power 
(without discussing its questionable ‘softness’ or ‘hardness’), it is essential to know what is the 
outcome of exertion of this power, and how then a second factor of external influence, leverage, is 
produced. 
2.1.2. Spiral nexus of linkage & leverage and role of culture 
The reasoning of linkage and leverage concepts presented above implies that the two 
categories must have immediate interrelation. However, Levitsky and Way are somewhat restrained 
in their judgments on this matter. Indeed, they realize that “leverage is most effective when 
combined with extensive linkage”. The scholars note that linkage and leverage work in pair and 
their interaction have a direct proportional effect on the result of the work – the higher linkage and 
leverage the more likely that the goals of their action will be achieved. Nevertheless, Levitsky and 
Way attribute the primary role in this interplay to linkage, because leverage alone normally cannot 
bring lasting and persistent effect.
37
 The ultimate goal of this action, as the academicians defined, is 
“the democratization of authoritative states”. In essence, ‘democratization’ means regime change, 
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only with a more pleasant name. The ‘democratic face’ of regime change implies that the driver of 
change is within the target state but triggered by external influence via soft means of power that 
shape incentives and preferences of local populace.
38
 If it is assumed that linkage plays the primary 
role in this process, it means that the operation of linkage is supplemented by leverage, that is, 
linkage is backed by leverage. This argument is quite evident, so it would be more interesting to 
know the opposite – how linkage contributes to better leverage. I argue that whereas leverage helps 
linkage from outside, linkage backs leverage from inside by creating a proper domestic environment 
through shaping preferences of the masses and elites. 
Although Levitsky and Way stress that the impact of leverage varies with linkage, and “in 
the absence of linkage the effects of leverage are too limited and too inconsistent”, they avoid 
making an assumption that linkage as such is a source of leverage.
39
 Sasse, however, notes that 
“linkage can, but does not have to, turn into leverage”. But at the same time she argues that 
“leverage denotes the direction of causality, whereas linkage points to sets of relationships without 
prejudging the mechanism, significance, and direction of causality”. Thus, the scholar explains that 
linkage and leverage “function on different analytical levels: while a country’s set of linkages can 
be mapped more or less comprehensively for a certain moment in time, leverage requires an ex post 
assessment taking outcome variables into account”.40 
Therefore, we could consider linkage as a static set of ties at concrete moment. However, as 
it was discussed above, linkage is a form of power and it creates a certain effect. Therefore, linkage 
cannot be mapped simply as a set of ties; it should be considered as a form of power with its own 
mechanisms that can produce an effect and outcome. However, since this form of power creates 
favourable environment for exerting leverage, it is rather a potential than an active power. I argue 
that leverage is based on linkage, as it achieves its force specifically from the density of ties. If we 
consider, for example, economic ties, then leverage in the form of sanctions would have its best 
effect when the economy of target state or the economic situation of target social group of this state 
incurs significant losses. The significance of losses naturally depends on how dense and beneficial 
economic linkage is. The same is relevant for inducements and conditionality – the possible 
expansion of the existent economic or social contacts or establishing new ones, including getting 
direct economic assistance or political support, opens the prospects for threatening with a taking 
away these benefits. Leverage in any event leads to cutting or a threat of cutting the existent and/or 
potential links beneficial to more dependent party. 
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The linkage-leverage interplay in international relations can be described as following. The 
density of connections of one state to another forms the linkage network, which is an essential 
dimension of foreign policy by itself. Based on the dense linkage and using a wide range of ties in 
various spheres of inter-state interactions, a powerful country may create strong leverage utilizing 
another state’s dependency on the existing model of cooperation. However, it is important to recall 
that Nye together with Keohane explained that international cooperation is often asymmetrical; that 
is, states depend on each other in a varying degree. They argued that it is precisely the asymmetry in 
interdependent relations that provides for power to the dominant party.
41
 Dependence (as a result of 
asymmetric extensive linkage) can be used as a tool of influence on one’s foreign policy decision-
making (that is leverage). Thus, the direct dependence of leverage on linkage occurs: the denser the 
linkages in an asymmetrical model of cooperation, the stronger the leverage. Leverage in this case 
appears to be a derivative of linkage. The common purpose of exploiting such leverage is to draw 
the target state closer into their orbit of interests (this process is often associated with “regime 
change” or “democratization”), that is, to establish even closer ties with the dependent state. 
Therefore, we may witness a constant process: linkage creates leverage, and leverage’s main goal is 
to create even stronger linkage. In this study, this process is called the spiral nexus of linkage & 
leverage (where “nexus” refers to mutually reinforcing interaction of linkage and leverage and 
“spiral” points to the ‘ideal goal’ of causal process: linkage creates leverage that eventually creates 
denser linkage) or shortly linkage-leverage nexus. 
In addition, for the purpose of this work it is necessary to clarify dimensions of linkage and 
leverage. Being a derivative of linkage, leverage should have the same patterns, that correspond to 
whether it makes use of economic, social, political and cultural ties, as well as security links. 
Nevertheless, theoretically there is one dimension of leverage where the presence of dense linkage 
is not a necessary prerequisite for exerting pressure – military intervention. One state can unleash 
war against another state without any links to the ‘victim’ – this logic stems Middle Age, 
exaggeratedly: “I want your territory”. However, this logic does not work so well in the modern 
Westphalian and in the emerging post-modern system of international relations.
42
 Today, military 
intervention requires legitimacy from the international society or at least from an influential group 
of states that have authorized themselves to present the interests of the international society. In the 
contemporary world, obtaining legitimacy implies preliminary and parallel work with the local 
population using the density of links in order to create an image of humanitarian intervention; 
military aggression opposed by both local and international societies is doomed to fail.  
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As it was described by Levitsky and Way, as well as Sasse, only tangible links such as 
economic, migration, information, political, diplomatic ties, etc. Importantly, they ignore culture, 
which in my assumption should also be considered as a linkage dimension. If we examine it as a 
layer of deep cultural relations based on historical memory, ethnic and language proximity, identity 
and similarities in behavior between nations living in the interrelating countries. Particularly this 
dimension of linkage forms a solid fundamental linkage, which hardly can be destroyed by external 
forces of third-party actors, especially if they are historically and culturally less involved than the 
deeply ingrained relations. Although Levistky and Way note that linkage is rooted in a variety of 
historical factors such as colonialism, military occupation, and geopolitical alliances, they do not 
consider a common history as a link but rather a facilitator and intensifier, like the geographic 
proximity, of the tangible links.
43
 The scholars examine the role of history in creating links between 
countries on the global scale, but I suppose that the intra-regional level of relations between states 
can be more indicative for inter-state power relations and thus better reveal their deep layers. 
This limitation of the linkage concept is inherited by the Democratization theory as a whole. 
The goal of “the democratizing process” is global, and the West simply cannot possess deep-rooted 
cultural ties with all nations around the globe, in such a way that they seriously influence identities 
as of the target countries as well as of Western nations themselves. ‘Americanized’ theories, such as 
Democratization theory and neo-liberalism
44
 have declared the superiority of ‘Western values’ and 
do not accept questioning neither transforming it by third-party countries. On the contrary, 
‘democratization’ or ‘regime change’ implies that the target state is penetrated by values and norms 
that are new and non-traditional for this country, but at the same time, allegedly, ‘universally 
attractive’. The value-normative penetration aims at creating new patterns of behaviour of the local 
population and altering their identity, if they do not meet with ‘Western standards’. 
This study aims to integrate a dimension of linkage that involves collective memory, 
proximity of cultural values, ethnic origins, and languages, all of them contributing to common 
patterns of behavior, into further research on external influence, and refers to the respective 
dimension as cultural linkage.
45
 Cultural links can be assumed to be much more solid and less 
amenable to alternative external influence than the other dimensions of linkage. In contrast to 
economic, political, and social linkages, which often depend on factors that can be altered in the 
short- or medium-term perspective (such as country’s openness to the external influence, supported 
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by the political will of its elites and disposition of the people to accept it), cultural linkage are 
deeply rooted in human experience, historical memory, language, habits, norms of behavior, 
traditions, rituals, cultural heritage of literature and art,  and so on.
46
 
However, to channel cultural links into a particular political direction, intervening external 
powers and the related domestic agents need to resort to historical revisionism, the propaganda of a 
new ideology, norms and values, manipulation of nationalistic feelings; eventually, they would need 
to alter the public conscience and behavior. Thus, the mitigation, change and substitution of existing 
cultural links (to the benefit of an alternative cultural linkage) require a lot of time and effort. 
Moreover, the exact time period and consequences of those ‘risky games’ are hard to estimate. 
Some of the dimensions of cultural linkage, like historical memory, experience, patterns of 
behavior, as they have been transmitted from one generation to another, cannot be erased 
completely; neither is it possible to demolish ethnical and language proximity between nations. The 
efforts of the Soviet leadership to assimilate numerous peoples in the Caucasus, or Turkey’s policy 
of denying the existence of the Kurdish people on its territory, which eventually led to violent inter-
ethnic conflicts, illustrate this fact.
47
 As a result, cultural linkage can serve as a foundation, a 
facilitator, or a significant impediment to creation of the other dimensions of linkage indicated 
above. 
One of the main assumptions of this study is built upon the mechanism of interplay of 
linkage and leverage. It supposes that the main goal of an actor who possesses the power of linkage-
leverage nexus is to exploit interrelation of linkage and leverage in a way that they do not 
negatively affect each other. I assume that leverage should be used very neatly in a manner that it 
would not undermine those linkages that were not intended to be targeted. For example, if sanctions 
are imposed too widely and too extensively, they can cause serious damage to the stance of those 
individuals or social and political groups that support the intervening international actor. If the 
outcome of leverage eventually contradicts the expectations of the supporters, this can lead to the 
weakening of important links, such as social and political ties, and eventually the loss of local 
support. Needless to say, military intervention carries yet greater risks. 
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It seems that the role of linkage, when leverage is applied, would be to create supporting 
incentives of local groups and individuals, adherent to values presented by the external agent. The 
incentives usually oppose the incumbent leadership and aim to change the current foreign policy 
orientation. The stimulus of the incentives is a prospect of withdrawal of the leverage if the required 
change happened. In addition, in case of low linkage, extensive leverage can contribute even to 
maintenance of power and preservation of the policy orientation by incumbents: when the 
government does not face strong domestic opposition it can successfully build the image of the 
enemy upon the external states who put pressure on its authority and legitimacy. 
Obviously, linkage undermines leverage if it is ineffective and narrow, and therefore is not 
able to create the necessary environment for exploiting leverage. Levitsky and Way note that in low 
linkage countries external pressure is weaker and can have only short-time effect tending to be 
limited and sporadic.
48
 Moreover, it seems to be advisable for a powerful actor to keep links 
beneficial to the dependent side (individuals, social groups, and/or state) as it makes potential cut of 
links be a significant threat. 
The present study distinguishes between the two types of activity of the linkage-leverage 
nexus: based on threat (potential) and based on action (actual). Potential activity requires an 
environment that generates fear amongst the population of the target state, of losing the existing or 
planned set of beneficial links to a powerful state (for example, in case of the rejection of political 
conditions imposed by a powerful international actor). The application of sanctions, withdrawal of 
economic and political benefits, and other instances of realized downsizing cooperation, as well as 
the military intervention, represent the actual stage of linkage-leverage nexus. To be most effective, 
it requires legitimacy from the local populace and their active support. In this case, linkage is called 
for creating favourable environment that induces local people for supporting incentives. 
It is important to note that Vachudova’s discrimination between ‘passive’ and ‘active’ 
leverage
49
 did not provide much insight for my differentiation between ‘potential’ and ‘actual’ 
activity of the linkage-leverage nexus. Perhaps, passive leverage, as it is based on creating of 
possibilities of accession for a target state into the EU, may indicate a similar tendency of potential 
activity of linkage-leverage nexus, when it produces the possibility for a target state to establish a 
more beneficial links with a power-wielding state. Active leverage, if understood as conditionality 
power, may also point to the actual activity of linkage-leverage nexus developed in this study. 
However, active and passive leverage in Vachudova’s interpretation represent only one of the 
various aspects of potential and actual functional types of the linkage-leverage nexus. 
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2.2. The post-Soviet space in the context of linkage-leverage nexus 
2.2.1. Asymmetric interdependence 
Based on the discussions above, I argue that an external actor tries to utilize its existing and 
potential links to a country with a purpose to gain leverage over it, and so tie the target state closer 
to the circle of own interests. I avoid using here such words as “democratization”, “Western 
countries” and “Western norms”, as I believe that the two forms of external influence on foreign 
policy of certain state are not a prerogative of the West alone. Quite the contrary, any actor, which 
is less dependent in asymmetric structure of cooperation among international and, particularly, 
regional actors, is able to make use of linkage-leverage nexus that is always present in inter-state 
relationships. For example, Jakob Tolstrup sees “nothing particular Western” in the concepts of 
leverage and linkage and suggests making them “more general” and “more applicable to all of the 
various external actors”.50 But Tolstrup did not dwell on this issue, and, in general, the ignorance of 
this fact remains to be a significant constraint of Democratization theory. Although the Western 
theoretical conceptualization of linkage and leverage gives a clear answer to the question regarding 
the sources and mechanisms of external support for ‘pro-Western’ forces in the target country, it 
with difficulty finds an explanation of the ways in which ‘anti-Western’ receive their backing from 
outside of the state. 
According to Levitsky and Way, the “black knights” wielding countervailing power to 
Western pressure provide support for the states captured by geopolitical game in form of economic, 
military and diplomatic assistance.
51
 However, their conceptualization of linkage and leverage does 
not clearly indicate the sources of this power. The present study is an attempt to fill this gap. It 
argues that the “black knights” (I would refer to them as alternative powerful actors) have their own 
linkage and leverage, which form the countervailing power against Western influence in the target 
state, and in regard to certain states their linkage and leverage may be even more powerful than the 
Western countries actually have.
52
 The representatives of Democratization theory face difficulties in 
giving a unified definition to linkage and leverage as key dimensions of foreign policy of non-
Western international actors, and their criteria is based upon the level of adherence of an actor to 
democratic values, appears inapplicable in case of international relations in the regions neighboring  
Russia. While there could be different estimations of Russian and Western foreign policy actions, 
given to their democratic aspirations toward other countries, I think it would be more rational for 
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this study to look at exact foreign policy instruments abstracting away from a still ambiguous 
understanding of what behavior international actors consider “democratic”. 
Russia has wide and various connections with numerous countries all over the world. The 
density of Russian ties is determined by different factors and, first of all, geographic proximity, 
cultural interactions, intertwined historical past, and economic cooperation. It is clear that the region 
wherein the ties between Russia and other countries are most dense is the post-Soviet space. Based 
on the assumption that linkage produces leverage, Russian leverage should be most powerful in 
regard to the post-Soviet republics. However, after the dissolution of the USSR Western countries 
have developed their links to the post-communist states and intensified connections that existed 
before. Nevertheless, Russia has managed to preserve its high-dense linkage, and consequently 
leverage, over the former Soviet Union states, with the notable exception being the elites in the 
Baltic States who did their best in severing economic, political, and cultural links with Russia and 
the post-Soviet space by replacing them with tight linkage networks to the West. Recently, the 
advantages of Russian foreign policy have been challenged by EU-ization spreading to Russia’s 
Near Abroad. The process has been actively opposed but has not been strong enough to compete the 
Eurasian integrationist efforts. In response to the ‘westernization’ of the post-Soviet space, Russia 
has attempted to reinforce its linkages and strengthen leverage in the FSU region. Prior to the 
analysis of the mechanisms of how linkage produces leverage within the spiral nexus in Russian 
foreign policy, it is necessary to outline dimensions of Russian linkage and present the asymmetric 
interdependence that exists in the post-Soviet region and empowers Moscow’s leverage. 
Economic linkage 
Russian economic linkage to the post-Soviet republics emanates from the peculiarities of the 
economic development of the region based upon industrial production of various products, 
distributed and consumed within the then-existed model of the Soviet society. With the collapse of 
this model, numerous cooperation ties between enterprises of the former USSR and the system of 
consumption maintenance broke up. But the essence of this model still persists to a certain degree, 
for instance, many industrial enterprises of Ukraine and Belarus, such as machinery and aircraft 
construction, cannot survive without Russian supplies of raw material, technology and the Russian 
market.
53
 Similarly, Russia needs various components for its final products and traditionally 
procures them from these states, which are the most industrially and technologically advanced 
among the CIS countries, except Russia. The new independent states in the post-Soviet space are 
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unable to withstand tough competition of the world market and complete the successful 
reorientation of their exports, and therefore the Russian market is still the most important outlet for 
their goods. In addition, Russia is the main investor in the CIS countries, taking into account FDI 
coming from offshore (mostly Cyprus) companies that are controlled by Russian businesses.
54
 
Energy relations are the most considerable linkage; indeed, it is a distinguishing 
characteristic of Russian relations with post-Soviet countries, which are vitally dependent on 
Russian energy deliveries, albeit not all of them (for example, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan and 
Azerbaijan have enough energy resources both for their domestic consumption and for export which 
allows them to conduct a relatively independent foreign policy, irrespective of Moscow’s opinion). 
Moreover, the economic infrastructure of most of the post-Soviet countries, including energy 
facilities and pipelines, rail and motor roads, is in some way or another linked to Russia.  
The degree of integration within the region is an important indicator of the linkage density. 
There are several economic integration projects initiated by Russia as under the framework of CIS 
as well as on the basis of Eurasian Economic Community (EurAsEC). The most viable of them 
today is the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU) between Russia, Belarus, and Kazakhstan, which is 
planned to be joined by Armenia and Kyrgyzstan. In 2012, the Free Trade Zone of the CIS 
countries (CIS FTZ) began operating and includes Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, 
Moldova, Russia and Ukraine.
55
 This, however, clashes with overlapping offers from the EU on 
DCFTA promoted under the EaP initiative covering Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Belarus, 
Moldova, and Ukraine. Some Russian experts believe that by developing the EaP Brussels directs 
its efforts toward complete disintegration of the former Soviet space and pull the CIS countries 
away of the influence of Russia.
56
 I assume that precisely this initiative of the EU, viewed in 
Moscow as being aimed at undermining Russia’s geopolitical influence in Eastern Europe and 
strengthening its own position, has become a trigger for the intensification of Russian linkages with 
countries of the Near Abroad. 
Security linkage 
The security of the former Soviet states is still substantially dependent on Russia. This 
circumstance is inherited from the Soviet single military defence system: all the essential military 
defence components, including air defence, air forces, navy, border troops, special forces, etc., were 
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fully integrated and subordinated to the Soviet high command in Moscow. The same was the case 
with intelligence service and law enforcement agencies. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the 
new independent states (NIS) had to create their own military and security forces. Not all 
immediately succeeded in this process: some of them were in need of direct Russian security 
assistance in a form of special missions as, for example, it was in the case of Russian troops that 
guarded the Tajik-Afghani border between 1992 and 2005, and it is still the case of the Armenian-
Turkish border, guarded by Russian forces. 
In addition, the dissolution of the Soviet Union was accompanied by violent increase in 
inter-ethnic conflicts, complicated by rivalry of domestic political elites. In the newly created 
national republics ethnic minorities found their rights infringed by the state authorities. By the end 
of the 1990s, all the conflicts that occurred in the post-Soviet space were stopped or ‘frozen’ due to 
Russian mediation, peacekeeping operations, and in some cases direct military intervention. Today, 
the processes of the conflict settlement are taking place with immediate participation of Russia as a 
mediator, and the final solutions to the protracted conflicts are hardly to be achieved without taking 
Moscow’s position into consideration. 
It is important to understand that the presence of Russian military on the territory of new 
independent states must be considered not as ‘leverage’ but a specific dimension of military 
‘linkage’. The two main forms of presence of Russian troops in the post-Soviet space can be 
defined as peacekeeping forces, and military bases and facilities. The military presence may have a 
legal and legitimate basis recognized by the host country, as it is in case of the Russian 102
nd 
military base in Armenia and 201
st
 military base in Tajikistan. Another option is the stationing of 
Russian troops regardless of the reluctance of the host state. In this situation, they do not have 
legitimate and legal ground, for example, in case of Russian troops deployed in Abkhazian and 
South Ossetian breakaway regions of Georgia until 2009.
57
 
Russia is actively promoting a military-political alliance of the post-Soviet states under the 
Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO), joined by Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, 
Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. The CSTO is vertically integrated security structure built around Russia, 
and the dialogue and mutual guarantees of three security systems (the Central Asian, Southern and 
Western) are based on their individual ties to Russia without any horizontal type of interaction 
between each other.
58
 Nevertheless, the CSTO plays a crucial role in ensuring the security of the 
member-states from any external threats, including political-military aggressors (Chapter 4 of the 
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Treaty mirroring NATO’s Chapter 5), international terrorists and criminals, drug trafficking, illegal 
immigration, as well as large-scale natural disasters. The CSTO has created the Collective Rapid 
Reaction Forces and the Peacekeeping Forces. Currently, the organization is aimed at strengthening 
the integrated regional systems of air defence and air forces.
59
 
Russian military advisers consult colleagues from the post-Soviet partner-states, and the 
officers and special operation forces are trained at Russian military educational institutions and 
grounds. The post-Soviet states are armed mainly with Russian and Soviet weapons, and that 
creates their dependence on Russia, as the equipment requires constant technical service from 
Russian specialists. Moscow provides armament both on commercial basis and in form of aid.
60
 
Russian military and semi-military enterprises that are designing, producing and repairing military 
equipment, vehicles and weapons have created joint ventures with some of their partners from the 
CIS countries.
61
 In general, the military-industrial enterprises of the CIS countries need Russian 





It is hard to give an exhaustive list of Russian political ties to the FSU countries as they 
comprise numerous inter-governmental, inter-parliamentary, inter-party and inter-personal contacts. 
Moscow has strong ties with the heads of numerous post-Soviet republics, notwithstanding 
occasional diplomatic tensions with them, and in general with political, business and security elites, 
both ruling and opposition. It is important to mention, however, is the fact that the ‘Russian factor’ 
is an integral element of the political structure of the post-Soviet states as it is present practically in 
all political debates and competition between elites of the countries. Today, with an active rise of 
the ‘European factor’ in the domestic politics of the countries covered by the EaP, the division of 
their elites into pro-European and pro-Russian camps has become more evident than ever before. 
Elections in these countries are frequently accompanied with a necessity to make choice in favour 
of one or another geopolitical competitor; Russia or the West. That often translates into a choice 
between two integration formations – the EEU or the EU. Many Russian politicians and (affiliated 
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with them) experts with ideological purposes attribute the term “civilizational choice” to these two 
alternatives inevitably and constantly proposed for post-Soviet countries.
63
  
To promote a ‘civilization choice’ that would secure Russian interests Moscow is using its 
wide political linkage to pro-Russian agents that can influence decision-making process and 
contribute to mobilization of many-sided social linkage. For this purposes Russia uses political 
tricks common for the Western policy, as well, such as personal contacts between high 
representatives of its political establishment with loyal politicians, opposition leaders from the 
target state as well as meetings with local population advocating policy of the external actor. The 
aim of such an activity is to create legitimacy and attract public and media attention to the forces 
supporting external influence. Particularly, the members of the Russian State Duma and the Federal 
Council frequently pay visits to different regions of the CIS countries and make political statements 
that Russian officials sometimes do not dare to voice. 
Regional cooperation plays no less an important role in linking the local population to 
Russia. Today, there are even attempts to implement a version of the EU’s integration concept 
“Europe of Regions” in a form of “Eurasian regions” specifically aimed at breakaway regions of 
certain post-Soviet republics.
64
 Of course, the classic approaches to regional cooperation such as 
“twin cities” or the reciprocity of neighboring borderlands remain on the agenda, too. Various 
Russian regions take part in organization of joint sporting and cultural activities, including the 
organization of commemorations of historical dates and events, with other regions of post-Soviet 
countries. The inter-regional interaction implies wide economic cooperation, including trade and 
investments. Some Russian regional leaders make personal contributions towards establishing links 
with various regions across the CIS. For example, Yuriy Luzhkov, ex-mayor of Moscow, was very 
active in providing financial aid to the Crimean Autonomous Republic of Ukraine (allocated from 
Moscow’s city budget), organizing numerous pro-Russian activities in the region, and making 
provocative political statements, for which in 2008 he was declared persona non grata by the 
Ukrainian Security Service.
65
 The Head of Chechen Republic, Ramzan Kadyrov, was also active in 
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The most important aspect of social linkage that has bound all countries of the post-Soviet 
republics to Russia is migration. The visa-free regime within CIS countries reinforces cross-border 
flows of people, including tourism, personal visits, and business trips. Foreign workers enjoy the 
opportunities of the country’s large economy that favours cheap foreign labour. Russia became the 
main destination for labour migrants from the CIS countries, and thus forms the centre of the 
regional migration structure, wherein the main flows of labour migrants from CIS countries are 
concentrated.
67
 According to the World Bank calculations, Russia was ranked fourth in the world in 
2011 by the volume of remittances sent by migrant workers from the country, while money 
transfers from abroad amounted in Tajikistan to 47 % of GDP, in Kyrgyzstan to 29 %, in Moldova 
to 23 %, in Armenia to 13 %.
68
 Money sent by workers to their families helps them to make ends 
meet and develop the households. Labour migration strengthens social stability and the 
development of integration processes in CIS, as actively functioning migration networks enhance 
the countries’ interdependence.69 The migration interdependence between Russia and the CIS 
countries is unbalanced and asymmetric. Russia can easily redistribute the immigrant flows from 
one country to another, while the CIS countries have fewer options for the diversification of the 
emigration. 
Along with labour migration, there is also considerable education migration. Russia is using 
its position as a country with an advanced education system amongst CIS countries to attract their 
students to study. Students from countries, with which Russia signed respective agreements, enjoy 
status that is almost equal to the Russian students in terms of admission to universities and 
receiving social benefits. The 2012 Concept of the State Migration Policy of Russia promotes, in 
particular, educational migration with a focus on CIS countries and the intention to open new 
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channels of academic mobility.
70
 Since the Russian-educated foreigners preserve ties to Russian 
universities, NGOs, and academic societies, they are essential domestic adherents to regional 
integration with Russia. Acknowledging importance of the CIS citizens educated in Russian 
universities, Moscow is about to multiply state-funded study places for them; in this regard the 
corresponding bilateral agreements have been signed. 
In addition, Russia is actively exporting its higher education. It established branches of the 
leading Russian universities in the CIS countries.
71
 Moscow opens and supports universities with 
education programmes in the Russian language or that are focused on studying Russian language 
and culture, such as Slavic Universities. The universities of CIS countries actively cooperate and 
many of them are members of the Eurasian Universities Association.
72
 A number of universities of 
the post-Soviet republics have partnership relations with Rossotrudnichestvo, the Russian 
government agency that aims to maintain ties with Russian compatriots abroad. 
As a part of social linkage, Russia is also actively engaged in providing humanitarian aid to 
the post-Soviet countries. According to the 2013 Oxfam report, the FSU countries received 
humanitarian aid from Russia more often and in the greater volumes. The report argues that this 
testifies to “the deeper involvement and participation of Russia” in the life of its fellow former 
Soviet republics.
73
 The authors of the Oxfam report believe that “the geographical distribution of 
Russia’s aid must be viewed in the context of its long-term strategic ambitions”, which shows that 
“Russia regards former Soviet republics as its sphere of influence, and its willingness to maintain 
close ties with them explains why they receive such a large proportion of its aid.”74 
Information linkage 
The study views information linkage as a penetration of media and discourses of external 
actors in the target country. Indeed, in this regard Russia has a clear advantage in the CIS countries 
over the Western states, as Russian is a common language of international communication for many 
citizens of the CIS countries, and this considerably facilitates penetration of the discourses formed 
by Russian and pro-Russian media, experts and politicians. In addition to global Russian media 
agencies, such as Russia Today, RIA, Voice of Russia and ITAR-TASS, there are regional Russian 
and/or pro-Russian media operating in the post-Soviet countries. In Russia, there are also 
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information agencies, including internet-based portals, which are focused on the post-Soviet region 
as a whole (such as Regnum) or its particular parts (for example, Vestnik Kavkaza). 
Nicu Popescu argues that the Kremlin has created a network of loyal media, which are 
“vertically integrated in a huge ‘public relations’ machine”, also including “political technologists” 
faithful to the Kremlin.
75
 The process of Russian discourse penetration into the post-Soviet region 
involves also various think-tanks and institutes that organize conferences and seminars with experts 
of pro-Russian orientation; among them there are such organizations as Institute of CIS, headed by 
Konstantin Zatulin, ex-chairman of the Committee on CIS Affairs and Relations with Compatriots 
of the State Duma, and Russia’s Institute for Strategic Studies, a government-financed institution. 
Following the recent information developments, many Russian experts, officials and politicians 
have created their personal websites and accounts in internet-based social networks mainly in 
Facebook and Twitter, where they express their views on world politics, regional developments and 
Russian policy. In regard to international and regional politics, some of the most active and resonant 
internet posts of those from Russian political ruling elite belong to such statesmen as Dmitry 
Rogozin, Deputy Prime Minister of Russia in charge of defence industry, and Aleksei Pushkov, 
Chairman of the State Duma Committee on Foreign Affairs. Their activities on social media attract 
a great deal of attention and are widely discussed by various media companies in Russia and 
abroad. 
The Russian federal state-run TV-channels broadcast for the CIS countries (with the help of 
satellite television) and often enjoy a large local Russian-speaking audience.
76
 There are also pro-
Russian domestic channels that broadcast in both Russian and in local languages. Some Russian 
newspapers and magazines are also distributed in the CIS countries; in addition, there are local 
newspapers that support Russia-led integration projects, including media printed by pro-Russian 
movements, Russian diaspora, NGOs, and political parties backed by Moscow. Russia supports and 
organizes various events and activities aimed at enhancing the skills of local Russian-language 
young journalists. For example, in June 2013 in Penza the Forum of young Russian speaking 
journalists from the CIS countries gathered representatives of youth media and young journalists 
from Armenia, Moldova, Tajikistan, Ukraine, Belarus, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Kazakhstan, and Russia. 
The forum was supported by Russkiy Mir foundation, a government-funded organization promoting 
Russian language and culture. As announced, the purpose of the event was “to enhance the capacity 
of young Russian-speaking CIS journalists and strengthen ties among youth of CIS member states, 
                                                 
75
 Popescu, Nicu: “Russia’s Soft Power Ambitions”, CEPS Policy Brief, No. 115, October 2006. 
76
 Kudors, Andis: “ ‘Russian World’ – Russia’s Soft Power Approach to Compatriots Policy”, Russian Analytical 
Digest, 16.06.2010, Vol. 10, No. 81. 
30 
 
restore and develop the historical ties of the Commonwealth states”.77 Obviously, such an activity 
goes beyond information linkage and concerns already cultural links between Russia and post-
Soviet countries. 
Cultural linkage 
The cultural links in the post-Soviet space are deeply rooted in a common history, shared 
cultural heritage, ethnic and language proximities, a single religion, and a long experience of 
coexistence of different ethnics, languages and religions that determined the similar patterns of 
behavior of nations living together in one space. These factors maintain cognate treats of mentality 
of the post-Soviet people, and form their non-tangible linkage to Russia, with which the common 
past is associated. 
The statements of various Russian officials, experts and politicians, with reference to 
common past and shared culture between Russia and post-Soviet countries, are made to demonstrate 
that Russia is the core of the civilization called Russkiy Mir that brings together people of different 
origins, ethnics, religions and languages, who was and is involved in creation of the ‘civilization’ 
and its values. Naturally, the Russkiy Mir makes its own efforts to intensify the linkage to Russia. 
Russian compatriots and Russian-speaking population, as well as local people, attracted by and 
loyal to Russia, are treated as public bearers of these ideas and values within the area they live on. 
Therefore, Moscow is aiming to support “consolidation of organizations of compatriots to enable 
them to effectively uphold their rights in the countries of residence while preserving the cultural 
and ethnic identity of the Russian diaspora and its ties with the historical homeland”.78 Thus, it is 
supposed that the diaspora under protectorate of Moscow would play the role of a provider and 
keeper of Russian culture in the world, particularly in the post-Soviet space. In this context, 
information and social links facilitate and intensify cultural linkage. At the same time, cultural links 
form a basis for expansion of other dimensions of the Russian linkage.  
Nevertheless, Russia’s cultural linkage to post-Soviet countries is challenged by a natural 
factor, namely the generational change. With each succeeding generation the temporal depth of 
historical memory and shared experience proportionally move forward to the present and away 
from the initial point of time preserved in memory and experience of preceding generation. Reinhart 
Koselleck argues that with the significant lapse of time any great occurrence in the past “can appear 
in a completely different form, thanks to a ‘historical criticism’ capable of making allowances for 
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the polemical partiality of earlier contemporaries”.79 Therefore, Moscow puts a great deal of effort 
to enhance its information, social and cultural links, and to counteract attempts for the revision of 
history common to the post-Soviet countries. This helps to continually cultivate historical memory. 
Otherwise, it would stop transferring from one generation to another. 
Language is a very important, if not to say the main, carrier of historical memory, as it 
reflects cultural and ethnic identity of nations and determines personal thinking. It is a “unifier” that 
makes post-soviets understand each other and forms their common mentality.
80
 Therefore, Moscow 
plans to extend the network of Russian language, cultural and science centres and museums abroad, 
and to involve the large Russian diaspora to the process of expanding and strengthening the space of 
the Russian language and culture.
81
 There has been training organized for Russian language 
teachers and the supply of methodological literature in CIS countries, primarily on the basis of 
Slavic universities, language centres and schools. 
The Russian Orthodox Church became a partner of the state in this process. The Church and 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs have created a joint working group aimed at developing the 
interaction between the ‘spiritual’ and the foreign policy institutions. The canonical territory of the 
Russian Orthodox Church covers all post-Soviet republics except Armenia and Georgia, which have 
their own churches independent from, but which closely ‘cooperate’ with their Russian 
‘colleagues’. Visits from the Patriarch of Moscow and All Russia to these countries causes great 
social resonance within the local population and draws a great amount of attention from political 
elite and media. While visiting countries, the Patriarch meets with heads of states and establishes 
personal contacts with them, and so tries to bridge a gulf between orthodox societies of the post-
Soviet republics and the Moscow patriarchate.
82
 Indeed, it contributes to the spiritual consolidation 
of these countries. In addition, there are different social movements and associations advocating 
interests of the church and defending traditional moral values as a counterbalance to influence of 
the Western ‘moral decay’. 
2.2.2. Security environment and threatened sovereignty 
While it is obvious that exerting leverage creates threats to the security of the target state, 
the question how an external leverage affects security requires further investigation. The vulnerable 
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aspects of security of the target country should serve as entry points for an external power to apply 
leverage. As noted above, the strong one-sided linkage of a state to external power leads to 
asymmetric interdependence between them. Hence, the sectors of cooperation where linkage is 
asymmetric and high-concentrated, should be the most vulnerable points of country’s linkage-
leverage security, as the powerful side can cut or threaten them with the severing of the dense 
linkage, on which social, political, and economic stability of the target country rely. Nevertheless, 
cutting, for instance, information linkage alone cannot cause a catastrophic situation in the 
dependent state, therefore, apparently, such dimensions of linkage generate leverage through other 
means, and one of the purposes of this study is to find out what are they. For the purpose of this 
study I find it necessary to draw attention to the most important threats that exist in the post-Soviet 
region. This, hopefully, will cast some light on the process of the penetration of the linkage-
leverage nexus to the state security through certain vulnerabilities. 
The post-Soviet republics have plenty of security problems, which are caused not only by 
highly concentrated linkage but also by a great number of other external and internal factors and 
threats. The aggregate of such problems eventually creates a situation, in which most of the states 
appear to be fragile and backward. After the dissolution of the USSR the new independent states 
managed to establish their statehoods with all the basic institutions needed for this. Nevertheless, 
many of the post-Soviet countries failed to create stable stateness. The political systems of these 
countries are erratic, the state institutions are malfunctioning, and the change of authorities and 
power often happens through coup d’etat rather than democratic election procedures. This creates 
the possibility for interference in domestic affairs by external forces, which support, in accordance 
with their interests, the ruling regime or opposition. In addition, various militant, radical and 
oligarchic groups are pursuing their own interests in certain states and in the entire region. 
Russian security linkage to the CSTO countries implies assistance in tackling with some of 
these threats, including drug, arms and human trafficking, international crime, and illegal 
immigration. Russian assistance covers a considerable portion of expenses of the states regarding 
these matters, and, cutting this linkage would bring instability to CSTO members, especially, such 
vulnerable states as, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan and Armenia. Leverage based on security linkage is 
even more effective, if the external power plays a role of the guarantor of security from the 
aggression of other countries. An illustrative example of this is the Russian security protectorate of 
Armenia involved in the conflict with Azerbaijan, which has a standing potential to plunge into 
large-scale war. Apparently, this was a reason, why Yerevan renounced its plans to sign the 
Association Agreement with the EU, who, unlike Russia and CSTO, did not have enough resources 
and will to ensure security of the Armenian state. 
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In general, the most distinctive security problem existing in the post-Soviet region is related 
to presence of regional conflicts determined by separatist regimes, secessionist regions, and 
territorial disputes. They are commonly referred to as the post-Soviet “frozen” or “protracted” 
conflicts. The conflicts in Central Asia between neighbouring countries over territory and water 
resources from time-to-time escalate to military confrontation. The conflict between Armenia and 
Azerbaijan over Nagorno Karabakh is characterized with a permanent high-intensity military 
tensions. The post-Soviet conflicts differ by specific objects of dispute but are similar by their 
nature. The ethnic factor is to one degree or another always present in all of the conflicts. After the 
dissolution of the USSR various ethnic groups became separated and isolated from their motherland 
states, and their position as an ethnic minority in the new state did not coincide with their 
expectations for status in social and political system. The classical scholar in the field of ethnic 
conflicts, Donald Horowitz, explains ethnic conflict as a result of the concerns of a group about its 
place among the other groups (the feeling of threat to its occupied position or to its better future).
83
 
Hence, one may assume that in the context of ethnic conflicts linkage can generate leverage 
through social and political mobilization of people for actions against the incumbent authorities of 
their country, striving for a better position, status and representation within the socio-political 
structure of the state or for the full independence from the state treated as ‘usurper’ of power and a 
threat to their identity. Identity itself can be a crucial factor that triggers a conflict. Dan Smith 
believes that the most fundamental factors in conflict development are identity and group status, 
and that denial of their recognition and discrimination cause inevitable and irresistible protest.
84
 A 
prominent Russian expert on ethnic conflicts, Valery Tishkov, gives great consideration to ethnicity 
and religion as powerful tools of political mobilization, which are also important factors of identity 
formation. In ethno-political conflicts, both sides appeal to the emotions of the people – they call 
either for “national liberation” and “self-determination” on the part of the rebels or for “national 
security”, “sovereignty” and “territorial integrity” on the part of the existing states. Often their 
referents are put in a way of something sacred and so not a subject for discussion or compromise.
85
 
Obviously, such cultural links as ethnicity, religion, historical memory, and language are the 
essential elements that form group and national identity. Thus, the intensification of these ties, 
which constitute profound cultural linkage, contributes to fostering inter-group competition, and so 
creates leverage applied through vulnerabilities of the country’s stateness. 
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Under the constructivist approach conflict can also be seen as a part of social reality 
constructed by social modes, intellectual categories, representations, and discourses. All of these 
elements of social reality have a historical dimension and they are reproduced in historical memory. 
Thus, memories can be selected in order to touch the feelings and cognitive focus of people and, 
thereby, to serve the individual, group or national needs and interests. This is how social 
mobilization can be provoked from within the state and can be supported by external forces. 
Horowitz noted that memory of earlier conflicts, even from ancient time, “can be revived to fit 
contemporary conditions” and “history can be a weapon, and tradition can fuel ethnic conflict”86. 
The formation of the necessary discourses that refresh historical memory of social and ethnic 
groups happens through the creation of the corresponding information environment. Therefore, via 
the channels of information and social linkages, an external actor can create a discursive 
environment that serves its interests and revives the memory of the shared history and experiences. 
Eventually, it causes active support for external influence from local populace linked to the external 
actor by cultural, social and information ties. Thus, the task of an external actor employing leverage 
generated through cultural, social and information links is not to cut these ties, or threaten to cut 
them, but to create a perception among local people or specific social and/or ethnic groups that the 
current policy of their authorities (which are unfavourable for the external actor) can dramatically 
damage links to the ‘civilization’ important for their unique identity, habits and traditions. 
This mechanism of leverage generated through cultural, social and information linkage does 
not convert and eliminate the identity of the selected populace. On the contrary, I argue, that in our 
case an external power (a state) wields the linkage-leverage nexus in order to intensify and reinforce 
identity, based on the existing cultural links, and revive positive memory of common history, shared 
experience, similar traditions, fraternal relations, ethnic roots, unifying single civilization, etc. By 
doing this, the external power, an international actor, tries to secure its interests in relation to the 
target state. 
It is important to stress that post-Soviet conflicts are not purely ethnic conflicts but ethno-
political ones. Valery Tishkov understands such conflict as one that occurs between two or more 
parties, in which at least one party is organized on an ethnic basis (politicized) or acting on behalf 
of an ethnic group. He highlights that conflict is not caused by ethnic identity as such but its 
politicization, which can be backed by various powers and motivations.
87
 The object of political 
conflicts is usually specific resources – state authority, the organization of political institutions and 
the political status of social groups. The secessionism and separatism widely spread in the post-
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Soviet space can be attributed to regional political conflicts. Irina Busygina defines the regional 
political conflict as a conflict related to the desire of one social group to attain power and distribute 
it in favour of the region or to change the political status of the region.
88
 
Of course, economic interests are also important factors that can contribute to confrontation 
within and between the post-Soviet states. In the Soviet non-market planned economic model, the 
resources were distributed according to the decision made by the central apparatus in Moscow. 
With the transition to market economy, a new highly competitive economic reality led to the 
struggle for natural resources, large industrial facilities and transport and communication 
infrastructure among states, businesses, interested individuals and corrupt politicians. Therefore, in 
addition to important cultural, social and information linkages promoting rivalry in politically 
unstable and fragile states by shaping preferences of large social groups, a significant role is given 
to economic and political linkages, through which the preferences of elites are influenced. 
Based on the present discussions regarding the modus operandi of the linkage-leverage 
nexus, the two types of mechanisms of interaction between linkage and leverage – actual and 
potential – can be adjusted for socio-cultural dimensions of linkage. In addition to the creation of a 
threat to cut essential links that maintain stable social, economic and political systems of the target 
country, the potential activity also involves the creation of a belief in the society, or some of its 
groups, that the ‘wrong’ policy and political orientation of their ruling (or opposition) elite could 
destroy important cultural ties to the external actor representing common civilization, shared values 
and similar identity. Understanding this difference in the functioning of the linkage-leverage nexus 
is important for the empirical research and practical application of this concept to Russia’s foreign 
policy toward post-Soviet republics, namely Moldova. 
Comprehending the complex security environment and existence of stateness issues in the 
post-Soviet region, as well as for the purpose of convenient conduction of empirical research, I 
suggest distinguishing between leverages that have direct and indirect effect on sovereignty of the 
target country. Although I am aware of the ongoing transformation of the world system of 
sovereignty that blurs the very meaning of sovereignty, for the purpose of this research, I use a 
simple understanding of this notion as the right to rule the state.
89
 To be more precise, this study 
refers to two traditional types of sovereignty: Westphalian or Vattelian sovereignty, and 
international legal sovereignty. According to Stephen Krasner, Westphalian sovereignty implies “the 
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exclusion of external sources of authority both de jure and de facto”.90 It means that “within its own 
boundaries the state has a monopoly over authoritative decision-making”. In the Westphalian 
system of international relations states are guided by the principle of non-intervention in the internal 
affairs of others. In modern times, this system acquired a principle of mutual recognition, which is a 
basis for international legal sovereignty of “juridically independent territorial entities”, meaning that 
states are free and equal.
91
 
Hence, I call a leverage that openly prejudices the legitimacy and right of domestic authority 
to rule the state within officially recognized borders hard leverage. Hard leverage, thus, leads to 
centrifugal tendencies within the state, that is, the confrontation at region-centre axis and separatist 
aspirations within the society are triggered. Of course, any leverage is a force that one way or 
another is imposed on authority, but not all levers bring sovereignty under a direct threat in a short-
term perspective. I refer to the leverage, which does not impose direct threat to the state 
sovereignty, as soft leverage. It is important to underline that hard leverage of the intervening 
external power, unlike soft leverage, is specifically aimed at undermining order within the territorial 
polity for the purpose of preventing domestic authorities cooperating with alternative external 
actors. 
It is worth mentioning that the terms ‘soft’ and ‘hard’ have nothing in common with Nye’s 
soft power concept. In contrast to Nye’s conceptualization of ‘softness’ of power that is centered on 
sources of power that intrinsically mean the nature of tools of a particular foreign policy, the 
present study defines ‘softness’ and ‘hardness’ of leverage according to the effect it produces in 
regard to sovereignty exercised by the authority of the target state. All in all, I believe that these 
peculiarities can be observed only when a researcher departs from the approach to study one’s 
foreign policy globally but concentrates, instead, on concrete mechanisms of the linkage-leverage 
nexus at meso-level, i.e. regional politics. This research attempts to disclose such peculiarities 
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3. Methodological approach 
3.1. Case selection 
One of the best ways to test theoretical claims and hypotheses is to study cases that can 
demonstrate mechanisms of the phenomenon in the focus of the research. Indeed, a researcher may 
study a case just to understand better the case itself, but one may also examine a particular case to 
provide insight into an issue. Based on these two main research interests in cases, the prominent 
theorist of case studies, Robert Stake, distinguishes between two types of cases. When a particular 
case itself is of interest, Stake calls this type of study an intrinsic case study. If the researcher 
pursues interests outside of the case, and the case plays supportive role to illustrate other cases or 
particular trait of the phenomenon or problem, then, according to Stake, we should speak about an 
instrumental case study.
92
 In the present research, I made an effort to examine in detail the process 
of the linkage-leverage nexus of Russian foreign policy. The case of Russia’s policy towards 
Moldova, chosen for the purpose of the investigation, illustrates how the phenomenon of linkage-
leverage nexus is manifest and exists within this policy. Thus, I may say that the thesis provides an 
instrumental case study. 
Another characteristic of this research is that it is a single case study, the significance of 
which is debated among scholars. R. Stake and D. Vaughan representing the critics of single case 
study believe that one single case can be confirmative for a particular phenomenon but the 
researcher cannot rely on it for the generalization.
93
 Their opponents in turn urge for better 
understanding of single case studies and their significance for theory building and argue that the 
plausibility of the results of this type of case study largely depends on proper case selection and 
method that it defines.
94
 I agree with the former, that in this form of study the representation seems 
to be insufficient to develop a comprehensive generalization of the described phenomenon of 
linkage-leverage nexus in Russian policy toward post-Soviet states. However, to make a 
comparison of a number of cases with such a range of dimensions of the variables in the focus 
would take a considerable amount of time for data gathering, analysis and write-up, which does not 
fit into the scope of a Master’s thesis. Therefore, I rather follow those, who advocate single case 
studies, and who concentrate on choosing the case well. 
                                                 
92
 Stake, Robert E.: “Case Studies”, in: Denzin, Norman K. et al. (eds.): Handbook of Qualitative Research, Los 




 Klotz, Audie: “Case Selection”, in: Klotz, Audie & Prakash, Deepa (eds.): Qualitative Methods in International 
Relations: A Pluralist Guide, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008 – pp. 43-58. 
38 
 
In International Relations, as Audie Klotz notes, a case usually is equated with a country, 
and today this became the most common unit of analysis.
95
 My research does not disregard this 
well-established tradition of IR studies. Given the theme of the analysis, the range of options of 
cases for my study is limited to the post-Soviet states, of which I have to choose one that best meets 
the purposes of my investigation and resources I have for conducting it. Stake believes that a 
researcher should choose those cases from which he can learn the most of the phenomenon under 
examination. The scientist argues that the opportunity to learn should be the primary criterion for 
case selection. He also underlines that the best way would be to take the most accessible case so 
that a researcher could spend the most time with it.
96
 As I am currently employed at Tampere Peace 
Research Institute (TAPRI), where I gather material on Russian policy toward particular post-Soviet 
states, apparently, the circle of the case options can be reasonably reduced according to the states I 
have already tracked for. They are all post-Soviet states except the Baltic States and Russia’s closest 
allies at the moment, i.e. the members of the Eurasian Economic Union that unites Russia, Belarus 
and Kazakhstan. The exclusion of these countries also has an analytical explanation. The Baltic 
States, being members of the EU and NATO, are closely tight to the Western institutions and so 
Russian linkage to these countries is the weakest compared to other post-Soviet republics. On the 
contrary, Belarus and Kazakhstan are members of all integration formations initiated by Russia, and 
so Moscow has practically no interest to exert leverage on these countries in a bid to bring them to 
its ‘gravitation field’, as they already are firmly placed within it. 
Klotz advises a case study researcher to remain mindful of the theoretical framework and the 
core question.
97
 It is important always to stick to a dominant theme and keep in mind the key 
concepts that define a case, and the main dimensions of the phenomenon of interest. Hence, the 
present study requires the most illustrative case where all dimensions of linkage and leverage of 
Russia are present in full. The degree of dimensions of Russian linkage in relations with the post-
Soviet republics varies from one country to another. My preliminary observation of the post-Soviet 
countries, within the focus of TAPRI’s project, showed that such linkages as social, political, 
economic, military and information are more or less equally dense among all countries except such 
dissident countries as Turkmenistan (where neutrality became a state ideology and political tool), 
Azerbaijan (which is economically most independent from Russia compared to other post-Soviet 
republics), Georgia (whose ex-President Saakashvili did everything to drift apart from Russia, and 
in 2008 Moscow exhausted its hard leverage during the August war and thereafter when recognized 
independence of the Georgian breakaway regions), and to less extent Uzbekistan (where the self-
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contained president Islam Karimov wilfully attempts to conduct policy politically and militarily 
independent from Russia). At the same time, the dimension of linkage that is differs the most 
among post-Soviet republics is cultural. Although there are obvious similarities in behavior between 
all post-Soviet republics (including, of course, Russia), determined primarily by the common Soviet 
past, the Central Asian, Caucasian and Eastern European post-Soviet countries have two 
significantly different cultural patterns – language and religion. As stated above, I bear in mind the 
idea that in order to learn more from the single case I should select one that would provide for best 
representation of Russian linkage. For this purpose I need to select a country, which has closest 
religious and language ties with Russia (or at least a considerably large population of ethnic 
Russians and Russian-speakers).
98
 Apparently, the two criterion set above are met best by Ukraine 
and Moldova (though the Moldovan language is Romanian per se, the country has a large 
population of ethnic Russians and even more of those, who speak Russian as native language).
99
 
These two countries could both be good cases for the analysis, as all patterns of the critical 
phenomenon, that is, dimensions of linkage, are well present there. In the recent years, both states 
are experiencing a dramatic clash of the external factors influencing their internal situation and 
political orientations, which has urged scholars to pay greater attention to these countries. However, 
one should not forget that concept of linkage-leverage nexus sets two descriptive factors for the 
case – in addition to linkage, leverage must be observed. Today, both Moldova and Ukraine are 
subjects to the Russian intensive leverage generated practically from all dimensions of Russia’s 
linkage. Moreover, the countries are under pressure of Moscow’s hard leverage, i.e. their 
sovereignty as well as authority of the ruling elite is contested. Such a situation is a result of a new 
round of geopolitical rivalry between the Western countries and Russia for the influence in the 
Eastern Europe. The current confrontation has reached its most tense phase since the collapse of the 
bipolar world order. Having greater geostrategic and economic importance than Moldova, Ukraine 
became the main target for the two poles of regional influence. The recent grave developments that 
still continue in the country attract enormous attention from the international media and thus are 
used for propagandist purposes by Russia and its Western counterparts. This significantly distorts 
the information space around Ukraine and along with rapidly changing chain of events seriously 
complicates gathering research material on this country. 
                                                 
98
 Indeed, the Russian population is diverse by itself comprising various ethnic groups practicing different religions and 
speaking different languages. However, it is common for Russian political elite to say that ethnic Russian people and 
Russian culture “drive Russia’s nation’s development” (see, for a prominent example, Vladimir Putin’s speech at 
Russian Popular Front conference, 5.12.2013, http://eng.kremlin.ru/transcripts/6371 (last access 12.12.2013). 
99
 The estimations are based on Population census 2004: Demographic, national, language and cultural characteristics: 
Population by nationalities, mother tongue and language usually spoken, National Bureau of Statistics of the Republic 
of Moldova, http://www.statistica.md/pageview.php?l=en&idc=295&id=2234 (last access 15.09.2013). 
40 
 
The information space around Moldova is also agitated but considerably less so and 
therefore it provides better opportunities to conduct a balanced case study. Moreover, the Russian 
linkage-leverage nexus in Moldova functions within the environment complicated by a ‘frozen 
conflict’ issue and generally problematic Moldovan stateness. This is an important aspect as the 
similar stateness issues are common for many post-Soviet states, including also Ukraine. Thus, the 
Moldovan case has good prospects for further comparisons with other cases of the region. For this 
purpose it would be important to look not only for deviants in the case but also ordinary happenings 
and settings. In this regard, Stake refers to H. Blumer, who calls for researchers to develop and use 
the distinctive features in order to detect and study the common.
100
 That appears to be a kind of an 
inductive process of reasoning, by which a general conclusion is drawn from a set of distinctive 
premises of the critical phenomenon. 
It is important to understand that a case study as such is not a method but rather a form and 
framework of research, or to put in Stake’s words “a case study is not a methodological choice but a 
choice of what to be studied”.101 Each case requires its own methodological approach, but this study 
has a feature that allows me to speak about inter-methodological approach. As we already know 
from the discussions above, linkage-leverage is many-patterned as it has different dimensions, and I 
see that each of these patterns/dimensions can be an individual case requiring a particular method 
for its study. 
Most of the dimensions are institualized and materialized in concrete policy practices, which 
can be well observed by process tracing, I mean here primarily economic, security and political 
dimensions. Others are aimed more at formation or maintaining of certain discourses, identities, 
fake consciousness, or shaping preferences and desires, and can be revealed better by techniques of 
language studies. I understand that one can see these two methodologies epistemologically 
divergent as process tracing is more traditional for positivist-empiricist scholars and language 
techniques, especially if they imply narrative and discourse analysis, are widely used by 
constructivists. Incidentally, Jeffrey Checkel, one of the prominent theorists of process tracing, 
notes that the latter is split as some of them appear to support use of process tracing in their 
tradition and others are very sceptical about it.
102
 
The two methodological approaches can and should be combined when we study such a 
multi-patterned social and political phenomenon as linkage-leverage nexus, dimension range of 
which includes social, political, economic, security, information and cultural links and the same 
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dimensions of leverage. The constructivist tradition will be more evident in the studying of cultural, 
information and social dimensions of the linkage-leverage nexus. I support Checkel’s argument that 
the methodological framework combining textual and process tracing approaches would “fill the 
vast methodological space between positivism and post-structuralism”.103 I am also certain that 
practical application of this methodological understanding, especially in studying such phenomenon 
as the linkage-leverage nexus, can contribute to dialectical approximation of structuralism and 
agent-centrism as well as to further debate on manifestation and nature of power. 
3.2. Process tracing 
Linkage-leverage nexus as a causal process 
The linkage-leverage nexus can be viewed as a causal mechanism, the function of which 
results in ‘power-shaped’ outcome, leverage, derived from an independent variable presented by 
linkage. Many political scientists argue that the best way to identify, validate and test causal chains 
is to employ a method of process tracing.
104
 According to Jeffrey Checkel, this method can move 
researchers “beyond unproductive ‘either/or’ meta-theoretical debates to empirical applications 
where both agents and structures matter”.105 Thus, the method is fully in line with the 
epistemological purpose of the present research endeavour, namely bringing closer agent-centred 
and structuralist approaches to study of power in asymmetrical relations between dominant and 
dependent actors of international relations. At the same time, it should once again be noted that 
methodologically process tracing traditionally distances itself from constructivist epistemological 
assumptions as it is strongly rooted in empiricist and (post)positivist thinking.
106
 Eventually this 
divergence between the two epistemologies provokes a clash of assumptions that can affect the 
convincingness of the process tracers in the eyes of constructivists. In this section, I explicate in 
detail how the method can test suppositions presented in the theoretical chapters above and also find 
a point where constructivist and positivist epistemologies  intersect. 
First of all, process tracing, being a theory-testing and theory-building method, fits well into 
case study, which, as outlined above, is the analytical framework for this research. The fact that 
process tracing is compatible with and complementary to a case study is highlighted by both case 
study and process tracing theorists.
107
 The primary advantage of process tracing application is that it 
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provides a detailed analysis of how a phenomenon evolves through time from particular initial 
conditions to a specific outcome. The method reveals in dynamic causal mechanism that connects 
cause and outcome, i.e. independent and dependent variables. 
Set of hypotheses 
The research employing the process tracing method, as well as other theory-testing methods, 
begins with a theoretical explanation of social change in focus of the research. The theoretical 
explanation of the causal mechanism of the linkage-leverage nexus in Russian foreign policy was 
presented in the previous chapters of this paper. The leading hypothesis is that a regional 
asymmetrical model of cooperation implies a process, where the leverage of external influence can 
be generated through multidimensional linkage involving various ties connecting dependent actor to 
its powerful partner. The complementary hypotheses bring the mechanism of linkage-leverage nexus 
to concrete outcome of the causal process. Hypothetically, in the linkage-leverage nexus the 
leverage acquires two main forms that could be called for convenience soft and hard in accordance 
to effect they cause. While soft leverage does not openly undermine sovereignty of the actor under 
‘attack’, hard leverage directly undermines sovereignty of the target state by making use of internal 
problems relating to stateness issues, and that may result in questioning the legitimacy of local 
government, weakening its authority and the intensification of centrifugal tendencies leading to 
conflicts at the region-centre axis. The linkage-leverage nexus’ activity can be classified as 
potential that threatens the target actor with a cutting links beneficial and essential to it and as 
actual that implements the threats into concrete foreign policy actions actually cutting off these 
links. 
There are also a number of assumptions aimed at disclosing non-causal relations between 
linkage and leverage. I assume that linkage and leverage acts in such a way that provides mutual 
support – ideally, they tend to the maximal consistency of acts. Linkage creates an environment 
within society in a target state, in which leverage would be most effective, and in its turn, 
sophisticated use of leverage means exerting its power as to not harm those links. It is important to 
preserve the external influence among representatives of civil society and the elite loyal to the 
intervening actor. All in all, the final goal of linkage-leverage nexus is to make the linkage of the 
powerful actor into a dependent state (or at least to its regions or social and/or political groups 
favouring the external influence) denser than before. Therefore, we can speak about circuit causal 
process. 
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The role of process tracing in regard to these developments is to trace relations of linkage 
and leverage and eventually identify (or not) the linkage-leverage nexus as such a circuit causal 
process. The tracing of process helps to grade dimensions of the linkage-leverage nexus in respect 
to their ‘fundamentality’ in creating most effective policy of dominant actor towards its weak 
partner in asymmetrically interdependent relationship. In this regard, I wonder whether ‘cultural 
determinism’ fits to this process and assumption that cultural dimension of Russian linkage and 
leverage plays a decisive role in creation of the country’s high-capacity foreign policy instruments 
is right.  
In addition to the theory-testing function, process tracing can acquire a theory-building 
function.
108
 This functional aspect of the method is used in my analysis, too. Based on the results of 
process tracing of Russian linkage-leverage nexus I intend to draw a conclusion on the ways how 
linkage is instrumentalized into leverage and how leverage is operationalized to achieve concrete 
foreign policy goals. In general, I expect that process tracing would reveal the causal chain of 
consequent transformations of links between two countries into leverage, and this causal process 
should manifest in specific policy practices (actions) as well as the representative force 
(texts/speeches) of the dominant party that exerts power on the leadership and the population of the 
target state in order to change its political orientation. 
A moment when language techniques and process tracing approximate 
At the moment, when observing the transformation of linkage, especially informational, 
social and cultural, into leverage, language techniques can be applied to study leverage, as in this 
case it often acquires a form of representational force. The representational force is defined by 
Janice Mattern “as a nonphysical but nevertheless coercive form of power that it is exercised 
through language”.109  Furthermore: 
Representational force is a form of power that operates through the structure of a 
speaker’s narrative representation of ‘reality’. Specifically, a narrative expresses 
representational force when it is organised in such a way that it threatens the 
audience with unthinkable harm unless it submits, in word and in deed, to the terms 
of the speaker’s viewpoint.110 
Thus the representational force in the context of the linkage-leverage nexus is rather 
potential leverage, i.e. a leverage that poses only a threat of cutting links to the country that are 
essential for the target audience without actually cutting them. However, only potential leverage it 
does not mean that the representational force cannot be hard. I suppose that it becomes ‘hard’ when, 
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by utilizing primarily social, information, and cultural links it creates or activates certain identities 
and establishes certain discourses, which contradict the political orientation of the state leadership; 
and thus it triggers conflicts between the government and social/political groups loyal to external 
actor. Eventually, such a representational force, as a form of external pressure, undermines the 
government’s authority and sovereignty. Such a ‘power-shaped’ outcome caused by linkage, fits 
well into the casual chain that is traced in this research. 
Eventually, leverage may appear to be a kind of sociolinguistically produced force. By 
saying this I mean that it constructs (by means of language) ‘reality’ that would shape preferences 
of local people or widen their identities and personal reasoning in a way favourable for the power-
wielder. Thus, the leverage manifests in textual and verbal accounts produced primarily by officials, 
politicians, certain experts, civilian activists and the media of, or loyal to, the external actor exerting 
influence on its dependent partner. Therefore, while searching within accounts of these agents, a 
researcher needs to look for narratives producing leverage in the form of representational force, 
which in our case becomes an element/part of the causal mechanism of the linkage-leverage nexus. 
Causal analytical storytelling and time-framing 
The circuit process of sequent transformations of linkage into leverage is presented in this 
research in form of analytical narratives, i.e. I tell ‘stories’ that are intended to explain a causal 
mechanism of linkage-leverage nexus. The analytical narratives present my own interpretative 
‘construct of the reality’ of the Russian-Moldovan asymmetric interdependent relations, viewed 
through the lens of the analytical framework for the investigation of the linkage-leverage nexus in 
Russia’s policy toward Moldova. Rosemary Reilly describes analytical narrative as following: it 
“functions as an explanation in which the movement through time and space of the process or event 
under investigation is deliberately couched in an analytic framing of interactions with the dynamics 
that will explain the phenomenon of interest”.111 She stresses that to construct an explicit sequence 
of events, which constitutes the process, is difficult, because “it requires a precise conceptualization 
of the types of events that created the causal chain, as well as those that did not”.112 
In my case, the types of events lay within the dimensions of linkage. Thus, I try to observe 
all relevant events that create the causal chain of the linkage-leverage nexus, and primarily political 
actions and texts aimed at the instrumentalization of Russian multidimensional links with Moldova 
to produce leverage. In order to create an accessible picture of the causalities I explain the analytical 
‘stories’ apart, describing dimensions separately. The social and cultural ties connecting the Russian 
and Moldovan people are highly dense, due to the centuries-old interaction between the two 
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societies. Therefore, it would be rational to combine these two dimensions of linkage into one, 
including information as a link that is closely associated with them. I also combine security and 
political dimensions into one analytical narrative because they both represent intergovernmental 
interaction between Russia and Moldova, and to a large scale are related to the Transdniestrian 
settlement. Accordingly, the analysis presents three narratives: military-political, economic and 
socio-cultural. To maintain a ‘bigger picture’ all the analytical narratives are cross-refererenced. 
Each of them has a ‘powerful end’, in which leverage emerges, and so every narrative is dual – hard 
and soft. 
Sticking to time in causal storytelling is very important. The starting time-point for this case 
study differs according to analytical ‘stories’. Reilly in this regard notes that the issue of the starting 
point is very contentious. She finds that “some researchers begin their process trace in moments of 
critical junctures, whereas others argue that only contingent events can trigger path-dependent 
processes”.113 I believe that Russian foreign policy is dependent on ‘explosions’, radical changes, in 
international, regional and domestic politics. The recent ‘explosion’ that pushed the pendulum of 
Russian policy is associated with implementation of the EU’s EaP initiative targeted at the post-
Soviet space. The starting point of the process tracing is 2009, defined by the evolution of the EaP 
that prompted Russia to adjust its foreign policy. At the same time, bearing in mind that linkages 
are not created overnight but sometimes go back decades and centuries. I go back to the early 
periods only if that linkage has accumulated for the subsequent (after 2009) production of leverage. 
As for the end point, Reilly argues that it is easy to establish, “since it is determined by the 
outcome of interest”.114 Checkel, however, is against this argument: he finds the stopping point 
issue very difficult because in process tracing it is always hard to know when to stop – “how micro 
to go?”.115 I have set a time scope for how far to go back to ‘history’ of the casual mechanism. 
Thus, more or less I have decided on the ‘historical’ stopping point. Looking at this matter in 
broader terms, one could indicate the problem of the tangibility of outcomes of the causal process as 
the end point of Russian actions. The linkage-leverage nexus as a basis of Russian foreign policy is 
a dynamic process rather a linear way to obtain one particular foreign policy objective. Instead of 
looking for the achievements of Russian actions in the sense of connecting Moldova to the main 
Russian-led integration projects (in the long-term objective) or preventing ‘EU-ization’ and 
‘NATO-ization’ of the country (as a medium-term objective), this study considers individual 
manifestations of Russian leverage generated through linkage to Moldova as actual outcomes of the 
linkage-leverage nexus to be a causal process. 
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Schematic representation of the application of the method of process-tracing 
The general task of the theory-testing process tracing is to validate (or not) the conceptual 
idea about what happens between the initial point (X) and outcome (Y) of the single process they 
are involved in. To clarify, in our case X is linkage and Y is leverage. The conceptualized causal 
mechanism of translating linkage into leverage is called nexus of linkage and leverage. According 
to the conceptualization, the causal mechanism includes two main activities of an external 
intervening actor: potential (aimed at the creation of ‘fear’ to lose important links and realized 
through exerting representational force or activation of certain identity patterns) and actual (a real 
cut of links implemented through concrete policy actions). Eventually, each of these activities may 
lead to hard and soft types of leverage, i.e. directly threatened (reinforced threat of separatism) and 
indirectly threatened (or not-threatened) sovereignty. The causal process can be divided into two 
interconnected blocks that are individually insufficient, but are necessary parts of the causal 
mechanism: instrumentalization of linkage (Block 1) and its impact on state sovereignty (Block 2). 
This guideline is relevant for all three types of ‘stories’ – military-political, economic and socio-
cultural – that I tell in form of analytical narrative, defined by Dereck Beach and Rasmus Pedersen 
as “a tool used in the congruence method to structure a temporal analysis of correlations between X 
and Y during a historical process in a single case”.116 The block-scheme of the causal mechanism of 
linkage and leverage nexus is presented in Figure 1. For each of the analytical narratives an 
individual scheme is created and presented in form of tables including specific examples of 
transformation of Russian linkage to leverage at the each part of the causal mechanism. 
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There is a common understanding among process tracers that the data used for this method is 
qualitative by nature. However, in the present study I also include some statistics and make certain 
calculations in order to see how dense are given types of linkage between Russia and Moldova. 
Other sources in the research are overwhelmingly qualitative and secondary, including interviews 
on open access, analytical and historical reports, media accounts, documents, public statements, and 
minutes. In addition, I conducted two expert interviews regarding the theme of the research as a 
supplement source of information. I attribute the information acquired from the interviews to 
secondary material because the respondents are observers and not direct participants in the events 
that could have impact on the causal chain under investigation.
117
 The observers are well-known 
Moldovan foreign policy analysts. The interviews can be called “semi-structured” as the categories 
were created by the responders but the thematic field of the discussion was set by the interviewer. 
This format of interview gives flexibility and so, chance for new discoveries. A guideline of 
conducting interview is a methodology developed by Jack Douglas who works with the situational 
factors involved. His “creative interviewing” is purposefully situated interviewing, that embraces 
the immediate, concrete situation, tries to understand how it is affecting what is communicated, and 
by understanding these effects, changes the interviewer’s communication processes to increase the 
discovery of the truth.
118
 Understanding these general communication processes and then working 
with them more effectively help to discover truth and avoids any self-bias of the experts. 
According to Beach and Pedersen, the interviewed observer can be biased toward a 
particular theory of which way the events happened, and that along with the imperfection of human 
memory would decrease the accuracy of the analysis. Therefore the careful use of triangulation 
across different kinds of sources is needed.
119
 Triangulation is an important driven force for the 
methodological construction of my research. It is important to emphasize that I do not rely on 
interviews alone: they are just a small component of the source base. Checkel noted that to assert 
plausibly a causal role of a mechanism under investigation requires “multiple data streams” (i.e. 
triangulation across various sources).
120
 Triangulation is used in the research not only to improve 
reliability of interviews; in general, it is an important tool “to assess and potentially to correct for 
measurement error, contingent on the different sources being independent of each other”.121 
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4. Analytical narratives about Russian policy toward Moldova 
The geographic location determined Moldova’s position at the crossroads of different poles 
of attraction and influence, which means that the changes in Moldovan foreign policy have 
implications for regional politics. In 2003, the Moldovan leadership made a clear choice for the 
European integration and started its long journey towards integration with the EU. In June 2014, 
Chisinau signed the Association Agreement, which opened the door to European structures even 
wider. This course of approximation with the EU, however, is perceived in Russia as contradicting 
its foreign policy interests. 
Since Russia’s special concern in Moldova is related to the historical region of Bessarabia, 
Moscow associates the Europeanization of Moldova with the two processes: NATO enlargement 
and the ‘Romanization’. As for the latter, the rhetoric of the Romanian president Traian Basescu 
about “reunification” of Romania and Moldova within the EU touches upon “Russian national 
feelings related to the destiny of Bessarabia as an integral part of Russian civilization space”.122 
However, the main Russian concerns relate to the NATO issue. The Russian leadership has long 
perceived Moldova as a buffer zone to the EU and NATO expansion into the East: if Moldova came 
under Western influence, the expansion to Ukraine becomes much easier (thus opening the 
possibility of a ‘chain reaction’ for other post-Soviet participants of the EaP). In this situation, 
Moldova has been a ‘frontline’ of the rivalry between Russia and West over Ukraine, which made 
Transdniestria, a pro-Russian breakaway region in Moldova, Moscow’s main ‘outpost’. 
An important feature in this respect which needs to be especially emphasized is the fact that 
the existence of a frozen conflict on Moldovan territory appears to be a serious obstacle for further 
integration with the EU and NATO structures. The Transdniestrian issue has been long a 
characteristic of Moldova’s dialogue practically with all international and regional actors. Russia 
has a special position in this respect: its early and direct involvement in the settlement of conflict 
made it possible for Moscow to form an advantageous linkage to Moldova in form of a significant 
military presence that no any other partner of Chisinau possesses so far. Military presence is an 
essential line of a ‘big story’ not only of the Russian military and political linkage to Moldova but, 
generally, of the entire Russian linkage-leverage nexus as instrument of influence on Chisinau. The 
development of the conflict has at large determined Moscow’s policy toward Moldova as well as 
the ‘fate’ of the Moldovan state itself. Therefore, the first analytical narrative of the present analysis 
is about politico-military dimension of linkage, which is largely built upon this complicating factor 
of the Russian-Moldovan relationship. 
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4.1. Politico-military dimensions 
4.1.1. Hard leverage 
Security has been the most important aspects of the development of Moldova as an 
independent state. During the Soviet time the security issues were solved in Moscow, but with the 
dissolution of the USSR the new independent republic started looking for an alternative to 
Moscow’s protectorate.123 The Moldovan leadership made a clear decision not to cooperate in the 
security sphere with Russia.
124
 The country does not participate in the most advanced organization 
of military integration of the post-Soviet countries, the Collective Security Treaty Organization 
(CSTO). As for the military structures of the CIS, Moldova is not engaged in important military 
component as the Joint CIS Air Defence System, and has only status of observer in the CIS Defence 
Ministers’ Council. Perhaps, the most salient CIS security structures that could have at least some 
influence on foreign policy decisions in the security sphere of its member-countries, in which 
Moldova takes part, is the Council of CIS Border Force Commanders and the CIS Anti-Terrorism 
Centre. The low integration into the common security space of the CIS is, however, compensated 
for the security linkage of Russia to Moldova by the presence of Russian troops on Moldovan 
territory. 
In 1956 the Soviet 14th army was deployed in Moldavskaya SSR including the territory of 
Transdniestria. After the collapse of the Soviet Union the army remained, albeit considerably 
reduced, to guard stores of weapons and ammunition left from the strategic arsenal of the former 
Soviet Western Military District. In June-July 1992, Moldovan military forces attempted to restore 
jurisdiction over the left bank of the Dniester and that resulted in the violent military confrontation. 
The 14
th
 Russian army, which was stationing on the territory of Moldova as a successor of the 
former Soviet 14
th
 army, interfered into the conflict. This interference ceased the escalation and 
since then the status quo has been preserved. Russia’s policy did not promote the conflict situation 
in Moldova as such, but the Soviet weapons of the 14
th
 army served as the means of warfare, and 
namely Russia played the key role in saving physical existence of a political subject, the 
Pridnestrovian Moldavian Republic (PMR).
125
 Thus, unintentionally or not, but the Russian 14
th
 
army’s interference in the conflict supported separatist forces. 
Based on this event, one may say that it was the first time when the post-Soviet Russia 
openly instrumentalized its military linkage and gained hard leverage over Moldova, though I have 
doubts whether Russian leadership during that difficult time for its political future, seriously 
                                                 
123




 Devyatkov, Andrey: Facing the challenge of Europeanization (2012) – pp. 12-33. 
50 
 
thought about maintaining Russia’s presence in the region. In fact, during the first years after the 
end of military stage of the Transdniestrian conflict Russia viewed the conflict in the context of the 
withdrawal of the former Soviet 14
th
 army. It is evident by the ceasefire agreement (“On Principles 
of a Peaceful Settlement of the Armed Conflict in the Transdniestrian Region of the Republic of 
Moldova”) signed by Russia and Moldova on July 21 1992, which says that: “Questions about the 
status of the army, procedure and time interval of a stage-by-stage withdrawal shall be determined 
in the course of negotiations between the Russian Federation and the Republic of Moldova”.126 
Even though this wording is quite vague, it shows that Moscow was ready to discuss this 
issue by that time. However, later Russia developed so-called “strategy of synchronization” of the 
political settlement and the withdrawal of the 14
th
 army. The Russian expert on the Transdniestrian 
conflict Andrey Devyatkov notes that initially, during the elaboration of the Russian-Moldovan 
agreement on the army withdrawal in 1993-1994, Moscow bounded up the two issues rather 
because there was no full confidence that few hundreds of peacekeeping soldiers will be able to 
contain the renewal of the military conflict. The Kremlin also clearly understood that the 
Transdniestrian leadership, supported by local people, would do everything to preclude the 
withdrawal as the army is important factor for their political independence, and even for physical 
survival, and the independent-minded and charismatic commander of the 14
th
 army, General 
Aleksander Lebed, will support them.
127
 In addition, on March 26, 1995, there was a referendum on 
the presence of the 14th Russian army on the territory of Transdniestria. More than 90% of voters 
voted “for” the presence of Russian troops in the PMR. Thus, it was obvious that the issue of the 
withdrawal could not be solved at once. 
In 1995 the preparations for the first rounds of NATO enlargement began, and in this 
connection “the strategy of synchronization” started transforming into an instrument of influence on 
the foreign policy direction of Moldova.
128
 In 1995, the 14
th
 Army was reorganized into the 
Operational Group of Russian Forces in the Transdniestrian region of the Republic of Moldova 
(OGRF) to continue guarding the ammunition depots, and one of its battalions fulfilling 
peacekeeping mission in accordance with the international agreement. Thus, the presence of 
Russian military on the territory of Moldova has consolidated, and that encroaches directly on the 
sovereignty of the Moldovan state. The developments of the first half of the 1990s were the start of 
the transformation of Russian military linkage into hard leverage over Moldova. 
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Nevertheless, under the pressure of ‘the international community’ as well as for simple 
economic considerations Russia showed a will to withdraw the troops, and in 1994-1997 Moscow 
made a number of attempts to find political solution acceptable for Tiraspol and Chisinau and at the 




 However, the 
procrastination of resolving the Transdniestrian issue, including the army withdrawal, played into 
the hands of Transdniestrians, who in 1995 finished the formation of their main state institutions. 
Their orientation towards independence or at least the soft confederation with Chisinau became 
official state ideology once and for all.
130
 Eventually, the Russian military presence was an 
important factor of the emergence of the Transdniestrian statehood. 
In 1990s, military factor played essential role in the development of the process. However, 
starting in the beginning of 2000s, the ‘realpolitik’ came to proscenium of the negotiation arena. In 
2001-2002, Russia began to implement its ‘Istanbul Obligations’ in exchange for the creation of 
international regime of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE), which was 
supposed to be a cornerstone of the European security policy. Under these obligations all CFE 
limited arms and equipment were to be withdrawn or destroyed by the end of 2001 and all Russian 
troops to be withdrawn by the end of 2002. The Russian Defence Ministry adopted the decision to 
liquidate OGRF, and despite fierce resistance from PMR authorities and with support of the OSCE 
began the withdrawal of military equipment and troops. The equipment withdrawal was completed 
on schedule but Russia failed to meet the deadline for withdrawal of troops.
131
 The Russian Deputy 
Minister of Foreign Affairs, Grigory Karasin, stressed that “when in 2001-2003 appropriate 
conditions were created, we removed more than 40 railway wagons with ammunition and military 
equipment”.132 An important factor that undermined “the appropriate conditions” for the withdrawal 
was the unwillingness of the US, the EU and other NATO members to cooperate with Russia on 
security issues. It was evident by the refusal to link the CFE ratification in their countries and 
complete withdrawal of the former 14
th
 army. At the same time, the insistence of the US and EU on 
implementing the ‘Istanbul Obligations’ assumed by Russia created an impression in Moscow that 
the West will not let Russia play any substantial role in the future European security.
133
 
In 2003, Moscow initiated secret talks with the then president of Moldova, Vladimir 
Voronin, and the sides agreed to the memorandum presupposing asymmetrical federalization of the 
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country that was proposed by the Russian envoy on the settlement process, Dmitry Kozak. But 
Voronin at the ultimate moment, and after consultations with representatives from the US and EU, 
drew back from the ‘deal’. When the talks were revealed the Western countries accused Russia of 
its intentions to preserve its influence in the region. As evidence of these Russian aspirations, they 
pointed out Moscow’s proposal (in response to Transdniestrian demand on military guarantees) to 
maintain Russian-led peacekeeping operation with 2,000 Russian troops (more than the then size of 
OGRF) until 2020, albeit with possible participation of Ukrainian troops and international 
observers.
134
 Apparently, Kozak’s task was to achieve the final political settlement under the aegis 
of Russia and extend the presence of the Russian military contingent, as a basis of the guaranteeing 
operation in order to restore Russian leading positions in determining the future of the unified 
Moldovan state. 
According to Andrey Devyatkov, the signing of the Memorandum was explicitly 
undermined by the Western pressure on Moldova as Russia’s unilateral diplomacy caused negative 
reaction of the EU, the US and OSCE. However, there scarcely were other alternatives for Chisinau 
and Tiraspol that also could lead to unification of the two banks of the Dniester River. The scholar 
believes that without taking into account realities of the actual existence of the independent state of 
PMR the representatives of OSCE, EU and US took quite the same one-sided actions: viewing 
Russia’s efforts only as negative, they made Moldovan president understand that after the signing of 
the Memorandum his political future and Moldova’s European future will be seriously 
questioned.
135
 William Hill, the former Head of the OSCE Mission to Moldova in 1999-2006, also 
notes that the Western countries, in general, deny the Russian independent diplomatic and political 
role in the region.
136
 
In the response to the actions of the EU, OSCE, and the US, Moscow suspended the 
withdrawal of military equipment and troops.
137
 The strategy of synchronizing the withdrawal of 
armaments and troops with a political settlement of the conflict remains on the agenda of Russian 
policy in the Transdniestrian settlement, and Russian officials constantly repeat that there are still 
no ‘appropriate conditions’ for the withdrawal of OGRF as far as the political settlement is 
locked.
138
 Moreover, since 2012 in accordance with the general plan of modernization of the armed 
forces of the Russian Federation, Russia’s Defence Ministry began upgrading and refitting OGRF 
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with modern weapons and military equipment.
139
 All in all, the preservation of Russian military 
presence in the Moldovan breakaway region became an important form of linkage for Russia to 
generate a powerful instrument of influence on Moldovan authorities. The presence of OGRF 
contradicts Moldova’s Constitution, which bans the stationing of foreign troops on its territory,140 
and at the same time explicitly supports the Transdniestrian secessionist government. Such a 
situation directly threatens Moldova’s sovereignty and thus, forms Russian hard leverage toward 
this post-Soviet republic. 
The next period of the development of Russian political linkage-leverage nexus began in 
2005, when Moldova unilaterally adopted the Law on the Transdniestrian status that provided  the 
possibility of establishing “an autonomous territorial unit with special legal status” – 
Transdniestria – after the implementation of conditions listed in subsection (2) of Article 1 of the 
law: demilitarization, in particular, the withdrawal of troops and armaments of the Russian 
Federation, and “formation of democratically elected government”.141 Devyatkov notes that the EU 
did not criticize Moldova’s action towards Transdniestria, which in fact appeared to be evidence of 
the revival of Chisinau’s centralist policy.142 This caused concrete retaliatory actions of 
Transdniestria, who in 2006 held a referendum which posed two questions: 
1. Do you support the course towards the independence of the Pridnestrovian 
Moldavian Republic and the subsequent free association with the Russian 
Federation? 
2. Do you consider it possible to renounce independence of the Pridnestrovian 
Moldavian Republic and subsequently become part of the Republic of Moldova? 
Expectedly, 97.2 % of citizens of Transdniestria, who took part in the referendum, were in 
favour and only 1.9 % of voters voted against independence and subsequent accession with the 
Russian Federation. Answering the alternative question, 94.9 % of voters said “no”, while only 3.3 
% approved the possibility to renounce independence and consequent integration with Moldova.
143
 
The official representatives of Moldova as well as the US, the EU, the Council of Europe, 
Romania, Ukraine and the OSCE stated in advance that they do not recognize the referendum as 
legal. Moscow officially did not announce recognition of the legitimacy of the referendum either. 
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On the eve of the voting day the Russian Foreign Minister, Sergey Lavrov, very carefully 
interpreted the referendum. He said that the plebiscite is “probably a desire to draw attention to the 
fact that the situation is not resolved”. He also stressed that the referendum in Transdniestria is a 
reaction to a virtual blockade, which affects the economy and people of this region, adding that the 
essence of the event “is the need to return to the negotiating table.”144 Later commenting on the 
results Lavrov said that “they were predictable” and “this is but one more confirmation of the 
thesis that conflicts ought to be settled on the basis of the fulfilment of all the existing 
agreements”.145 He also noted that Transdniestrian referendum is a counter-step to unilateral 
actions of Moldova, meaning, first of all, the aforementioned law on the status of Transdniestria.
146
 
However, this modest official Russian position does not mean that the Kremlin ignored the 
referendum. The plebiscite demonstrated solid support of local population for the Russian policy 
and so legitimized it, and this became a “powerful weapon” (if not practical than at least 
psychological) to influence the Moldovan political orientation and defend Russian interests from the 
attacks of external actors. Russian politicians made also concrete steps based on the results of 
referendum. On October 6, 2006 the Russian State Duma adopted a resolution on the recognition of 
Transdniestrian independence referendum legitimate. The State Duma called on the international 
community to allow for the outcome of the referendum. “The State Duma considers that the 
Russian Federation should build its policy based on free will of the people of Pridnestrovie”, says 
the statement.
147




Both the Moldovan law on the status of Transdniestria and the Transdniestrian referendum 
are two great obstacles to achieve any consensus on political status of the left bank of Dniester 
within the negotiation process. Russia has long insisted on the cancelation of the law by Moldovan 
legislators, otherwise there will be no serious progress in the political settlement.
149
 At the same 
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time Russia posed another important condition for compromises in the Transdniestrian settlement. 
Given the possibility of the Ukrainian and Georgian accession to NATO, Moscow began to 
consider Moldova as a “sanitation cordon”, which should secure Russia from complete isolation 
from the European security system. Thus, since 2006-2007 an arsenal of the Russian diplomacy in 
addition to “the synchronization principle” has been completed by the principle of Moldova’s 
“constitutional neutrality”, i.e. non-accession to NATO.150 Officially, this policy is formulated as 
following: Russia “will participate… in the settlement of the Transdniestria problem on the basis of 
respect for the sovereignty, territorial integrity and neutral status of the Republic of Moldova while 
providing a special status for Transdniestria”.151 Apparently, if one of these elements is absent, 
Russia cannot “respect” the others, and so the current position of Transdniestria will remain 
unchanged or rather can be changed in favour of the secessionist region. Russia has great concerns 
regarding the increasing influence of NATO in Moldova. The neutrality status enshrined in the 
Constitution of Moldova is not enough: Russian politicians understand that the constitution is not 
dogma and can be a subject to amendments. Therefore, the Russian leadership believes that a 
federative, or better confederative, Moldovan state unified with Transdniestria, which firmly 
opposes any close alliances with the West, is the best guarantee for Russia that Moldova would not 
fall under NATO’s influence.152 
In 2009, the EaP initiative of the EU began its active pulling-out of the Western post-Soviet 
republics from Russia’s orbit of influence. The EU involved Moldova into the EaP and initiated 
negotiations about the AA. Such process of ‘EU-ization’ causes two main concerns in Moscow: it 
opens a way for the expansion of NATO to the East and in case of Moldova to possible unification 
of the country with Romania under the EU, about which the Romanian president Traian Basescu 
repeatedly speaks.
153
 The key figure, however, is NATO, whose military infrastructure’s 
approximation to the Russian border is traditionally perceived as an attempt to implement a project 
of “Europe without Russian participation”.154 Russia’s policy in the Moldovan direction, especially 
after the accession of Romania and Bulgaria into NATO and the advent to power of the Alliance for 
European Integration in Moldova in 2009 (today succeeded by the Pro-European Coalition), is 
determined primarily by the interests to deterrent NATO enlargement. Therefore, the Russian 
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official position on the Transdniestrian conflict settlement is linked with the neutrality status of 
Moldova. 
With the increased understanding that the existing strategy is aimed at restraining Moldova 
from moving toward the EU and NATO is not effective enough, Russia made certain steps to 
demonstrate a more cooperative approach with the EU, including discontinuing its support, for the 
then intractable president of the PRM, Igor Smirnov. In June 2010, Russia and Germany signed the 
Meseberg Memorandum, which in fact was the last diplomatic effort of Moscow to anchor in the 
European security system. Chancellor Angela Merkel and President Dmitry Medvedev “proposed 
to explore the establishment of an EU-Russian Political and Security Committee on ministerial 
level” with the Transdniestrian conflict to become a major subject on the Committee’s agenda.155 
As it is known, the Memorandum failed and the Committee had never been set up. The testing 
ground, which was Transdniestria, has shown that the security dialogue between Russia and the EU 
is not possible in the present realities. 
Following the failure of the Meseberg process, the Russian leadership has changed its 
approach to certain aspects of the Transdniestrian settlement. Moscow activated its mediating 
efforts and, in 2011, achieved the resumption of the talks between Tiraspol and Chisinau in 5+2 
format after a five-year hiatus. In addition, Russia reiterated that independence of Transdniestria 
cannot be internationally recognized and reaffirmed its adherence to the principle of the territorial 
integrity of Moldova. Moscow also offered another encouraging signal for the European partners, 
namely its principal readiness to reform the format of the peacekeeping operation in Moldova and 
withdraw the troops from its territory, and probably substitute them for a police mission, i.e. to 
demilitarize the conflict zone, though with a stipulation that this can happen only after achieving an 
agreement on final settlement.
156
 But the receiver of these signals, the EU, could not formulate solid 
position on its policy toward Russia, and the security dialogue between Moscow and Brussels came 
to an end without having started.
157
 Moreover, the increasing expansionist policy of the EU to the 
East continued and this forced Russia to take response actions along the entire former Soviet 
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‘Western frontline’, and in particular, Moscow activated its strong political links and toughened its 
policy towards Moldova. 
The contemporary tough policy on Moldova started taking shape with an appointment in 
March 2012 of a person with very nationalistic and straightforward rhetoric, Deputy Prime Minister 
and former Russian representative to NATO Dmitry Rogozin, a Special Representative of the 
Russian President on Transdniestria and a Co-Chairman of Intergovernmental Committee on 
Economic Cooperation between Russia and Moldova. The appointment of such a politician, who as 
early as in March 2006, even before the Transdniestrian referendum was held, urged to admit 
appeal of Transdniestrian parliament to unite with the Russian Federation,
158
 showed that the 
Kremlin needed active, rapid and decisive actions in this direction in order to preserve its regional 
influence. The Russian leadership decided to secure Russia’s interests by utilizing its solid position 
in the settlement of the Transdniestrian conflict, and this idea was well understood in Chisinau.
159
 
Moscow attempted to get ahead of the EU and take over the initiative in order to incline Moldova 
with Russia-initiated Eurasian integration. The rhetoric of Dmitry Rogozin and other Russian 
officials who deal with the Transdniestrian issue can be boiled down to a message addressed to 
Chisinau that the final and main decision on the future of Moldovan territorial integrity is up to 
Moldova itself, but if Chisinau continues to move to Euro-Atlantic direction then it should forget 
about the unified state.
160
 
In his statements Rogozin points out that in case of Moldovan accession to NATO and/or its 
unification with Romania, Russia will re-consider its position on the recognition of the 
independence of Transdniestria. He also stresses that the integration to the EU cannot be supported 
by Tiraspol. The Russian deputy prime minister believes that the AA with the EU is “a handle of 
the door to NATO” and openly warns Moldovan government of possible grave consequences for 
territorial integrity of the state in case it signs the agreement. Thus, the meaning of such rhetoric is 
that the current political orientation of the Moldovan ruling elite must be renounced; otherwise there 
is a possibility that no single state will be within the present Moldovan borders (still officially 
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recognized by Russia). Intrinsically, Rogozin said nothing new but just summed up the already 
known Russian preconditions to Moldova. At the same time, today Russia already came into the 
open and shows its game. Such Russian frankness with straightforward rhetoric of a Russian top-
level official can be alarming for Moldovan politicians and at the same time supported by pro-
Russian people on both banks of the Dniester River. Essentially, Rogozin’s rhetoric, highlighting 
independence of Transdniestria, is a means of psychological pressure on pro-European Moldovan 
politicians, and on the eve of signing the AA between Moldova and the EU, the rhetoric has become 
increasingly threatening with less diplomatic ceremony. 
However, the representational force of Rogozin is not the only ‘weapon’ against Moldovan 
pro-EU government. The potential political leverage has already been transformed into active 
leverage as some threats have started being implemented. After the accession of Crimea to the 
Russian Federation, Transdniestria has intensified its desire to unify with Russia. On March 3, 2014 
Roman Khudyakov, a politician from Tiraspol, who is now a deputy of the Russian State Duma 
from Russian far-right party, Liberal Democratic Party of Russia (LDPR), and a member of the 
State Duma Committee on CIS Affairs and Relations with Compatriots, sent a letter to the Russian 
Foreign Ministry asking to recognize Transdniestria as an independent state.
161
 On March 18, 2014 
Chairman of the Transdniestrian Supreme Soviet Mikhail Burla sent the Russian State Duma 
Speaker Sergei Naryshkin a letter in which he asked to broaden grounds for admitting new 
territories to the Russian Federation provided in legislation which was adopted specifically for the 
case of Crimea. Transdniestria is hoping that this will allow joining the Russian Federation.
162
 On 
April 16, 2014 a formal appeal to the Russian authorities, the UN and the OSCE to recognize the 
Transdniestrian independence was adopted by the Supreme Soviet of the PMR.
163
 
In May 2014, the tensions between Moldovan authorities and Russian politicians who during 
the period 2012-2014 made numerous visits reached its a new high for the last decade. Ukraine and 
Romania closed its airspace for the Moscow-bound plane of Dmitry Rogozin, who was on the visit 
with Russian Culture Minister Vladimir Medinsky and other Russian officials to Transdniestria on 
May 9 to celebrate the Victory day. During his visit Rogozin received lists of Transdniestria 
citizens’ signatures petitioning for unification with Russia. The signatures were supposed to back up 
the appeal to Moscow for accession to Russia adopted by the Transdniestrian parliament. Moldovan 
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authorities searched the plane and confiscated some boxes filled with the documents. The Russian 
delegation had to return to Moscow by a passenger plane. This incident caused a serious diplomatic 
scandal.
164
 “Anyway, provocation of Chisinau will have serious consequences for our bilateral 
relations”, wrote Rogozin on his webpage in Facebook.165 
The hard leverage on Chisinau that has been produced from the linkage can be illustrated by 
yet another aspect of Russian-Moldovan interaction, namely the one related to the autonomous 
territorial entity of Moldova, Gagauz Yeri. The latter has been in a situation similar to 
Transdniestria after the dissolution of the USSR: the capital of the region, Komrat, declared 
independence even earlier than Tiraspol. Gagauzia was a de-facto independent state from Chisinau 
for four years (1990-1994) before it was peacefully integrated into the Moldovan state. The 
integration took place on the grounds of the Law on the Special Legal Status of Gagauzia adopted 
by the Republican Parliament, which granted the rights of autonomy to the Gagauz region.
166
 The 
peaceful settlement of the conflict between the centre and region, however, did not eliminate 
tensions between Chisinau and Komrat. 
Russian official and semi-official politicians, including Dmitry Rogozin and Sergey 
Naryshkin, frequently meet the leader of Gagauzia Mikhail Formuzal, who has been one of the most 
active advocates of the Eurasian integration of Moldova. Under his patronage, an expert group was 
formed to analyse and compare perspectives and effects of the country’s possible integration into 
the European versus the Eurasian Unions. He has also insisted on the involvement of Gagauzia in 
the decision-making process of Moldova, especially with regard to its foreign policy.
167
 It is quite 
obvious that some actions taken and statements made toward Chisinau by Gagauz leaders are 
coordinated with Moscow. Their visits to Moscow (as well as of Russian representatives to Komrat) 
and frequent meetings with Russian official and semi-official figures prove this conjecture. The 
heads of some other municipal administrations are also favourable to Russia’s policy and enjoy 
Moscow’s reciprocal feeling, and not to mention even better Russian political ties with the 
Transdniestrian elite. 
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On February 2, 2014 the Gagauzian region held two local plebiscites simultaneously: the 
consultative referendum on the foreign policy vector of the country (the EU or the Customs Union) 
and the legislative referendum on the “deferred status of autonomy”, which gives Gagauzia the right 
to self-determination if Moldova loses sovereignty. Despite the attempts of the Moldovan 
government to prevent the plebiscite, the turnout was high and the Gagauz people gave almost en-
bloc vote in support of the integration with the then Customs Union and the deferred status of 
independence.
 
Following this event, Rogozin made a post on Facebook: “Moldovan 
eurointegrators are furious”.168 After the Gagauzian referendum there was a spread of ‘referendum 
idea’ through the entirety of Moldova, involving various municipalities and regions. When the 
former Moldovan Prime Minister Vlad Filat urged local authorities to “sign a public declaration in 
support of the European vector and to condemn separatism” of Gagauzia, authorities in a number of 
districts including the second largest city Balti as well as Orhei, Basarabeasca, Ungheni, and 
Rascani refused to support this appeal.
169
 
To sum up, the situation where the positions of Russia and Moldova are being mutually 
opposed is one of the major hindrances to a solution of the conflict. The Russian position on the 
political settlement of the conflict has not changed substantially since 2003, when the ‘Kozak 
memorandum’, was proposed to Moldova. The Russian strong political support deprives 
Transdniestrian leadership of impulses to negotiate with Moldova. The geopolitical factor has a 
serious impact on the negotiation process as Moscow links its national interests, challenged from 
Brussels and Washington, with the settlement of the regional conflict in Moldova. The existing 
Russian leading position in the resolution of the ‘frozen conflict’ contributes to its powerful hard 
leverage that utilizes the stateness problems of Moldova in order to maintain the influence on 
decision-making of the country. In such an environment, Transdniestria has consolidated its 
political independence from Chisinau, and now Moldova will unlikely be able to restore its 
territorial integrity. At the same time Russia does not hasten with the recognition of the 
Transdniestrian independence in order to preserve this source of influence on Moldovan policy as 
long as possible. However, the Kremlin has a backup option: Russia’s close links and support to 
political elite of Gagauzia as well as of other Moldovan regions with compact settlements of ethnic 
groups (in particular Russians but also Bulgarians) foster them to act vigorously against the political 
course pursued by the centre as long as it does not meet their aspirations. 
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4.1.2. Soft leverage 
The presence of Russian military on the territory of the post-Soviet states is considered as a 
means to undermine sovereignty of the host state, and thus associated mostly with ‘hard leverage’. 
However, the military presence as such cannot always be equated with military ‘occupation’ or 
‘intervention’ but has non-aggressive forms of military cooperation such as various formats of 
military cooperation and peace-making operations. Yet, being non-aggressive does not exclude the 
possibility of exerting influence on political decision-making processes of the host country. To 
understand the soft leverage of the Russian military presence in Moldova, we need to take a look at 
the history of the peacekeeping operation on the Dniester River. The consent to the peacekeeping 
operation was achieved in July 1992, when the ceasefire agreement was signed by the presidents of 
Russia and Moldova in the presence of the Transdniestrian leadership. This document officially 
embodied the Russian position as a party of the conflict settlement and established peacekeeping 
forces, charged with ensuring the ceasefire and future security arrangements, under control of the 
Joint Control Commission (JCC).
170
 The mandate of the peacekeepers was to operate in the security 
zone on the border between the Republic of Moldova and the self-proclaimed Pridnestrovian 
Moldavian Republic. According to the agreement, the format of the peacekeeping mission is 
trilateral, including Moldovan, Transdniestrian and Russian peacekeepers, who are coordinated by a 
joint military command structure. Since 1994, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in 
Europe (OSCE) has participated in all JCC meetings. In 1998, the JCC was enlarged to include 10 
Ukrainian military observers. 
This form of peacekeeping operation has proved to be efficient to the extent that the conflict 
zone in question is the only one in Eastern Europe where the introduction of peacekeeping 
contingent led to the end of hostilities, which never recommenced. The local population had not 
protested against the peacekeeping mission.
171
 With the approximation to the EU Moldova has 
insisted on reformation of the peacekeeping operation under the auspices of the UN, OSCE or the 
EU.
172
 The ruling politicians in Chisinau like the president of Moldova Nicolae Timofti, Prime 
Minister Iurie Leanca, the leaders of Liberal Democratic Party Vladimir Filat and Mihai Ghimpu, 
have repeatedly proposed withdrawal of Russian peacekeepers and substituting them by a civil 
police mission, which obviously would effectively diminish the Russian role in the conflict 
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resolution process and, in general, political influence in the region.
173
 Russia, in its turn, insists on 
inadmissibility of attempts of the Moldovan politicians to “blur” the existing peacekeeping and 
negotiation formats. Rogozin and representatives of the Russian foreign office constantly underline 
that no changes here can be done before a final agreement on conflict settlement and Chisinau must 
stop dragging the extra-regional actors into the process and so provoking clashes between them and 
Russia. Rogozin demands that Moldova recognizes the role of Russia as an actor with the strongest 
political and power authority in the region.
174
 
According to the ceasefire agreement, it can be terminated “by consent of the parties or in 
case of withdrawal of one of the negotiating parties from it”,175 but the Moldovan leadership has so 
far not dared to exercise this right, fearing unpredictable consequences of such action. Moreover, 
the Joint Declaration of Russian and Moldovan presidents and the head of Transdniestria adopted in 
March 2009 notes the stabilizing role of the present peacekeeping mission and the advisability of 
transforming it into a peace-guaranteeing operation under the aegis of the OSCE only followed a 
settlement of the conflict.
176
 
The issue of internalization of the peacekeeping operation is directly linked with the 
beginning of the EU’s diplomatic intervention in the Transdniestrian settlement process. It was 
especially evident in the summer of 2003, when the EU proposed to substitute the Russian 
peacekeepers for the European peacekeeping contingent with participation of Russia as a partner. 
Moscow, which also felt the pressure within the issue of troops and armament withdrawal, 
perceived this proposal as an attempt to exclude Russian presence from a country of its Near 
Abroad. It was obvious that in such a joint peacekeeping operation Russia would be able to 
participate only in controlling and not in real management and planning. According to Devyatkov, 
this had a serious symbolic meaning for Russia: it would completely lose the role of an actor, who 
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Such a possible scenario fostered Moscow’s one-sided actions from July-November 2003 
for the creation of the “Kozak’s Memorandum”. The proposal stipulated a federalization of the 
Moldovan state and stationing of Russian peacekeepers over 20 years as a guarantee that the 
conflict will not resume. Until today, Moscow avoids any discussions on the future of the 
peacekeeping mission while insisting on establishing a Moldovan federation or confederation.
178
 
The incumbent authorities in Chisinau have opposed such an option: an inclusion into the political 
decision-making process of a player with strong pro-Russian aspirations poses serious threats to 
both the political authority of the Moldovan leadership and the European (and to a certain degree 
pro-Romanian) orientation of Moldova (especially when the foreign policy course of the country is 
contentious for many Moldovan citizens). In issues of the peacekeeping mission, Transdniestria 
seconds the position of Moscow, as Russian peacekeepers are considered the only guarantor of their 
political and economic independence. Moreover, Russian soldiers on the left bank of the Dniester 
River have important symbolic meaning to people who live there; they are an important part of their 
identity, fuelled by Russian and local propaganda.
179
 
Such a situation contributes to a deadlock of the political settlement and consolidation of the 
status quo. The only winner in this situation is Russia: the unresolved regional conflict is an 
effective impediment for Moldova to join NATO and the EU, as well as to merge with Romania. 
The continuous claims of the Russian officials reflect this position by emphasizing Moldova’s 
neutral status as a precondition for Russia to consider any compromise regarding the unification of 
Moldova with Transdniestria.
180
 The best way to safeguard the neutral status of the country 
established by the Constitution is believed to be con/federalization of Moldova, as Transdniestria 
being a part of the state will not let it join NATO or ally with Romania. As for Chisinau and 
Tiraspol, neither of the two can be satisfied with the status quo. Although the Transdniestrians have 
been surviving the economic blockade since 2006 thanks to the Russian economic and political 
assistance, they are longing for a more certain future following twenty-two years of de-facto 
independence. At the same time, Chisinau is not ready to give up Transdniestria and continue its 
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further integration into Euro-Atlantic structures regardless of the future of the status of the left bank 
of the Dniester. 
The status quo, unfavourable for both parties of the conflict, and the unstable security 
environment, caused by the 2013-2014 Ukrainian crisis and aspirations of the Moldovan 
government to accelerate the European integration process, make the parties go to the extremes, 
namely by taking provocative actions in the security zone. Since the end of 2013, the situation in 
the security zone has been considerably aggravated by unilateral actions of the Moldovan and 
Transdniestrian authorities. Among such actions are increases in the number of different kinds of 
security forces deployed there as well as the setting up of new posts without prior arrangement with 
the JCC. Russian peacekeepers have not openly interfered with this situation, being cautious about 
the potential discrediting of the peacekeeping operation format. At the same time, both Moldova 
and Transdniestria seem to have apprehended the consequences of bringing the situation beyond the 
point of no return. Eventually, all parties of the trilateral peacekeeping operation have become 
‘prisoners’ of the current situation. 
At the first glance, one can view the presence of the Russian military as a linkage that 
generates only hard leverage. However, at a closer look, the military presence also has a soft facet: 
in a form of the peacekeeping mission that was established by the consent of all the parties 
involved. The translation of military linkage to soft leverage results from the very fact that the 
presence of Russian peacekeepers on the territory of Moldova is a great obstacle for Chisinau 
joining NATO and the EU. Moscow’s aim is to preserve this factor as long as possible. In short, the 
Russian soft leverage generated from military linkage is based on the following main elements: 
legal status of the peacekeepers backed by support of local population and actual efficiency of the 
existing format of mission in terms of people’s peaceful coexistence of the two banks of the 
Dniester river; the discourses of Russian and Transdniestrian officials and media about the crucial 
importance of the presence of Russian soldiers for people’s peaceful life and strong belief in the 
inadmissibility of change of the format before a political settlement of the conflict. 
The legal foundation of the operation highlights the fact that the Russian peacekeeping 
forces on the territory of Moldova are not ‘occupational troops’. However, this is not to say that the 
peacekeepers are not safeguarding Moscow’s (geo)political ends. First, the presence of the 
peacekeeping forces upholds Moscow’s preferred option of the political settlement namely the 
creation of a con/federal state with a neutral status. Second, the Russian position of the provider of 
peacekeeping forces repels efforts of the Western countries to get ground in the conflict settlement 
and take a leading role in the process. Third, Russian peacekeeping troops are generally a deterrent 
factor to the Euro-Atlantic aspirations of the Moldovan leadership. Thus, the presence of 
peacekeeping forces can be considered to be a representation of a soft leverage: a military presence 
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has not been translated into an action directly affecting the sovereignty of the target state but rather 
has been an instrument to achieve Russia’s associated political and security objectives. 
To create political discourses and also to influence domestic politics, Russian politicians 
may also use their close ties with Moldova’s political elite, especially in the Party of Communists of 
the Republic of Moldova (PCRM) that currently enjoys the highest public support. According to the 
poll, the party’s leader Vladimir Voronin, is the most trusted compared to his competitors, Iurie 
Leanca (Liberal Democratic Party of Moldova), Marian Lupu (Democratic Party of Moldova), or 
Vlad Filat (Liberal Democratic Party of Moldova). Moldovan citizens associate Voronin primarily 
with Eurasian integration, while Filat, who is strongly associated with the European vector, is much 
less trusted as a political leader. The public opinion poll of April 2014 shows that in the next 
presidential elections the citizens would prefer to vote for Vladimir Voronin, rather than such pro-
EU politicians as Iurie Leanca, Marian Lupu or Vlad Filat.
181
 However, the Kremlin is suspicious 
about Voronin as he withdrew the decision to sign the Kozak’s memorandum for final resolution of 
the conflict. It was also Voronin who after these events initiated integration to the EU and since 
then the relations between Moscow and Chisinau have significantly worsened. 
Although Voronin ‘confessed’ about his deeds and publicly supports integration to the 
Eurasian Union, the initiative to organize a referendum on the foreign policy orientation of the 
country within the entire republic today comes not from PCRM but mainly from the Socialist Party 
of Moldova (SPM). SPM criticizes PCRM for insincerity of their declared position about the 
Eurasian Union as a priority for the country’s development: potentially having enough votes in the 
parliament PCRM does not want to initiate the national referendum on the issue. Reportedly, the 
chairman of SPM is currently absconding to Russia as in Moldova he is accused of prejudice in the 
public budget.
182
 The leader of another left-wing party, the Party of Socialists of the Republic of 
Moldova (PSRM), Igor Dodon, announced his plans to organize national referendum on the 
Eurasian integration vector or at least local referendums or citizens’ assemblies in each region of 
Moldova. He initiated the collection of signatures of the citizens supporting Eurasian integration.
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 «Кишинев призвал подконтрольные ему районы выступить против «сепаратистской» Гагаузии» [“Chisinau 




The Gagauz referendum had a serious impact on the political life of Moldovan regions. It 
should once again be underlined that Gagauzia held two referendums simultaneously – consultative 
on the foreign policy vector of the country and legislative on the “deferred status of autonomy”, 
which gives Gagauzia the right to self-determination if Moldova loses its independence. If the latter 
can be seen as a manifestation of separatist aspirations, and so can be considered as an evidence of 
the ‘hard hand’ of Moscow, the consultative referendum on political orientation of Moldova is 
rather a result of “attractive” (as Nye would say), soft leverage of Russia. According to the final 
protocols of the Central Electoral Committee of Gagauzia, 70 355 (70.04%) of citizens of Gagauzia 
eligible to vote took part in the plebiscite. The course of the foreign policy vector of the 
development of the Republic of Moldova which is directed to join the Customs Union (Russia-
Belarus-Kazakhstan) was approved by 68 182 voters, while 1 057 voters voted against. The course 
of the foreign policy vector of the development of the Republic of Moldova aimed at joining the EU 
was approved by 1 718 voters, while 66 643 voters voted against. The plebiscite was observed by 
representatives of PCRM, Party of Regions of Moldova (Chairman is Mikhail Formuzal, who is 
actually the Head of Gagauz administration), PSRM as well as representatives of non-governmental 
organizations and media. In addition, the voting was observed by a representative of the LDPR 
faction, deputy of the State Duma of the Russian Federation, Roman Khudyakov, and deputy of the 
Rada of Odessa Oblast of Ukraine Yurii Dimchoglo.
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Furthermore, it is important to bear in mind that many representatives of the Russian 
diaspora are deputies of the republican Parliament and local councils and officials of different 
levels; naturally, many of them support Russian policy. The Russian political linkage to Moldova is 
constituted largely by informal or semi-formal political contacts and ties with different Moldovan 
politicians who support integration toward the Eurasian Union. Formal political contacts are held 
mostly within the dialogue on the political settlement of the Transdniestrian conflict, economic 
cooperation between Russia and Moldova, and through some Russia-led institutions and 
organizations, in which Moldova takes part. The most important of such organizations is, of course, 
the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). Although Moldova avoids participation in its 
security structures, some platforms for political discussion remain. For example, Moldovan 
parliamentarians participate in the Inter-parliamentary Assembly of Member Nations of the CIS, 
through which the close contacts between Russian and Moldovan members of parliament can also 
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be maintained. In any case, well-established links between Russia’s and Moldova’s politicians 
provide for the channels of promotion of the Russian policy among elites and population, and this 
contributes to a strong leverage that poses a serious obstacle of the current Moldovan government  
and their pro-EU direction, though without undermining the state sovereignty as such. 
4.1.3. Summary table 
Table 1. Russian military and political linkage-leverage nexus 
ACTIVITY 












 Presence of military depots in 
Transdniestria  possible means for 
warfare 
 Political statements on Transdniestria 
(particularly, of State Duma, its 
representatives and Dmitry Rogozin)  
openly expressed threat to recognize the 
de-facto state if  Moldova does not 
change the foreign policy course 
 Demonstration of political support for 
separatist aspirations of Transdniestrian 
people and elite  threat to recognize 
the de-facto state 
 Political statements on negotiation 
and peacekeeping formats  threat 
with destabilization of the 
peacekeeping operation in case of 
change of the formats 
 Creating and fuelling discourses 
about Russian soldier as the only 
guarantor of peace  consolidation 
of Russian position in the settlement 
process 
 Use of different formats of inter-state 
dialogue  intensification of ties 







 Presence of troops  military and 
political support for the separatist 
Transdniestrian region and factor for the 
survival of its statehood 
 The critical role in the settlement process 
 conditionality power (synchronization 
strategy, principle of neutrality, 
(con)federation, etc.) 
 Use of contacts with regional political 
elite that support Russian policy and 
Russia-led integration projects  
promotion of separatist tendencies in 
Moldovan regions 
 Appeal to supportive opinion of people 
(regional referendums)  legitimization 
of military and political activity 
violating the Constitution of Moldova 
 Presence of peacekeeping forces  
preservation of position in the 
settlement process 
 Use of its critical role in the 
settlement process  channel for 
political influence in the region 
 Maintenance of status quo  
preservation of its critical role in the 
regional security 
 Demonstration of support for pro-
Eurasian political initiatives  
pressure on the foreign policy course 
of the ruling elite 
 Intensification of close ties with 
opposition political elite  creation 




4.2. Economic dimension 
4.2.1. Soft leverage 
Trade relations with CIS countries, and particularly, with Russia, are essential for the 
Moldovan economy. On this basis the Russian government uses this opportunity to influence 
Moldova’s foreign policy decisions. In 2005, Russia imposed a ban on the import of some 
Moldovan agricultural products and in spring 2006 an embargo on Moldovan and Georgian wine 
imports, but already in 2007 the import from Moldova had resumed. The wine embargo was 
imposed allegedly due to health concerns, though the true motives of this decision are far from 
protecting the health of Russian citizens. It is unlikely also that Moldova was just an accidental 
target while the real one was Georgia (the Russian relations with which were seriously heated at 
that time) and the simultaneous embargo on Moldova’s wine products was just an attempt to create 
an image of a ‘healthcare campaign’ in the Russian wine market. 
The reason behind the embargo clearly was an effort to push Moldova in regard to 
Transdniestrian settlement and as a response to active actions of the EU in this process. In 2005 the 
Ukrainian president proposed the so-called “Yuschenko plan”, but Russia, while supporting it in 
words, in deeds did not show real interest, being concerned about the introduction of Ukrainian 
peacekeepers in the security zone, supplanting the Russians. Therefore, Moscow proposed its own 
plan for the settlement of the conflict, which was denied by the Moldovan side on the ground that it 
reminded them of the Kozak Memorandum, while the Yuschenko plan was used by Chisinau to 
adopt the 2005 law belittling the status of Transdniestria.
185 
The EU, in its turn, by pressuring 
Ukraine into accepting Moldovan jurisdiction over Transdniestrian export transactions and using its 
Border Assistance Mission to Moldova (EUBAM), managed practically to reintegrate the custom 
zone of Moldova.
186
 Furthermore, Chisinau together with Tbilisi attempted to use the WTO 
negotiations on accession of Russia to influence them to limit Moscow’s economic interaction with 
their breakaway regions. 
In such a situation the Russian leadership decided to bring into play economic means of 
pressure. Some experts argued that this resulted in a way opposite to Russian desires and since the 
mid 2000s Moldova has reoriented its trade relations towards the EU but such judgments are made 
without considering the actual statistics.
187 It is true that in 2006 and 2007 the EU’s total share 
(including all member states) in Moldova’s total trade reached its maximum of 46.9 %. We should 
not disregard the fact that at that time new countries became members of the EU and naturally it 
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pushed up the share of the EU slightly. Anyway, it was a temporary effect as already in 2008 it 
rolled back to 45.1 % and in 2012 it remained still (45.2 %). The real trend is that since 2003 
Russia’s share (note, not a share of the CIS or Customs Union countries) has slightly decreased 
from 22.3% to a minimum of 14.5% in 2007 but starting from 2010 it has rapidly restored almost to 
the position of 2004 (then it was 20.5%) and 2012 was marked by 20%.
188
 To understand the scale 
of the Russian economic linkage to Moldova it should be noted that total trade turnover (as well as 
separately by export and import) between Russia and Moldova exceeds Moldova’s trade turnover 
with any other country; in this regard individual countries of the EU cannot compete with Russia. 
Thus, the real situation was that the use of Russian soft leverage gained from a weighty trade 
linkage resulted in a way that Moldova enforced political rather than economic rapprochement with 
the EU. Chisinau signed the Association Agreement with the EU on June 27, 2014. Before it was 
initiated in November 2013, Russia employed its ‘trade cudgel’ again. In September 2013 the 
Russian Federal Service on Customers’ Rights Protection and Human Well-being Surveillance 
(Rospotrebnadzor) made a decision to suspend the import of wine from Moldova until the 
Moldovan side forms “a package of measures that will ensure consistent quality and safety of 
products supplied”.189 Apparently, in response, Moldova’s Constitutional Court stopped the force 
of the government decree on the transfer of Chisinau International Airport to the concession of a 
Russian company.
190 
Next day, the Russian Federal Service for Veterinary and Phytosanitary 
Surveillance (Rosselkhoznadzor) asked Moldova to strengthen control over the fruits and 





In the beginning of January 2014 some portion of the vegetables and fruits originating from 
Moldova were banned from entering the Russian Federation.
192
 This happened due to the fact that 
the importers did not have valid quality certificates for the products transported, as 
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 Socio-economic situation of Republic of Moldova in 2012, National Bureau of Statistics, 
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Rosselkhoznadzor announced, though it was also a message to Chisinau of the possible problems it 
may face in the coming year. The Moldovan government ‘ignored’ the signal. A month after the AA 
was signed, Rosselkhoznadzor “due to the systematic violations of international and Russian 
phytosanitary requirements” introduced temporary restrictions on the import of fresh fruits from 
Moldova to Russia.
193
 It hit the country’s economy with a strong impact as during the period 
between July and October Moldova’s massive harvest of fruits was due for shipment to Russia.194 
Moreover, earlier on July 5, 2014 Rosselhoznadzor restricted imports of meat from Moldova and on 
July 18 Rospotrebnadzor suspended import of Moldovan canned fruits and vegetables into the 
territory of the Russian Federation.
195
 Moldova’s agricultural sector generates 12 percent of 
Moldovan GDP and is overwhelmingly oriented toward Russia.
196
 Obviously, restrictions on import 
of Moldovan agricultural products together with the embargo on wine can heavily hit the country, 
which even without this faces great economic problems. After all, transportation companies of 
Moldova are suffering great losses from the embargo on imports.
197
 Eventually, such a situation 
fuels the existing serious discontent among Moldovan people and businessmen about the one-sided 
foreign policy orientation of the country’s ruling elite toward the EU.198 
The trade sanctions are not the only economic leverage of Moscow. Indeed, the Kremlin is 
exploiting such traditional economic tools of Russia as energy supplying and energy pricing. In the 
mid 2000s Moscow announced a move to a market-based gas pricing system with countries of its 
Near Abroad who follow the European vector of integration. Naturally, the post-Soviet countries, 
which were used to enjoying preferences in relation with Gazprom during the eternal period of their 
independent living, were not ready to start paying ‘European’ prices for gas, even though Russia 
proposed an adaptation period with gradual increases of price. The year 2006 started with a gas war 
between Gazprom and Moldova, similar to the war with Ukraine in the same period. Moldova 
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refused to pay the offered ‘market price’ and in January 2006 Gazprom cut off gas supplies. 
Eventually, it forced Moldova to accept the almost twofold increase in the price of gas and to hand 
over to Gazprom the Transdniestrian share of the Moldovan energy company, Moldovagaz. This led 
to the situation in which Gazprom now possesses 63.4 % of shares of the Moldovan gas distribution 
monopoly.
199
 A similar situation happened in the electricity power supply sector earlier in 
November 2005: Russian-owned Moldavian GRES (the Transdniestrian-based power plant and the 
main electricity supplier in the region) warned the Moldovan electricity distributor Union Fenosa 
about its intention to raise the price due to the increase in price on gas it works with to produce 
electricity. Union Fenosa refused to buy electricity at the stated price, and the Moldavian GRES 




Until 2011 the formula of gas pricing for Moldova had a reduction factor on the ground of 
the gradual transition of Moldova to market gas prices; and since 2011, Moldova pays for gas as a 
‘European country’.201 Since then Moldova has received fuel on temporary contractual obligations 
as it cannot negotiate a long-term contract with Gazprom. Unlike Ukraine that has a chance to 
arrange reverse buying of at least some small portion of gas from Europe, projects aimed at 
diversification of the energy supply to Moldova, such as a pipeline from Romania, are still vague, 
and there is still no real alternative source of gas: Russia remains Moldova’s only source for 
imported gas. 
Today, Moldova seeks to get a long-term and profitable contract from Gazprom. However, 
the long negotiations did not lead to a consensus between the sides. The situation is complicated by 
the fact that Moldova has signed up to European Energy Charity and is going to implement its Third 
Energy Package (TEP), which, as is commonly known, encroaches upon Gazprom’s position in the 
European energy market and seriously harms the energy giant’s interests. Therefore, the main 
Russian precondition for giving a profitable gas contract to Moldova is a refusal of implementing 
the TEP. Obviously, this does not suit the country’s official pro-European aspirations. Nevertheless, 
acknowledging the seriousness of the situation, in 2012 the Moldovan government announced a 
delay for implementation of the third energy package until 2020; the EU accepted this. This was an 
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attempt to meet Gazprom halfway. Moscow agreed and the relations between Gazprom and 
Chisinau have somewhat stabilized.  
Although Moldova still cannot get a long-term or at least medium-term contract, each year 
Gazprom extends the existing contract for a year more. On December 25, 2013, Gazprom and 
Moldovagaz signed a new contract for 2014 and the price for gas was reduced by about 2.7%. By 
that time Moldova (without Transdniestria) had accumulated half a billion US dollars of debt for 
Russian gas and the sides agreed to determine the procedure for repayment in the first quarter of 
2014. It is possible that Gazprom will go for debt restructuring,
202
 though the negotiations can 
easily be conditioned according to the further development of the pro-European vector of the 
Moldovan government. 
The examples of complex energy and trade relations are illustrative to the process of how 
Russia uses its close and asymmetric economic cooperation with Moldova in order to prevent the 
country’s movement away from Russia toward the EU. Needless to say that Russian and Moldovan 
businesses have established profitable relations and are not happy about the possible risks the AA 
brings to Moldovan-Russian economic interaction. The AA includes the Deep and Comprehensive 
Free Trade Agreement with the EU, while in 2012 Moldova entered the CIS Free Trade Agreement. 
Russia is using this contradiction in order to create pressure on the Moldovan European choice. For 
example, Deputy Economic Development Minister of Russia Aleksei Likhachev visited Moldova 
two weeks before the signing of the AA and on the results of the bilateral consultations in 
connection with the preparation of Moldova to the Association Agreement with the EU stated:  
Moldova will not be able to combine the two regulatory systems: CIS and EU. It will 
have to make a choice. And if it is in favour of the European system, the system of CIS 
will cease to be comfortable.
203
 
Such a position is explained by the fact that simultaneous Moldovan existence in the two 
free trade regimes will affect the Russian market, which can be overflowed with undeclared 
products originating from the EU. In this regard Moscow promised to take adequate measures to 
protect its market, and this cannot but worry the economic agents from Moldova, who closely 
cooperate with Russia. On August 1, 2014, Russian Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev signed a 
resolution on the introduction of customs duties on Moldovan meat, vegetables, fruits, wheat, corn, 
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Moldovan businessmen have reasonable concerns about the future of their businesses as they’re 
afraid that uncompetitive Moldovan products will not find their niche in the EU’s market and, in 
their turn, producers from the EU will supplant Moldovan goods.
205
 Russia effectively interplays 
with concerns of the Moldovan business elite oriented at the Russian market in order to ‘break 
through the obstinacy’ of the Moldovan pro-EU government. 
All in all, trade restrictions, manipulation with gas pricing and pressure from the Moldovan 
business elite that enjoys profit from preferential economic relations with Russia, as well as a threat 
of the possible cutting-off of such preferences for conducting business on the Russian market
206
, are 
manifestations of Moscow’s leverage against the desires of the Moldovan leadership to be 
politically oriented toward the West. The described mechanism of creating pressure on Moldova 
from economic asymmetric interdependence represents the process of instrumentalization of 
economic linkage in order to gain soft leverage. In this case, the leverage is soft because it does not 
threaten sovereignty of the state and does not directly undermine authority of the centre. However, 
according to the main hypothesis of the present study, the density of economic ties can be 
transformed also into a hard type of leverage, especially when such a country as Moldova, 
characterized by weakness of the state, has a favourable environment for the interference of a 
powerful external actor on which it economically depends. 
4.2.2. Hard leverage 
According to the conceptualization given above, hard leverage is related to a threat imposed 
on a state’s political sovereignty. As a rule, the hard leverage received through linkage provokes 
stateness issues, which have been attributed to “tensions arising from incongruence between the 
state and nation”.207 Thus, the task of an actor exploiting this leverage is to create such 
incongruence. The political state sovereignty of Moldova is linked, first of all, to the territorial 
integrity of the state. Hence, the hard leverage would exert force aimed at disintegration of the 
territory or creation of the impression that there is a danger of the full disintegration if the target 
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country continues following ‘the wrongly chosen’ foreign policy direction. In this regard Russia has 
a special and unique set of tools for Moldova aimed first of all at its separatist region. 
Devyatkov notes that when in the mid 2000s due to the efforts of the EU Moldova’s custom 
space was completely reintegrated, Russia started to be concerned about “losing” Transdniestria, 
and consequently, the entirety of Moldova. Therefore, Moscow, in addition to rather symbolic and 
demonstrative humanitarian aid, started directly sponsoring the economy and budget of 
Transdniestria with stabilizing tranches, loans and, in fact, a free gas supply. Moreover, Moscow 
formalized this direct interaction with Tiraspol by signing a bilateral protocol.
208
 Since 2008, for the 
preservation of controllability of the region Russia has been carrying out humanitarian projects in 
Transdniestria, within the framework of which the social payments for the most vulnerable 
population groups has increased. This change in Russia’s policy happened due to the understanding 
that the poor socio-economic situation of the region may cause potential political destabilization 




As mentioned above, gas supply and gas price are important components of Russian 
economic linkage. Moldova has difficulty in bargaining a profitable contract with Gazprom and the 
reason for this is gas debt. In spite of the fact that Chisinau tries to pay its ‘gas bills’ on time not to 
provoke Russia, the problem is caused by the left bank of the Dniester river. The unrecognized 
Transdniestrian state has not paid for gas since 2009 and, according to the Trans-Dniester 
Republican Bank (TRB), has accumulated debt of $ 838.9 million by 2012.
210
 In fact, including 
penalties and interest for late payments this sum is much bigger. Officially, the debtor is a company, 
Moldovagaz, which is the operator of the gas-transport system in Transdniestria and Moldova. By 
2014 the total debt of Moldovagaz for natural gas to Gazprom was approaching $ 5 billion; $ 4.5 
billion of this amount is for the consumers from the left bank of the Dniester.
211
 The steady growth 
of the debt of Transdniestria for Russian gas is concurrent of a specific form of the Russian 
humanitarian aid to the region. Under the existing social programmes the population of 
Transdniestria receives gas at low prices, even lower than the procurement price. Moreover, the 
Transdniestrian government is directing the proceeds from the public not to settlements with 
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Gazprom but to the fulfilment of everyday social commitments and patching the budget “holes”. 
Russia, however, does not put pressure on Tiraspol to return the debt. 
Moscow uses the situation sophisticatedly. Russian officials repeatedly remind Chisinau 
about the necessity to rid itself of debts for Russian gas and demonstratively state that Moscow 
recognizes the integrity of Moldova and so, this debt is listed for Chisinau. Dmitry Rogozin 
unambiguously said: “If we are talking about a common state, as they say in Chisinau, then the bill 
should be shared”.212 This phrase is obviously provocative and a manifestation of representational 
force. It should be interpreted as following: if Chisinau does not want to share the bill, it has no 
reason to say that Transdniestria is a part of Moldova. Moreover, Rogozin links the resolution of the 
gas debt issue with Moldovan participation in the European Energy Packages. He stated in this 
regard that for the restructuring of the debt on gas contracts to Russia, Moldova has to reconsider its 
commitments in the relation to the second and third Energy Packages of the European Union. The 
Russian diplomat went further and warned Chisinau against its integration plans with the EU that 
will lead to a new state of relations with Moscow:  
“Now is capitalism, some people like it, some not so much. But this is predatory 
capitalism, so you have to be pragmatic. The Republic of Moldova has chosen the path of 
European integration, it is the capitalist path of development, so we will deal with them 
as capitalists, [i.e.] the capital is at the basis, first of all, the Russian capital on which the 
Moldovan side has a debt.”
213 
In September 2013 at a press-conference, when the Russian-Moldovan discussions on gas 
were at their height, Dmitry Rogozin maliciously jested with the Moldovan Minister of Economy, 
Valeriu Lazar: “Energy is important, especially in anticipation of a cold winter and autumn... 
Hopefully, you will not freeze.”214 
However, given Russia’s great authority in Transdniestria, and considering that the huge 
Moldovan gas debt is already a considerable burden for the Russian budget, it is obvious that 
Russian officials are cunning when saying that they cannot force Tiraspoltransgaz to pay. 
Apparently, Tiraspol does not pay while Russia shows tacit consent with this. This situation helps 
Moscow to keep Chisinau agitated and fearing the moment when Russia will seek payment. In 
2007, 2011 and 2012, Gazprom filed lawsuits on collecting debts from Moldovagaz. In all cases the 
International Commercial Arbitration Court at the Chamber of Commerce of the Russian Federation 
made a decision in favour of the Russian gas monopoly. However, so far Gazprom has decided not 
to take any further action. In 2013 the company submitted a new lawsuit to the court. Besides this, it 
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is important to bear in mind that the ongoing gas contract signed in 2006 has already expired and 
Russia can simply decide to stop its prolongation and put severe conditions for signing a new one. 
An opposite example, when Russian officials do separate the left and right Dniester banks, 
can be illustrated by the 2013 selective embargo on Moldovan wine imported to Russia. Unlike the 
embargo of 2006, when Transdniestrian wine producers suffered no less than producers from the 
opposite side of the river, the restriction of 2013 does not concern Transdniestrian companies that 
proved to be “responsible” wine producers.215A similar situation is observed with Gagauz wineries. 
The organization of referendum in Gagauzia brought concrete positive results to its economy. 
Already in the beginning of March 2014, a month after the results of the referendum were 
announced, Rospotrebnadzor stated that upon request of the head of Gagauzia it would examine the 
local wine products to address the gradual resumption of supplies to Russia that had been stopped as 
a part of embargo on import of all Moldovan wine since September 2013.
216
 On March 28, 2014 
during the visit of representatives of Gagauzia to Moscow the parties agreed that a joint laboratory 
will be opened in the autonomous region to control the quality of wine. In its turn Gagauzia 
promised to provide a five-year tax exemption for Russian businessmen who are willing to invest in 
the wine sector. The local authorities are considering creation of a single brand Wines of Gagauzia 
to export high-quality products to Russia.
217
 In April, Rospotrebnadzor restated that the quality of 
wines from Gagauzia rouses no censors.
218
 In May, it was announced that Rospotrebnadzor 
approved supply of wines from Gagauzia.
219
 Eventually, Moscow lifted a ban on wine export from 
the main Gagauzian producers, while the embargo on wine export from other regions of Moldova, 
except Transdniestria, remained in place. Moreover, in Septmber 2014 delegation of 
Rosselkhoznadzor visited Gagauzia and assessed the quality and fulfilment of phytosanitary 
requirements for agricultural products produced in the region at the “highest” level. The Gagauz 
authorities hope that Rosselkhoznadzor would make an exception for Gagauzian producers and let 
them export fruits and vegetables to Russia despite the general ban on import of fresh fruits from 
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 Such actions point at Russia’s efforts to eventually separate economically both 
Gagauzia and Transdniestria from Chisinau. 
More generally, contacts with political and business elites between Russia and Gagauzia 
play an important role in promoting Russian interests. The example of the funding of the Gagauzian 
referendums illustrates this fact. Although the People’s Assembly of Gagauzia approved the 2014 
regional budget with special funding for the referendums, the authorities of Moldova were against 
the plebiscite and ensured that the Court declared their illegal nature. Eventually, respective 
budgetary and financial operations were blocked. Nevertheless, significant amounts of money were 
allocated to the purpose of holding the referendum by two Russian businessmen of Moldovan 
origin, Yuri Yakubov and Renato Usaty.
221
 Intrinsically, the actions of the businessmen have 
reinforced the incongruence between the centre and the region; the consolidation of the ‘autonomy’ 
of Gagauzia is supported, and the confrontation with Chisinau becomes inevitable. The end effect of 
their actions corresponds to a threat to the political sovereignty of a state and therefore can be 
considered as hard leverage. This is not to say that all actions of the referred businessmen are falling 
within the category of supporting Russia’s hard leverage. Both of them, for instance, sponsor 
various cultural and social projects in Moldova and this can be seen already as a manifestation of 
soft leverage, since it is not actually aimed at fostering centrifugal tendencies. 
All in all, Russian economic hard leverage against Moldova works in a way that provides for 
greater economic independence of its breakaway region, Transdniestria, as well as of the 
autonomous territory of Gagauzia. As the statements made by Russian officials show, since 2012 
Russia has significantly increased the amount of financial and humanitarian aid for PMR and 
provides expert support to the unrecognized republic’s strategic socio-economic planning.222 
Various social, educational and cultural programmes back up the economic support,
223
 while 
pursuing two main goals. First, Russia seeks to meet all immediate social and economic needs of its 
compatriots, which allows maintaining the image of the major provider of critical goods. Second, 
this policy is aimed at making Transdniestria more developed economically than the right bank of 
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the Dniester River, which is expected to attract people of Moldova to the Transdniestrian (Russian) 
side and to demonstrate to them that only a close cooperation with Russia and the choice of the 
Eurasian integration guarantee a prosperous future of Moldova within the single state.
224
 
4.2.3. Summary table 
Table 2. Russian economic linkage-leverage nexus 
ACTIVITY 













 Indulgence towards growing gas debt of 
Transdniestria listed for Chisinau and 
Gazprom’s regular winning of lawsuits 
on collecting debts from Moldovagaz 
combined with expired long-term 
contract on gas supply (and respective 
political statements)  triggering a fear 
that money for the debt accumulated by 
the separatist region will be called for at 
any time, otherwise gas supply can be 
suspended 
 Economic support aimed at stabilization 
of the socio-economic situation in the 
pro-Russian regions  maintenance of 
the image of Russia as an important 
provider of critical social goods in these 
regions 
 Rospotrebnadzor’s and 
Rosselkhoznadzor’s notices, statements 
and occasional bans of some 
consignments to enter Russia   
threatening with potential actions against 
essential sectors of Moldovan economy 
 Creating discourses of incompatibility of 
the CIS FTZ and the DCFTA of the AA 
 threatening with an impossibility to 
combine two free trade regimes and 
negative consequences of pro-European 
choice for bilateral economic relations 
 Creating discourses of negative 
consequences of the AA for Moldovan 
economy  threatening Moldovan 
business elite with a loose of profit due 
to the terms and conditions provided in 
the Agreement 
 Use of contacts with Russian 
businessmen of Moldovan origins 
(funding social and cultural projects and 
events)  promotion of pro-Russian 








 Listing Transdniestrian gas debt for 
Chisinau   provocation of either-or-
decision from Chisinau in regard to 
Transdniestrian independence 
 Negotiations on restructuring of the 
Transdniestrian gas debt  influence 
 Embargo on wine and agricultural 
products in 2006  influence upon the 
joint actions of Moldova and EU to 
blockade Transdniestrian export 
 Embargo on wine in 2013  influence 
upon the decision to sign the 
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upon implementation of the EU’s Third 
Energy Packages through provocation of 
either-or decision from Chisinau in 
regard to the Transdniestrian 
independence 
 Humanitarian aid, social projects and 
subsidies for Transdniestria  
stabilization of socio-economic situation 
in the separatist region of Moldova 
 Humanitarian aid, social projects and 
subsidies for Transdniestria  widening 
the gap of social welfare between left 
and right banks to make the separatist 
region attractive for people of Moldova 
 Selective embargo on import  
economic separation of Transdniestria 
and Gagauzia from the centre 
 Use of contacts with Russian 
businessmen of Moldovan origins  
activities aimed at reinforcement of the 
incongruence between the centre and 
regions (funding the referendum) 
Association Agreement 
 Embargo on agricultural products and 
introduction of customs duties following 
the signing the Association Agreement 
in 2014  pressure on Moldovan 
economy triggering further discontent 
among businessmen and people about 
one-sided foreign policy orientation of 
the country 
 Gas and electricity cut off due to non-
payment of ‘European’ market-based 
price in 2005-06  influence upon the 
start of active approximation of 
Moldova with Western countries 
 Gas pricing policy and negotiations 
about a long-term gas contract and debt 
restructuring  influence upon the 
implementation of the EU’s Third 
Energy Package 
4.3. Socio-cultural dimensions 
4.3.1. Soft leverage 
Intensive flow of people from one country to another is an obvious result of the aggregate of 
social and cultural links. At the same time, migration has an important economic effect, and 
therefore it is reasonable to continue analysis of the Russian linkage-leverage nexus with this type 
of social linkage that constitutes potentially strong leverage on Moldovan political orientation. 
Migration remains an important factor influencing relations between the countries. According to 
even modest official statistics of Moldova, 223 400 people aged 15 years and over were working or 
looking for work in Russia in 2012. Compared with other countries Russia is receiving the lion 
share (68.1 %) of Moldovan labour migrants and since 2010 after the drop followed the crisis of 
2008-2009 the share has been again rapidly growing.
225
 The real number of Moldovan labour 
migrants in Russia, according to different Moldovan and Russian experts and officials, varies from 
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300 000 to 1 000 000 people. The number which is the most commonly referred to is 700 000-750 
000 people.
226
 Such a high number is a result of various factors. Moldovan workers enjoy a 
preferential regime for labour migrants in Russia as their country is a member of the CIS and signed 
the corresponding agreements regulating migration with Moscow in multilateral and bilateral 
formats. However, the most important factor that facilitates migration flows is cultural linkage: 
most of the Moldovans who go to Russia for work speak Russian, they are well-adapted to the 
Russian way of living, as the two nations have a long history of coexistence in a single state and are 
representatives of the Russian Orthodox culture, and, simply, many workers from Moldova are 
ethnic Russians. In addition, the common Soviet past left a developed transport and communication 
infrastructure that connects people and facilitates travel and cooperation between Russia and 
Moldova. 
In 2012, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) reported that Moldova is one of the largest 
recipients of personal transfers (remittances and workers’ compensation) in the world relative to 
GDP. By 2012, the personal transfers accounted for almost a quarter of Moldova’s GDP, and more 
than half of them originated from Russia (followed by the EU).
227 
According to Forbes estimates 
based on data of IMF and Central Bank of Russia, in 2012, personal transfers from Russia to 
Moldova amounted to $ 1.18 billion that accumulated 15 % of Moldovan GDP.
228 
Russian official 
estimates indicate the Russian share as being up to 30 % of Moldova’s GDP.229 Having such a 
significant linkage Moscow may employ it to create a leverage aimed at the suspension of further 
Europeanization spill-over in Moldova. For instance, by restricting overall migration legislation, 
which is now relatively liberal and still has enough room for additional restricting measures, Russia 
may try to make the Moldovan leadership reconsider relations with Moscow and Brussels in favour 
of the former. Starting on January 1, 2014 the Russian government has introduced a number of 
changes in immigration laws. The main change that concerns Moldovan labour migrants concerns a 
term limit (90 days within six months) for immigrants who are not holders of patents for a guest 
worker or do not have permission to work. Another legislative change that affects Moldovan 
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 «Соглашение о трудовой миграции выгодно для российско-молдавских отношений – Мухаметшин» 




workers is related to the ban on the use of driver’s licenses except Russian ones. These changes 
already closed the way back to Russia for some Moldovan working migrants.
230
 
Eventually, it allows Moscow to exert conditionality power that can be seen as one of the 
forms of soft leverage generated through migration linkage. In 2013, Russian and Moldovan 
authorities signed an agreement on labour migration covering the protection of rights of migrant 
workers. In parallel with this agreement, the sides were compiling another document regarding 
readmission. The negotiations about the latter agreement are making difficult progress most likely 
because of the Russian position that the new agreements between Moldova and the EU are hardly 
compatible with the existing agreements between Moldova and the CIS and will affect Russia’s 
cooperation with Moldova. The Russian experts are taking this development into consideration 
while compiling a text of any new cooperation agreements with Moldova.
231According to Russia’s 
embassy in Moldova, the two governments are due to sign three new agreements on migration 
during 2014 and, as Vladimir Socor notes, “this opens scope for Moscow to instrumentalize the 
issue politically”. It is expected that Russia can introduce entry visa requirements for citizens of 
countries that did not join the Eurasian Union, reserving the privilege of visa-free entry to Russia 




Dmitry Rogozin often refers in his statements regarding the future of Moldova in the EU to 
statistics, underlining that more than 700 000 Moldovans work in Russia and this number is at least 
double the number of Moldovans working in the EU. In his opinion, this highlights the fact that the 
Moldovan people have already made their choice in favour of integration with Russia, while 
‘myopic’ ruling politicians in Chisinau mislead the country in another direction.233 Subsequently, 
Russian officials have openly connected the introduction of new migration restrictions for 
Moldovan workers with the signing of the AA between Chisinau and Brussels. Today, Moldovans 
enjoy preferential terms for working in Russia but Russia can cancel these terms after Moldova 
signed the AA. The Head of the Department for Cooperation with the CIS countries under the 
Russian Ministry of Economic Development, Alexander Tsybulsky, who is participating in 
negotiations with Moldova on future trade and economic relations of the countries, said that if 
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Moldovans “simplify visa relations with the EU, then there are risks of the cross-flow of migrant 
labour; so […] we can get away from the preferential treatment and move to a normal one, with the 
registration”.234 He also, not without purpose, noted that the share of personal transferences of 
migrant workers in Moldova’s GDP, according to some experts, reaches 40 %.235 
A common and rich historical past as well as cultural proximity of Russia and Moldova form 
a natural linkage of a particular nature. This is because the cultural linkage relies upon aspirations 
of local population traditionally supporting Russia, as a result of shared historical and cultural 
experience. The instrumentalization of this linkage is especially relevant if the economic and 
political pressure is not sufficiently effective. It can be transformed into leverage by intensifying its 
dialogue with local people traditionally favourably disposed toward the intervening external actor. 
Through visits of Russian officials, parliamentarians, public figures and experts as well as through 
special programmes of Rossotrudnichestvo, Russkiy Mir Foundation and other assistance 
organizations, Moscow has maintained and enhanced social linkage between Russia and its 
compatriots in Moldova. Both ethnic Russians (6 % of total population) and people who speak 
Russian as their native language (11.3 %) of Moldova are playing the leading role in this socio-
cultural dialogue. A well-developed infrastructure of communication and interaction within the 
Russian diaspora, comprising numerous pro-Russian organizations and media, has successfully 
contributed to the creation of a particular discourse influencing the whole population, of which 16 




Orthodox religion is an intangible but appreciable ‘string’ that connects Moldovan society 
with the Russian, and Moscow’s politicians are trying to ‘strike a right chord’ that would resonate 
with Russia’s desire of empowering the Eurasian Union.237 Russian official and semi-official 
representatives are keen to underline common Christian values uniting different ethnic groups and 
nations under the Orthodox religion, while contrasting them with Western ‘liberalist approaches’ 
portrayed as undermining the traditional foundations. The Russian Orthodox Church became a main 
messenger in this ‘spiritual dialogue’. An illustration of this fact was the visit of the Patriarch of 
Moscow and All Russia in September 2013 to Moldova, which was devoted to the 200
th
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Anniversary of the establishment of the Moldovan Orthodox Church. The date coincided with a 
year, when Moldova was going to proceed further with its Western civilization choice, about which 
the Patriarch was most concerned and urged the faithful Moldovans to preserve the spiritual ties 
with Saint Rus’ and “not to sell the soul”.238 
Pro-Russian mass media, broadcasting and publishing both in Moldovan and Russian, 
reinforces the cultural linkage. This informational dimension generates a powerful instrument for 
the intention of Russian leadership to shape the preferences of the Moldovan society. According to 
the public opinion poll conducted in April 2014, the Russian TV channel Prime TV is the most 
watched and most trusted source of information and the situation has not changed much in 
comparison with previous years.
239
 Moldovan expert, Victoria Boian, explains the great support of 
Moldovan citizens to Russian television and radio by the historical background that makes people 
“feel more secure and open to receiving information from Russian sources”.240 Mass media became 
a major factor that backs up Russian influence on perceptions of the Moldovan population. This 
factor combined with the described set of Russia’s socio-cultural linkage-leverage actions allows 
Moscow to maintain the required level of loyalty within Moldovan society. According to the public 
opinion barometer, when asked how they will vote at a referendum on the accession of the Republic 
of Moldova to the European Union, 44 % of the respondents of the sample claimed that they would 
vote for it and 37 % would vote against it. When requested to express the opinion related to the 
accession of Moldova to the Customs Union (Russia-Belarus-Kazakhstan), 45 % of the sample 
expressed a positive opinion, 34 % of the sample stated they would vote against it. As for 
international politicians, Moldovans displayed the out-of-reach level of trust in Vladimir Putin (62 
%). Only 44 % of citizens trust in Angela Merkel followed by Barack Obama (35 %).
241
 
Against such a favourable background, Russia, however, is concerned about the fact that 
many representatives of the young generation relate their future with the West.
242
 This fact is 
evident from statistics of the IOM showing that in 2010 almost 90 % of Moldovan students 
studying abroad chose Romanian universities, while Russia had a share of only of 2.7 % (equal to 
that of Bulgaria and similar to that of Ukraine (2.6%)).
243
 Acknowledging the threat of losing an 
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important linkage, in February 2013, the Russian ambassador to Moldova announced the increase of 
the number of quotas for free education in Russian universities for students from Moldova.
244
 
The Russian social and cultural links to people of Moldova help to maintain the public 
opinion supportive for Moscow’s political line and integration projects on the high level. These 
foreign policy actions can be consequently, seen as a representation of soft leverage, which are 
mainly directed at preventing the ruling authorities from choosing a ‘wrong’ direction. At least in 
part, the recognition of the importance of Russia’s soft leverage by the government of Moldova 
triggered the decision of Chisinau to accelerate the process of approximation with the EU, namely 
the signature and application of the Association Agreement before the parliament elections, which 
are scheduled for the end of 2014. However, Russian foreign policy tools are not exhausted by the 
soft leverage that does not undermine authority of Chisinau and legitimacy of the ruling elite 
directly, and in addition to it, Russia utilizes its socio-cultural linkage in a way that produces hard 
leverage against the Moldovan state. 
4.3.2. Hard leverage 
The structure of the present work reasonably dictates the subsequence of aspects of the 
Russian linkage-leverage nexus with which analysis should proceed next. I have described above 
how migration links between Moldova and Russia provide Moscow with strong but soft leverage 
based mostly on conditionality power exerted in the process of signing the new cooperation 
agreements with Moldova. However, besides resorting to conditionality power Moscow can simply 
deport Moldovans or refuse them entry to Russia on various legal pretexts, especially considering 
the fact that at least 60 % of Moldovan labour migrants in Russia are working illegally.
245
 In 2013, 
according to official data of the Federal Migration Service of Russia, 562 861 Moldovans were in 
the country. Out of them more that 288 000 people are labelled as a “risk category” in legal terms, 
implying that they have violated immigration or other laws.
246
 22 000 Moldovan workers have been 
either repatriated outright, or slapped with interdiction to return to Russia, after breaching labour or 
residency regulations.
247
 In September 2013, when the Vilnius summit, where Moldova and 
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Gerogia initialed the AA, was approaching, the head of the Gagauzian autonomous district of 
Moldova, Mikhail Formuzal, noticed that the cases of deportation became more frequent and 
warned that with the signing of the AA Moldovan migrants workers may face even more 
problems.
248
 Vladimir Socor notes that in January 2014, the Russian government announced long-
overdue measures to bring some order to the foreign workers’ employment system. He expects that 
Moscow can enforce such measures selectively, “reflecting at least in part political considerations” 
and “might well imply a wave of repatriations from Russia and interdictions to return”, and 
Moldova could be the prime target for selective enforcement. Eventually, mass unemployment 
would hit the country in that case.
249
 
According to estimations of the investigation made by Expert-Grup, deportation of the “risk 
category” workers from Russia would lead to the following consequences: reduction of personal 
remittances by around 35 %, decrease in amount consumed by 9.4 %, slump in budget revenues by 
8.3 %, decrease in on-budget expenditures by 10.5 %, and outflow of investments by 4 %.
250
 In 
addition to negatively impacting the economic growth of the country, this type of leverage affects 
the family budget of Moldovan citizens and may cause social discontent against the pro-EU 
government of the state. Many experts consider the threat of mass expulsion of Moldovan workers 
currently employed in Russia as Moscow’s intention to influence the electoral campaign (scheduled 
for autumn 2014) in favour of opposition forces.
251
 Some experts, like Ruslan Shevchenko, even 
suppose that after the election a ‘Maidan-like’ situation could take place in Moldova and the 
deported Moldovan labour migrants can be used as a driving force in these developments.
252
 At the 
same time, there is an expert opinion that Russia is unlikely to opt for mass deportations of 
Moldovan migrant workers and rather “it may expel smaller groups of Moldovan citizens and 
publicize those cases through the Russian media in order to unsettle the public in Moldova”.253 One 
way or another, migration as a socio-economic as well as socio-cultural link can be transformed into 
a hard leverage that would undermine pillars of the incumbent pro-EU leadership in Chisinau: this 
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can lead to a deep political crisis, in which the opposite sides will be supported either by Russia or 
the EU. In this case, sovereignty and subsequently territorial integrity of the Moldovan state would 
be seriously challenged. 
Close economic and socio-cultural links to Russian compatriots living within the entire post-
Soviet space have been widely used by Moscow for the purpose of legitimization of its foreign 
policy actions toward the Near Abroad countries.
254
 Moreover, the high density of such ties in 
countries with serious stateness issues contributes to production of powerful Russian hard leverage. 
In the case of Moldova, the stateness problems are primarily related to the Transdniestrian region 
which hosts about 200 000 people with Russian passports. The right bank of the Dniester River also 
harbours a populous Russian diaspora, and many of its representatives are Russian citizens. The 
Russian officials are keen to highlight this fact and to stress that the Russian citizens will be 
protected by any possible means.
255
 As both the actions and statements made by Russian and 
Transdniestrian officials show, the idea of the protection of Russian citizens has been fundamental 
to the Kremlin, including when it decided to significantly increase the amount of financial and 
humanitarian aid for PMR and provide expert support to the unrecognized republic’s strategic 
socio-economic planning in 2012.
256
 
The problem of the rights of compatriots, especially in Transdniestria, is included in the 
process of the domestic politics in Russia, and therefore Russia’s accusations of Moldova being in 
violation of the rights of Russian compatriots have been a permanent issue in dialogue between the 
two countries. Different Russian public figures, ‘patriotic’ organizations, experts and media 
attentively monitor the situation in the post-Soviet space. If Moscow makes serious concessions 
without guarantees securing its interests and interests of its compatriots, they will voice against the 
possible “surrender” of Transdniestria and Russians living in the region.257  
Various political figures, especially members of the State Duma and the Federal Council, as 
well as Russian experts, appreciate and support strong Eurasianist aspirations of the Transdniestrian 
leadership. In November 2012, the non-profit organization “Eurasian Integration” was established 
in Moscow with the support of Dmitry Rogozin, Representative of the Russian President on 
Transdniestria, and with a purpose of “the development and implementation of the financial 
assistance for PMR” under the implementation of the initiative “Eurasian region ‘Pridnestrovie’”, (a 
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response to the Euroregion “Dniester”).258 More than $ 100 million are earmarked for 
implementation of various humanitarian projects aimed at the socio-economic development of 
Transdniestria for 2013-2015.
259
 To spread information about Transdniestrian desire to integrate the 
Eurasian project as well inform about the advantages of the Eurasian Economic Union for Moldova, 
Moscow provides pro-Russian mass-media on both Dniester’s banks with technical support and 
journalist training.
260
 There is therefore a continuous and purposeful policy of activation of a 
number of the existing links to support the linkage-leverage transformation in the case of Russia’s 
policy towards its compatriots. 
Arguably the most significant instrument supporting this transformation is the Russian 
policy of ‘passportisation’. This particular ‘compatriot instrument’ employed for legitimization of 
the policy towards Moldova, has especially caused concerns in Chisinau. The claim that the Russian 
citizens are under the protection of their state regardless of their place of living became an 
important guideline for the Kremlin’s foreign policy.261 After Receiving Russian citizenship, people 
form a strong linkage to Moscow, which, coupled with Russia’s proclaimed duty to protect its co-
citizens, creates a direct threat to the sovereignty of the respective states, thereupon the high-
capacity hard leverage emerges. The presence of a large number of Russian citizens was a casus 
belli for Russia’s vigorous military response to Georgian aggression toward South Ossetia in 
August 2008 and subsequently legitimate ground for recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. 
The passportisation policy that took place in these two breakaway regions since 2002-2003 and 
prior to the 2008 Russian-Georgian war is similar to the policy of granting Russian citizenship to 
Moldovans, particularly, in Transdniestria. From Tiraspol’s point of view, a Russian passport is a 
deterrent of possible Moldovan aggression, while Chisinau considers this as a soft annexation of its 
territory. In any event, the present case is a representation of Russia’s active transformation of 
linkage into leverage. 
To consolidate this linkage, Russia has been trying to persuade Chisinau to open a consulate 
in Transdniestria and other regions of Moldova, while justifying this aspiration by difficulties to 
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provide consulate services for such a large number of Russian citizens. Moldovan leaders have 
rejected this idea. In 2013, Dmitry Rogozin threatened Chisinau with the opening of an embassy in 
Tiraspol if Moldova did not agree to open a consulate.
262
 While advancing his argument, Rogozin 
(just like some other Russian politicians such as deputies of the Russian state Duma, Roman 
Khudyakov, Leonid Slutsky and Vladimir Zhirinovsky) often refers to rhetorical questioning of the 
sovereignty and integrity of the Moldovan state, highlighting the independence of Transdniestria 
and its historical roots as a land of Russians. Such rhetoric aims to become a tool of psychological 
pressure on the Moldovan leadership and functions in a form of “representational force”, as a 
constructivist would have it. This policy has a favourable historical ground, which allows actors like 
the Russkiy Mir foundation to reinforce the association with the glorious history of Russian 
Bessarabia, resonating with the discourse of Russian and pro-Russian politicians and civil society 
activists. 
Russia possesses an extensive and well-established cultural linkage to Gagauzia, which has 
the potential to be transformed into hard leverage up to the point of directly threatening the 
territorial and political integrity of Moldova. Historical, cultural and language factors determine 
Gagauzia’s close ties with Russia. The Russian language is widely used among the Gagauz 
population, which in spite of its Turkic roots, is orthodox in its religion. Almost all educational 
institutions of Gagauzia teach in Russian and this language is prevailing in local mass media. 
Hence, it comes as no surprise that the region has always resisted the expansion of the Romanian 
language, resulting in deep and frequent tensions between Komrat and Chisinau. Gagauz people are 
also dissatisfied by its de-facto exclusion from the decision-making process of the republic in regard 
to foreign policy, though the Law on the Special Legal Status of Gagauzia stipulates this right of 
Gagauz.
263
 Thus, it is not suprising that the Gagauzian region held the abovementioned referendums 
on the foreign policy vector of the country and on the “deferred status of autonomy”, results of 
which brought humanitarian aid and political and economic preferences of Moscow to Gagauzia. 
Russia is actively using interregional cooperation as an effective way to integrate pro-
Russian regions with the Eurasian Union. In the Moldovan context, where the central authorities are 
focusing on the development of trade and economic relations primarily with the EU, the population 
is clearly divided on this matter, the socio-economic linkage can be transformed into hard leverage 
as it may support centrifugal tendencies within the state. This is illustrated by the example of 
Gagauzia’s close relations with the Russian regions. In recent years Gagauzia has entered into 
cooperation agreements with more than 10 regions of Russia. After the Gagauzian plebiscites at the 
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end of March 2014, a joint delegation of the People’s Assembly and the Executive Committee of 
Gagauzia visited Moscow region and signed a number of agreements on economic, cultural and 
humanitarian cooperation with one of the economically largest regions of Russia. The agreement as 
such rather contributes to the production of soft leverage than hard as they are a result of 
agreements with the government of the Moscow region in the sphere of healthcare and education. In 
particular, the agreement stipulates each year, for about 350 graduates of Gagauzia to obtain free 
education and accommodation in Russian universities, and for about 400 teachers to go to Russia to 
upgrade their qualification and skills. Russia will furthermore receive around 50 Gagauz citizens in 
need of special treatment as well as provide necessary equipment to all three district hospitals of 
Gagauzia. Finally, Moscow region authorities intend to deliver ten ambulances to the autonomous 
region and to train Gagauz doctors in Russia.
264
 
However, the main destination of this delegation was Moscow itself, where they had a 
productive meeting with the delegates of the State Duma. Reportedly, it was agreed that obtaining 
Russian passports for the citizens of the autonomous region will be facilitated. The Gagauzian 
delegation also reported that the parties came to an agreement regarding the issue of subsidizing 
energy deliveries to the population of Gagauzia, with the gas discount up to 35-50 %.
265
 Soon after 
the delegation’s return to Gagauzia, the Russian ambassador in Moldova visited the region with 
humanitarian aid in the form of schools manuals and utensils for an Orthodox church being built in 
Komrat,
266
 and in order to discuss implementation of the agreements achieved in Moscow.
267
 
Even before these arrangements with Russia, the example of Gagauzia has inspired other 
regions of Moldova with close cultural ties to Russkiy Mir. In February 2014, the Party of Socialists 
of the Republic of Moldova sent an application for holding a Gagauzia-like referendum in the 
Municipal Council of the second largest predominantly Russian-speaking city of Moldova, Balti. 
The application was initially registered but in the end the initiative was blocked in the Municipal 
Council by the Party of Communists of the Republic of Moldova that occupies most of the sits in 
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 «О рабочем визите посла России в Молдавии Ф.М. Мухаметшина в Гагаузии» [“On Working Visit of the 










 «Фарид Мухаметшин не видит острой необходимости в открытии консульства в Комрате» [“Farid 






 Prior to the referendum in Gagauzia, the local deputies of Tipala 
commune in Ialoveni district on the behalf of their electorate signed a declaration expressing their 
“support and solidarity” for the citizens of Gagauzia in the organization of a consultative 
referendum on accession to the Customs Union. They also demanded that the central authorities of 
Moldova organize an analogous referendum at the national level. In particular, it was stated: 
“We appeal to all citizens of the Republic of Moldova to support this Declaration. If 
the authorities of countries once again ignore the will of people, we reserve the right 
to organize and conduct referendum regarding accession to the Customs Union at the 
local level”.269 
In addition, the head of Taraclia, a Bulgarian-populated district of Moldova, Aleksandr 
Garanovskiy, and mayor of the capital of Basarabeasca, Nikolay Nikolayev, took part in the 
meeting in Komrat in support of the referendum.
270
 
On February 2, 2014, the meetings in support of the Gagauzian referendum on Moldova’s 
foreign policy and deferred status of independence took place in a number of localities of Moldova, 
including Chisinau, Balti, Basarabeasca and Taraclia. Importantly, in neighbouring Taraclia and 
Basarabeasca districts there were even assemblies of citizens in support of the issues raised by the 
Gagauz. In Chisinau, the meeting in support of the Gagauz plebiscite was held in front of the 
Russian Embassy. According to mayor of Taraclia, Sergey Filipov, assemblies at Taraclia district 




It is important to understand that the Russian cultural linkage resulting from Russia’s 
relations with its compatriots and Russian-speaking population generates both powerful soft and 
hard leverage on Chisinau. The former aims at creating an impact on the pro-European Moldovan 
orientation. The latter represents an intensified version of the former, and combined with economic 
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and political pressure, it can trigger internal region-centre confrontations and thus create a direct 
threat to the authority of Chisinau. 
4.3.3. Summary table 
Table 3. Russian social and cultural linkage-leverage nexus 
ACTIVITY 












 Threat of deportation of illegal Moldovan 
guest workers from Russia  influence on 
the upcoming elections and formation of 
critical mass discontented with one-sided 
foreign policy of the ruling elite 
(eventually may lead to public unrest) 
 The declared readiness to protect Russian 
citizens and compatriots with all possible 
means wherever they are (particularly in 
Transdniestria)  threat of the use of 
force in case of violations of the rights of 
these people that form a large group of the 
Moldovan population  
 Political statements highlighting vital need 
to open a consulate in Tiraspol; “otherwise 
an embassy should be opened”  threat of 
recognizing Transdniestria as an 
independent state in order to ensure rights 
of co-citizens 
 Political statements portraying 
Transdniestria and the whole historical 
region of Bessarabia as a land of Russians 
 threat of recognizing and uniting 
Transdniestria (and other regions) with 
Russia 
 Involvement of Moldovan regions into 
Eurasian integration threat of “soft 
federalization” and “transdniestriazation” 
of the country or “soft recognition” of 
Transdniestrian independence 
 Discussions on further restrictions on 
labour migration  threat with 
possible economic losses due to the 
AA with EU 
 Political statements underlying great 
dependence of Moldovan socio-
economic system on labour migration 
to Russia and highlighting 
irrationality of the Moldova decision-
makers   threatening with possible 
consequences following the signing 
of the AA and introducing visa free 
regime with the EU 
 Visits of prominent Russians and 
special programmes of assistance 
organizations  mobilization of 
Russian diaspora and Russian 
compatriots 
 Activities of the Russian Orthodox 
Church and political statements 
referring to common Orthodox values 
 mobilization of people supporting 
traditional Orthodox values 
 Support for pro-Russian and 
opposition media  creating 
discourses aimed at maintaining 
loyalty within the population and 
positive image about Eurasian 
integration contrasting with negative 








 Establishment of the organization 
“Eurasian Integration” that channels 
financial assistance and coordinates 
humanitarian projects in Transdniestria  
reinforcement of public support for 
Russian policy in the separatist region of 
Moldova 
 Restricting migration legislation for 
countries that have not joined Russia-
led integration projects pressure on 
the decision of the Moldovan ruling 
elite to enter visa-free regime with 
EU 
 Political instrumentalization of the 
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 The passportisation policy (particularly in 
Transdniestria) and demands to open 
consulates in Russian-populated regions of 
Moldova  expanding ‘compatriot 
instrument’ to exert pressure on foreign 
policy course of the country 
 Intensification of socio-cultural activity in 
Russian-speaking Gagauzia  fuelling the 
‘forgotten’ separatist aspirations in the 
region 
 Development of cultural and social inter-
regional cooperation between Moldova 
and Russia  involving Moldovan pro-
Russian regions into Eurasian integration 
negotiations on new agreements on 
migration with Moldova  pressure 
following the signing of the AA  
 Intensification of the dialogue with 
local people favourably disposed 
toward Russia  creating public 
incentives influencing domestic 
politics 
 Increase of the number of quotas for 
free education in Russian universities 
for students from Moldova  


























Russia’s linkage-leverage nexus toward Moldova 
After the dissolution of the USSR the Moldovan political leadership made a choice in favour 
of the EU and integration into the Euro-Atlantic structures and firmly remains in this position. 
According to the main analytical argument of the present study, in response, Russia’s policy toward 
Moldova has acquired a form of linkage-leverage nexus, which is based on the transformation of the 
aggregate of highly dense multidimensional links connecting Moldovan and Russian societies into 
leverage that exerts influence on the political orientation of the elite in Chisinau. The Russian 
leadership attempts to create a subtle power that would influence the political choice of the 
Moldovan government based on wide and deep-rooted political, economic, social and cultural ties 
between the countries. 
A study of Moscow’s policy toward Moldova, therefore, should consider the whole set of 
Russian multi-dimensional levers generated from various links to the target country. The analytical 
approach based on the concept of linkage-leverage nexus perhaps suits best for such a type of 
research. The linkage-leverage analysis enables a researcher to observe various patterns of Russian-
Moldovan relations both at structural and agent levels. The present analysis captures an important 
aspect of the Russian policy toward Moldova, in which Moscow focuses on the relations with 
individual social and political groups, including opposition, pro-Russian activists and the Russian 
diaspora, who promote the Russian vector of Moldova’s development. The most promising strategy 
for Russia to support their aspirations is establishment of inter-regional relations coupled with direct 
contacts with the leadership from various Moldovan regions and municipalities. This aspect of 
Russian policy may result in the fostering of centrifugal tendencies within the state, dissolution of 
Chisinau’s authority in regions and triggering separatist aspirations within the society. 
The Moldovan stateness issues, primarily related to the Transdniestrian conflict and 
troublesome relations with Gagauzia, represent those vulnerable points of the Moldovan state, 
through which the intervention of Russian leverage is the most effective in undermining authority of 
the central power. Transdniestrians made it clear that the unrecognized republic does not support 
the foreign policy of Chisinau and seeks to integrate into the Eurasian Union. The similar choice 
has been made by Gagauzia and this creates a new challenge for the ruling elite of the country and 
may grow into a serious obstacle on the way to further approximation with the West: the de-facto 
independence of Transdniestria has lasted for 22 years and has already been perceived as something 
ordinary, but resumption of the forgotten separatism in Gagauzia may bring a damaging effect upon 
the weak Moldovan state. 
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The Russian socio-cultural linkage that generates powerful soft and hard leverage against 
today’s Moldovan political orientation lies upon the density of various formal and informal ties 
with Moldova, which if combined all together and transformed into leverage can trigger serious 
internal region-centre confrontations. Since the Moldovan regions have serious social and economic 
problems that have been ignored by the centre for a long time, the Moldovan leadership has little 
capacity to preserve authority within the state, and its territorial integrity is increasingly threatened. 
While the country’s economy and even more budgets and everyday life of a large number of 
Moldovan families rely on deep-rooted ties with Russia, the choice in favour of the EU creates 
serious challenges for the ruling political elite in Chisinau. The public opinion polls show that 
Moldovan society is divided in half, supporting integration with the EU- or Russia-led 
organisations. Under such complex conditions the artificially accelerated movement to one direction 
may result in widespread public discontent that certainly would be heated up by Russia as well as 
the EU and other Western countries, which would support respectively pro-Russian and pro-EU 
sentiments. The situation similar to the Ukrainian crisis 2013-2014 might develop. Either way, it 
means that while there is no consensus between Russia and the EU on how to conduct their 
mutually exclusive policies toward Moldova, new conflicts will continue to emerge and the 
incongruence within this country will continue to grow. 
For the researchers who study this region it would be especially interesting to apply linkage-
leverage analytical framework to Romanian policy toward Moldova, given the fact that there are 
discussions of the union between Moldova and Romania (while only around 10 % of the Moldovan 
population supports the idea)
272
. Romania is a neighbour of Moldova and has strong ethnic and 
cultural ties with this country. Bucharest is also trying to use these links in order to influence 
people’s minds, including through media propaganda, statements of various officials, politicians 
and experts. Romania launched social projects in Moldova, offers free education for Moldovan 
students, increases its consulate presence, and conducts “passportization” policy.273 That is 
something that resembles the Russian policy in Moldova. Moreover, the military agreements 
between Chisinau and Bucharest indicate an emerging military alliance between the two states. By 
and large, there are many aspects for comparative inquiry of antagonistic and at the same time 
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 For a general overview of Romanian policy toward Moldova see: «Политика Румынии по отношению к 
Молдове» [“Romanian Policy toward Moldova”], Voprosik, 20.07.2012, http://voprosik.net/politika-rumynii-v-
otnoshenii-moldavii/; see some information on recent developments in Romanian-Moldovan relations presented by 




similar Russian and Romanian policies toward Moldova and that can be well captured through the 
lenses of analysis of linkage and leverage nexus. 
Concept of linkage and leverage nexus 
The main purpose of the case study of Russian policy toward Moldova approached with a 
process tracing method was to test the concept of the spiral nexus of linkage and leverage in the 
context of asymmetric interdependent relations between powerful and weak regional actors. The 
result of the test can be considered positive as the main hypothesis is proven to be plausible. The 
task of the empirical research to find a causal mechanism of transformation of linkage into leverage 
has been achieved. The analysis shows that a multidimensional set of links between Russia and 
Moldova has been utilized by Moscow in order to create an external direct and indirect influence on 
the political decision process in Chisinau in regard to the foreign policy orientation of the country. 
It is important to note, that the research did not put forward a task to decide whether the Russian 
leverage on Moldova is effective or not, nor did it seek to find an answer to the widely debated 
question among political scientists of how to measure the effect of power. Instead, the theoretical 
objective was rather to understand how power in asymmetric interdependent relationships can be 
produced and what forms it may acquire. 
The thesis differentiates between two forms of leverage – soft and hard. However, the two 
notions have nothing in common with Joseph Nye’s conceptualization of soft and hard power. The 
terms ‘soft’ and ‘hard’ are used for the convenience of classification and a better understanding of 
the mechanism of linkage and leverage nexus. The study avoids discrimination between soft and 
hard as military and economic vs. non-military and non-economic. Instead, of Nye’s attempt to 
understand ‘softness’ and ‘hardness’ of power according to the nature of the means it uses274 this 
study defines soft and hard leverage taking into consideration the effect it has in regard to 
sovereignty exercised by the authority of the target state. Thus, it allows arguing that the ‘threatened 
sovereignty’ can serve as a differential factor between ‘softness’ and ‘hardness’ of leverage used 
against a weak state, and the analysis of Russian policy toward Moldova corroborates this 
conception. This approach may even explain why, for example, such foreign policy tools 
traditionally attributed to ‘soft power’ as penetration of external values (proclaimed to be 
‘attractive’) through means of NGO networks, public diplomacy, media, national branding, etc., 
may lead to grave consequences for the state building of certain nations. 
Some scholars attempt to give a definitive discrimination between ‘bad’ and ‘good’ soft 
power based on the judgement of its ideological component and use for this purpose a contested 
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notion, “democracy” and associated with it such terms as “human rights”.275 But this approach to 
comprehend mechanisms of soft power, however, limits the capabilities of a researcher to 
encompass all dimensions of the foreign policy tools of a powerful state used against its weak 
partner. Instead, the concept of linkage-leverage nexus takes into consideration Steven Lukes’ 
appeal to study the ways and mechanisms in which powerful agents “influence others’ conceptions 
of their own interests”, and shape (not only limiting but also widening) personal reasoning and 
identity of other actors so that their aspirations, expectations and wants were concurred with the 
interests and wants of the powerful actor.
276
 The use of leverage generated from strong Russian 
linkage to its compatriots abroad demonstrates how power can work not only to limit the scope of 
one’s self-identity but also to widen it by emphasizing certain aspects of his/her identity important 
to the external power. I refer to this functional form of linkage-leverage nexus as potential activity. 
The analysis of Russian policy in Moldova demonstrates that potential leverage is targeted at 
individuals and certain social groups such as political and business elite as well as people with pro-
Russian sentiments and those supporting traditional values. One of the purposes of potential 
leverage is to create a fear among the target audience that the beneficial links to them can be cut off 
and this would damage their social, political or economic situation. Another purpose of potential 
linkage is to create a discourse that potential widening and densifying of existent links may bring 
more benefits for these individuals and social groups. The study points to an important finding of 
the analysis: the links attributed to the cultural dimension are actively engaged in producing soft as 
well as hard leverage and they are instrumentalized through both potential and actual mechanisms 
of linkage-leverage nexus. Therefore, they should not be neglected by Foreign Policy analysts, and 
the thesis invites scholars to include cultural dimensions into the study of linkage and leverage as 
two factors of external influence and in broader discussions on power. 
In this context, the thesis puts forward an assumption that requires comparative study 
between Russia’s and the EU’s linkage-leverage nexus in the post-Soviet space. I suppose that in 
terms of socio-cultural links Russia and the EU have a difference that puts the former in an 
advantageous position: if the EU’s policy is based on spreading and planting overwhelmingly new 
values within the post-Soviet states, Russia is just intensifying those values that are common to the 
societies of their partner states due to their shared history and experience. Penetration of new values 
is more likely to be opposed by local populations and such an attitude of society might be used by 
alternative powers to antagonize the values of the ‘invader’, while the revival of common values 
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and positive experiences from the shared past can make people be well disposed toward a ‘fraternal’ 
country using such policy. 
 If a potential mechanism of linkage-leverage nexus threatens the target actor with cutting 
links beneficial and essential to it, the actual one implements the threats into concrete foreign policy 
actions really cutting off these links. The summary tables of empirical research of potential-actual 
and soft-hard leverage generated from linkage present the reinforcing tendencies between causes 
and outcomes as it is possible to see how a certain outcome of causal mechanism of linkage-
leverage nexus transforms into a new linkage that in turn transforms again into leverage. It is also 
possible to see the high level of inter-connection between activities and impact of the causal 
mechanism of linkage-leverage nexus that actually creates a solid and integrated structure of the 
policy based on a spiral nexus of linkage and leverage. 
There is also another important difference between potential and actual leverages that has 
been revealed during the analysis: if potential leverage constructs discourses and threats, often 
based on common cultural values, and that represents power as such, in actual leverage the power of 
the dominant actor is projected through policy actions, while the references to common cultural 
values are aimed only at underpinning and legitimizing such actions. It is important to bear in mind 
that in the linkage-leverage nexus concept culture is understood as a set of links comprising 
proximity of language, ethnicity, religion and identities between interacting states as well as their 
shared past and historical memory that contributes to common patterns of behaviour. The cultural 
dimension of interdependency is an essential characteristic of the relationships between the post-
Soviet republics and Russia. Since the launch of the EaP, Russia has intensified its extensive 
cultural linkage to the post-Soviet states that fell under the ‘spell’ of the EU, and has activated its 
leverage produced from cultural links. The case of Moldova illustrates the process of such 
utilization of cultural linkage. 
The linkage-leverage nexus fits in well to the study of Russian foreign policy toward the 
post-Soviet states, since it is a kind of prism through which patterns and mechanisms of bilateral 
relations between Russia and a particular post-Soviet state can be captured both as a picture at a 
certain moment or a set of pictures at a given period of time. In other words, it allows researchers to 
analyse the Russian policy toward this state in statics and/or dynamics. This approach opens up new 
perspectives for comparative analysis of Russian foreign policy. The ‘pictures’ of the Russian 
linkage-leverage nexus from different periods of time can be compared between each other, and so 
this analytical framework can be useful for historians interested in the development of Russian 
relations with its neighbours. Since Russian policies vary in accordance with distinctions of the 
relationships with diverse post-Soviet states, the approaches based on linkage-leverage nexus 
concept can be employed for comparing Russian policies toward each of these countries to reveal 
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their sub-regional patterns. Given the accrescent West-vs.-Russia geopolitical rivalry, it is important 
to look at the similarities and differences between Russian linkage-leverage policy toward the post-
Soviet countries and linkage and leverage of the Western countries. 
In more general terms, the presented analytical framework, which adjusts the concepts of 
linkage and leverage to the ‘realities’ of the post-Soviet space and Russian policies, brings closer 
structuralist and agent-centred approaches and it is more inclusive than concepts of linkage and 
leverage originally presented by representatives of the Democratization theory, Levitsky and Way. 
Thus, the analytical approach developed in this paper can be useful also for the analysis of the 
Western influence, where the linkage and leverage similarly to the Russian ones could be 
understood as elements integrated within a single causal mechanism (nexus), in which they appear 
to be closely interconnected factors of the external influence. At the same time, the thesis 
demonstrates the fact that the two forms of external influence are not prerogatives of the West 
alone, as the Democratization theory initially had it, and so the linkage-leverage nexus can be 
applicable also to other powerful regional states in Asia, Africa or Latin America. 
I would suggest the following 10-point guideline for a researcher who intends to analyse 
asymmetrically interdependent relations between a regional dominant state and its dependent 
partner/s by employing the linkage-leverage nexus concept: 
1. Find a case of asymmetrically interdependent cooperation in the region of interest. 
2. Define objectives of the powerful actor in the region and its interests in a certain 
dependent state or group of states, i.e. role of these states in the region and 
expectations of the powerful state from their policies. 
3. Identify objectives of the dependent state or group of states and their expectations of 
the policy of the dominant regional player and alternative influential external actors. 
4. Indicate the most important dimensions of relations and links between the parties to 
cooperation, i.e. points of concentration of their linkage. 
5. Identify vulnerabilities of the weak state/s dependent on the relations with the 
powerful counterpart and observe what support they can get from other external 
actors. 
6. Identify domestic agents within the weak state who serve as providers of external 
influence and/or the target audience of the powerful actor. 
7. Gather the relevant research material in accordance with the chosen methodology and 
time framing. 
8. Depict the causal process of transformation of linkage to leverage by the dominant 
actor given the points of concentration of linkage, vulnerabilities of the target state/s, 
and involvement of various agents. 
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9. For the convenience of the research and deeper understanding of the process it would 
be useful to discriminate between hard and soft effects of leverage possibly on the 
basis of presence and absence of a threat to the sovereignty of the target state. 
10. Discuss the results of analysis and continuity or alterations of the relations between 
the dominant and dependent parties. 
As every newly understood concept, linkage-leverage nexus requires careful employment. A 
researcher must pay attention to the difficulties of choosing proper methods and setting right 
framing as a scope of research material depends much on this. If a researcher does not have much 
time and enough resources at his disposal (for example, a Master student) he should choose a 
pragmatic method focused on concrete policy practices, for example, in political linguistics it could 
be “speech acts” of decision-makers. If short on time it would be better for a researcher to employ 
analytical framework based on linkage-leverage nexus to set a short period for the investigation. I 
advise that the starting point for the analysis of a regional actor’s foreign policy to be a radical 
change in the global, regional or internal political environment that pushed the actor to active 
transformation of linkage to leverage in order to secure its position (influence) and achieve concrete 
foreign policy goals. At the same time, it is important to bear in mind that the density of links is a 
result of a longstanding multidimensional cooperation among the partners, and therefore a 
retrospective glance to history is essential for comprehending the process. In this regard, the cultural 
links, deep-rooted in language, ethnicity, religion, common historical memory, etc. should not be 
neglected. This is especially important when we analyse asymmetrical interdependence of 
international actors at a regional scale and meso-level of their relations. 
I would also urge future researchers who will use this analytical approach in their study of 
regional politics to give consideration to further conceptualization of ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ leverage. As 
it was stated above, in my opinion, a proper discrimination between ‘softness’ and ‘hardness’ 
should be based on the effect the leverage brings rather than merely its nature and sources. 
However, the IR grand question, what effect can be considered ‘soft’ and which one can be seen as 
‘hard’, still requires further elaborations. Obviously, different agents within the state can treat the 
same external leverage and its effect differently. This thesis proposes to proceed from the factor of 
threatened (or not threatened) sovereignty, which is based rather on a traditional understanding of 
sovereignty, i.e. from the perspective of the modern (‘Westphalian’) state. But what a differential 
factor of soft and hard leverage can be if we look from the perspective of a ‘post-modern’ state 
whose scope of sovereignty is limited by various external and internal dynamics and the state is not 
understood anymore as a ‘container’ but a ‘floating’ and non-linear polity? This question is still 
open, and I hope a differential factor between ‘soft’ and ‘hard’ types of leverage that would be more 
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Annex 1: Share of Russia, CIS and the EU in Moldova’s trade turnover (2003-2012) 




Source: Calculations based on the data from the National Bureau of Statistics of the Republic of Moldova, External Trade, 2012, 
http://www.statistica.md/category.php?l=en&idc=336 (accessed 14.09.2013) 
Year 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Total trade 
turnover 
2192280,7 2753707,5 3383210,1 3743545,4 5029574,8 6489875,1 4561250,5 5396775,2 7408085,6 7374808,3 
CIS 1016917,0 1267187,4 1456434,8 1444427,5 1882586,7 2360255,0 1632197,8 1880854,8 2632680,9 2551840,7 
EU 940882,1 1175534,1 1481961,4 1755416,4 2359912,4 2925336,1 2088524,4 2433178,5 3339297,6 3332032,0 
Russia 491333,9 565613,4 615195,9 598951,5 731339,0 979829,1 661004,4 990455,7 1448470,4 1472014,1 
CIS (%) 46,4 46,0 43,0 38,6 37,4 36,4 35,8 34,9 35,5 34,6 
EU (%) 42,9 42,7 43,8 46,9 46,9 45,1 45,8 45,1 45,1 45,2 
Russia (%) 22,4 20,5 18,2 16,0 14,5 15,1 14,5 18,4 19,6 20,0 
Russia (% 
within CIS) 
48,3 44,6 42,2 41,5 38,8 41,5 40,5 52,7 55,0 57,7 
